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Red Hat Bugzilla – Attachment 297817 Details for
Bug 435773
CVE-2008-0887 gnome-screensaver using NIS auth will unlock if NIS goes away
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[patch]
patch for upstream svn / rawhide
gnome-screensaver-2.22-pwent-unlock.patch (text/plain), 7.78 KB, created by
jmccann
on 2008-03-12 17:48:12 UTC
(
hide
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Description:
patch for upstream svn / rawhide
Filename:
MIME Type:
Creator:
jmccann
Created:
2008-03-12 17:48:12 UTC
Size:
7.78 KB
patch
obsolete
>Index: gnome-screensaver/src/gnome-screensaver-dialog.c >=================================================================== >--- gnome-screensaver/src/gnome-screensaver-dialog.c (revision 1398) >+++ gnome-screensaver/src/gnome-screensaver-dialog.c (working copy) >@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ > > #include "gs-debug.h" > >+#define MAX_FAILURES 5 >+ > static gboolean verbose = FALSE; > static gboolean show_version = FALSE; > static gboolean enable_logout = FALSE; >@@ -299,8 +301,6 @@ do_auth_check (GSLockPlug *plug) > gs_lock_plug_show_message (plug, _("Authentication failed.")); > } > >- g_timeout_add (3000, (GSourceFunc)reset_idle_cb, plug); >- > printf ("NOTICE=AUTH FAILED\n"); > fflush (stdout); > >@@ -325,15 +325,28 @@ response_cb (GSLockPlug *plug, > static gboolean > auth_check_idle (GSLockPlug *plug) > { >- gboolean res; >+ gboolean res; >+ gboolean again; >+ static guint loop_counter = 0; > >+ again = TRUE; > res = do_auth_check (plug); > > if (res) { >+ again = FALSE; > g_idle_add ((GSourceFunc)quit_response_ok, NULL); >+ } else { >+ loop_counter++; >+ >+ if (loop_counter < MAX_FAILURES) { >+ g_timeout_add (3000, (GSourceFunc)reset_idle_cb, plug); >+ } else { >+ again = FALSE; >+ gtk_main_quit (); >+ } > } > >- return !res; >+ return again; > } > > static void >Index: gnome-screensaver/src/setuid.c >=================================================================== >--- gnome-screensaver/src/setuid.c (revision 1398) >+++ gnome-screensaver/src/setuid.c (working copy) >@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ uid_gid_string (uid_t uid, > return buf; > } > >-static int >+static gboolean > set_ids_by_number (uid_t uid, > gid_t gid, > char **message_ret) >@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ set_ids_by_number (uid_t uid, > > g_free (reason); > >- return 0; >+ return TRUE; > } else { > char *reason = NULL; > >@@ -141,9 +141,9 @@ set_ids_by_number (uid_t uid, > g_free (reason); > reason = NULL; > } >- >- return -1; >+ return FALSE; > } >+ return FALSE; > } > > >@@ -165,12 +165,21 @@ hack_uid (char **nolock_reason, > char **orig_uid, > char **uid_message) > { >- if (nolock_reason) >+ char *reason; >+ gboolean ret; >+ >+ ret = TRUE; >+ reason = NULL; >+ >+ if (nolock_reason != NULL) { > *nolock_reason = NULL; >- if (orig_uid) >+ } >+ if (orig_uid != NULL) { > *orig_uid = NULL; >- if (uid_message) >+ } >+ if (uid_message != NULL) { > *uid_message = NULL; >+ } > > /* Discard privileges, and set the effective user/group ids to the > real user/group ids. That is, give up our "chmod +s" rights. >@@ -181,12 +190,18 @@ hack_uid (char **nolock_reason, > uid_t uid = getuid (); > gid_t gid = getgid (); > >- if (orig_uid) >+ if (orig_uid != NULL) { > *orig_uid = uid_gid_string (euid, egid); >+ } >+ >+ if (uid != euid || gid != egid) { >+ if (! set_ids_by_number (uid, gid, uid_message)) { >+ reason = g_strdup ("unable to discard privileges."); > >- if (uid != euid || gid != egid) >- if (set_ids_by_number (uid, gid, uid_message) != 0) >- return FALSE; >+ ret = FALSE; >+ goto out; >+ } >+ } > } > > >@@ -200,81 +215,16 @@ hack_uid (char **nolock_reason, > and "USING XDM". > */ > if (getuid () == (uid_t) 0) { >- if (nolock_reason) >- *nolock_reason = g_strdup ("running as root"); >- return FALSE; >+ reason = g_strdup ("running as root"); >+ ret = FALSE; >+ goto out; > } > >- /* If we're running as root, switch to a safer user. This is above and >- beyond the fact that we've disabling locking, above -- the theory is >- that running graphics demos as root is just always a stupid thing >- to do, since they have probably never been security reviewed and are >- more likely to be buggy than just about any other kind of program. >- (And that assumes non-malicious code. There are also attacks here.) >- >- *** WARNING: DO NOT DISABLE THIS CODE! >- If you do so, you will open a security hole. See the sections >- of the xscreensaver manual titled "LOCKING AND ROOT LOGINS", >- and "USING XDM". >- */ >- if (getuid () == (uid_t) 0) { >- struct passwd *p; >- >- p = getpwnam ("nobody"); >- if (! p) p = getpwnam ("noaccess"); >- if (! p) p = getpwnam ("daemon"); >- if (! p) { >- g_warning ("running as root, and couldn't find a safer uid."); >- return FALSE; >- } >- >- if (set_ids_by_number (p->pw_uid, p->pw_gid, uid_message) != 0) >- return FALSE; >- } >- >- >- /* If there's anything even remotely funny looking about the passwd struct, >- or if we're running as some other user from the list below (a >- non-comprehensive selection of users known to be privileged in some way, >- and not normal end-users) then disable locking. If it was possible, >- switching to "nobody" would be the thing to do, but only root itself has >- the privs to do that. >- >- *** WARNING: DO NOT DISABLE THIS CODE! >- If you do so, you will open a security hole. See the sections >- of the xscreensaver manual titled "LOCKING AND ROOT LOGINS", >- and "USING XDM". >- */ >- { >- uid_t uid = getuid (); /* get it again */ >- struct passwd *p = getpwuid (uid); /* get it again */ >- >- if (!p || >- uid == (uid_t) 0 || >- uid == (uid_t) -1 || >- uid == (uid_t) -2 || >- p->pw_uid == (uid_t) 0 || >- p->pw_uid == (uid_t) -1 || >- p->pw_uid == (uid_t) -2 || >- !p->pw_name || >- !*p->pw_name || >- !strcmp (p->pw_name, "root") || >- !strcmp (p->pw_name, "nobody") || >- !strcmp (p->pw_name, "noaccess") || >- !strcmp (p->pw_name, "operator") || >- !strcmp (p->pw_name, "daemon") || >- !strcmp (p->pw_name, "bin") || >- !strcmp (p->pw_name, "adm") || >- !strcmp (p->pw_name, "sys") || >- !strcmp (p->pw_name, "games")) { >- if (nolock_reason) >- *nolock_reason = g_strdup_printf ("running as %s", >- (p && p->pw_name >- && *p->pw_name >- ? p->pw_name : "<unknown>")); >- return FALSE; >- } >+ out: >+ if (nolock_reason != NULL) { >+ *nolock_reason = g_strdup (reason); > } >+ g_free (reason); > >- return TRUE; >+ return ret; > }
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bug 435773
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296672
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