RPM does not require subkeys to have a valid binding signature. This could potentially result in a signature being wrongly trusted in the following (rather contrived) scenario: A malicious subkey (to which an attacker has the secret key) is added to a legitimate public key, via a process that rejects main keys but not subkeys and does not itself check binding signatures. The main key is exported and then imported into RPM.
Acknowledgments: Name: Demi M. Obenour
Statement: To exploit this flaw, an attacker must either compromise an RPM repository or convince an administrator to install an untrusted RPM or public key. It is strongly recommended to only use RPMs and public keys from trusted sources.
Upstream fix commit: https://github.com/rpm-software-management/rpm/pull/1788
This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.4 Extended Update Support Via RHSA-2022:0254 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:0254
This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Via RHSA-2022:0368 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:0368
This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.2 Extended Update Support Via RHSA-2022:0634 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:0634
This bug is now closed. Further updates for individual products will be reflected on the CVE page(s): https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2021-3521