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Red Hat Bugzilla – Attachment 509874 Details for
Bug 716476
CVE-2011-2502 systemtap: insufficient security check when loading uprobes kernel module
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[patch]
Don't allow path-based auth for uprobes
rhbz716476.patch (text/plain), 2.35 KB, created by
Josh Stone
on 2011-06-25 05:23:40 UTC
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Description:
Don't allow path-based auth for uprobes
Filename:
MIME Type:
Creator:
Josh Stone
Created:
2011-06-25 05:23:40 UTC
Size:
2.35 KB
patch
obsolete
>commit e75e70e736ea53078eaa9fd36a5f7186e3e2235c >Author: Josh Stone <jistone@redhat.com> >Date: Fri Jun 24 14:21:26 2011 -0700 > > rhbz716476: Don't allow path-based auth for uprobes > > For users that are only members of stapusr, and not stapdev, we only > allow loading modules that are either signed with a trusted certificate > or located in controlled paths. For the script itself, that path is > /lib/modules/.../systemtap/, and for uprobes it is the runtime. When > this policy was first written, uprobes only ever came from the runtime > path, so the path check just returned 1 always. > > Later, commit 474d17ad added an optional argument to staprun -u, to > allow the user to specify their own signed copy of uprobes to load. > Unfortunately, if presented with an unsigned module, that would still > fall back to the path check, which blissfully approved it anyway. > > Our policy is now that stapusr can only load a signed uprobes.ko, so the > path check for uprobes now unconditionally returns 0. > >diff --git a/runtime/staprun/staprun_funcs.c b/runtime/staprun/staprun_funcs.c >index 74eef9c..82754d4 100644 >--- a/runtime/staprun/staprun_funcs.c >+++ b/runtime/staprun/staprun_funcs.c >@@ -387,8 +387,10 @@ check_stap_module_path(const char *module_path, int module_fd) > } > > /* >- * Members of the 'stapusr' group can load the uprobes module freely, >- * since it is loaded from a fixed path in the installed runtime. >+ * Don't allow path-based authorization for the uprobes module at all. >+ * Members of the 'stapusr' group can load a signed uprobes module, but >+ * nothing else. Later we could consider allowing specific paths, like >+ * the installed runtime or /lib/modules/... > * > * Returns: -1 on errors, 0 on failure, 1 on success. > */ >@@ -398,7 +400,7 @@ check_uprobes_module_path ( > int module_fd __attribute__ ((unused)) > ) > { >- return 1; >+ return 0; > } > > /* >@@ -596,10 +598,8 @@ void assert_uprobes_module_permissions( > if (check_signature_rc == MODULE_ALTERED) > exit(-1); > #else >- /* If we don't have NSS, then the uprobes module is considered trusted. >- Otherwise a member of the group 'stapusr' will not be able to load it. >- */ >- check_signature_rc = MODULE_OK; >+ /* If we don't have NSS, the uprobes module is considered untrusted. */ >+ check_signature_rc = MODULE_UNTRUSTED; > #endif > > /* root can still load this module. */
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bug 716476
: 509874