Attachment 297817 Details for Bug 435773 – patch for upstream svn / rawhide

[patch] patch for upstream svn / rawhide

gnome-screensaver-2.22-pwent-unlock.patch (text/plain), 7.78 KB, created by jmccann on 2008-03-12 17:48:12 UTC

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Creator: jmccann

Created: 2008-03-12 17:48:12 UTC

Size: 7.78 KB

patch

obsolete

>Index: gnome-screensaver/src/gnome-screensaver-dialog.c
>===================================================================
>--- gnome-screensaver/src/gnome-screensaver-dialog.c	(revision 1398)
>+++ gnome-screensaver/src/gnome-screensaver-dialog.c	(working copy)
>@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@
> 
> #include "gs-debug.h"
> 
>+#define MAX_FAILURES 5
>+
> static gboolean verbose        = FALSE;
> static gboolean show_version   = FALSE;
> static gboolean enable_logout  = FALSE;
>@@ -299,8 +301,6 @@ do_auth_check (GSLockPlug *plug)
>                         gs_lock_plug_show_message (plug, _("Authentication failed."));
>                 }
> 
>-                g_timeout_add (3000, (GSourceFunc)reset_idle_cb, plug);
>-
>                 printf ("NOTICE=AUTH FAILED\n");
>                 fflush (stdout);
> 
>@@ -325,15 +325,28 @@ response_cb (GSLockPlug *plug,
> static gboolean
> auth_check_idle (GSLockPlug *plug)
> {
>-        gboolean res;
>+        gboolean     res;
>+        gboolean     again;
>+        static guint loop_counter = 0;
> 
>+        again = TRUE;
>         res = do_auth_check (plug);
> 
>         if (res) {
>+                again = FALSE;
>                 g_idle_add ((GSourceFunc)quit_response_ok, NULL);
>+        } else {
>+                loop_counter++;
>+
>+                if (loop_counter < MAX_FAILURES) {
>+                        g_timeout_add (3000, (GSourceFunc)reset_idle_cb, plug);
>+                } else {
>+                        again = FALSE;
>+                        gtk_main_quit ();
>+                }
>         }
> 
>-        return !res;
>+        return again;
> }
> 
> static void
>Index: gnome-screensaver/src/setuid.c
>===================================================================
>--- gnome-screensaver/src/setuid.c	(revision 1398)
>+++ gnome-screensaver/src/setuid.c	(working copy)
>@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ uid_gid_string (uid_t uid,
>         return buf;
> }
> 
>-static int
>+static gboolean
> set_ids_by_number (uid_t  uid,
>                    gid_t  gid,
>                    char **message_ret)
>@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ set_ids_by_number (uid_t  uid,
> 
>                 g_free (reason);
> 
>-                return 0;
>+                return TRUE;
>         } else {
>                 char *reason = NULL;
> 
>@@ -141,9 +141,9 @@ set_ids_by_number (uid_t  uid,
>                         g_free (reason);
>                         reason = NULL;
>                 }
>-
>-                return -1;
>+                return FALSE;
>         }
>+        return FALSE;
> }
> 
> 
>@@ -165,12 +165,21 @@ hack_uid (char **nolock_reason,
>           char **orig_uid,
>           char **uid_message)
> {
>-        if (nolock_reason)
>+        char    *reason;
>+        gboolean ret;
>+
>+        ret = TRUE;
>+        reason = NULL;
>+
>+        if (nolock_reason != NULL) {
>                 *nolock_reason = NULL;
>-        if (orig_uid)
>+        }
>+        if (orig_uid != NULL) {
>                 *orig_uid = NULL;
>-        if (uid_message)
>+        }
>+        if (uid_message != NULL) {
>                 *uid_message = NULL;
>+        }
> 
>         /* Discard privileges, and set the effective user/group ids to the
>            real user/group ids.  That is, give up our "chmod +s" rights.
>@@ -181,12 +190,18 @@ hack_uid (char **nolock_reason,
>                 uid_t uid  = getuid ();
>                 gid_t gid  = getgid ();
> 
>-                if (orig_uid)
>+                if (orig_uid != NULL) {
>                         *orig_uid = uid_gid_string (euid, egid);
>+                }
>+
>+                if (uid != euid || gid != egid) {
>+                        if (! set_ids_by_number (uid, gid, uid_message)) {
>+                                reason = g_strdup ("unable to discard privileges.");
> 
>-                if (uid != euid || gid != egid)
>-                        if (set_ids_by_number (uid, gid, uid_message) != 0)
>-                                return FALSE;
>+                                ret = FALSE;
>+                                goto out;
>+                        }
>+                }
>         }
> 
> 
>@@ -200,81 +215,16 @@ hack_uid (char **nolock_reason,
>            and "USING XDM".
>         */
>         if (getuid () == (uid_t) 0) {
>-                if (nolock_reason)
>-                        *nolock_reason = g_strdup ("running as root");
>-                return FALSE;
>+                reason = g_strdup ("running as root");
>+                ret = FALSE;
>+                goto out;
>         }
> 
>-        /* If we're running as root, switch to a safer user.  This is above and
>-           beyond the fact that we've disabling locking, above -- the theory is
>-           that running graphics demos as root is just always a stupid thing
>-           to do, since they have probably never been security reviewed and are
>-           more likely to be buggy than just about any other kind of program.
>-           (And that assumes non-malicious code.  There are also attacks here.)
>-
>-           *** WARNING: DO NOT DISABLE THIS CODE!
>-           If you do so, you will open a security hole.  See the sections
>-           of the xscreensaver manual titled "LOCKING AND ROOT LOGINS", 
>-           and "USING XDM".
>-        */
>-        if (getuid () == (uid_t) 0) {
>-                struct passwd *p;
>-
>-                p = getpwnam ("nobody");
>-                if (! p) p = getpwnam ("noaccess");
>-                if (! p) p = getpwnam ("daemon");
>-                if (! p) {
>-                        g_warning ("running as root, and couldn't find a safer uid.");
>-                        return FALSE;
>-                }
>-
>-                if (set_ids_by_number (p->pw_uid, p->pw_gid, uid_message) != 0)
>-                        return FALSE;
>-        }
>-
>-
>-        /* If there's anything even remotely funny looking about the passwd struct,
>-           or if we're running as some other user from the list below (a
>-           non-comprehensive selection of users known to be privileged in some way,
>-           and not normal end-users) then disable locking.  If it was possible,
>-           switching to "nobody" would be the thing to do, but only root itself has
>-           the privs to do that.
>-
>-           *** WARNING: DO NOT DISABLE THIS CODE!
>-           If you do so, you will open a security hole.  See the sections
>-           of the xscreensaver manual titled "LOCKING AND ROOT LOGINS",
>-           and "USING XDM".
>-        */
>-        {
>-                uid_t          uid = getuid ();		/* get it again */
>-                struct passwd *p   = getpwuid (uid);	/* get it again */
>-
>-                if (!p ||
>-                    uid == (uid_t)  0 ||
>-                    uid == (uid_t) -1 ||
>-                    uid == (uid_t) -2 ||
>-                    p->pw_uid == (uid_t)  0 ||
>-                    p->pw_uid == (uid_t) -1 ||
>-                    p->pw_uid == (uid_t) -2 ||
>-                    !p->pw_name ||
>-                    !*p->pw_name ||
>-                    !strcmp (p->pw_name, "root") ||
>-                    !strcmp (p->pw_name, "nobody") ||
>-                    !strcmp (p->pw_name, "noaccess") ||
>-                    !strcmp (p->pw_name, "operator") ||
>-                    !strcmp (p->pw_name, "daemon") ||
>-                    !strcmp (p->pw_name, "bin") ||
>-                    !strcmp (p->pw_name, "adm") ||
>-                    !strcmp (p->pw_name, "sys") ||
>-                    !strcmp (p->pw_name, "games")) {
>-                        if (nolock_reason)
>-                                *nolock_reason = g_strdup_printf ("running as %s",
>-                                                                  (p && p->pw_name
>-                                                                   && *p->pw_name
>-                                                                   ? p->pw_name : "<unknown>"));
>-                        return FALSE;
>-                }
>+ out:
>+        if (nolock_reason != NULL) {
>+                *nolock_reason = g_strdup (reason);
>         }
>+        g_free (reason);
> 
>-        return TRUE;
>+        return ret;
> }

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Attachments on bug 435773: 296671 | 296672 | 297817