Login
[x]
Log in using an account from:
Fedora Account System
Red Hat Associate
Red Hat Customer
Or login using a Red Hat Bugzilla account
Forgot Password
Login:
Hide Forgot
Create an Account
Red Hat Bugzilla – Attachment 601804 Details for
Bug 845106
CVE-2012-3447 OpenStack-Nova: compute nodes disk image file corruption, incomplete fix for CVE-2012-3361 (OSSA 2012-011)
[?]
New
Simple Search
Advanced Search
My Links
Browse
Requests
Reports
Current State
Search
Tabular reports
Graphical reports
Duplicates
Other Reports
User Changes
Plotly Reports
Bug Status
Bug Severity
Non-Defaults
|
Product Dashboard
Help
Page Help!
Bug Writing Guidelines
What's new
Browser Support Policy
5.0.4.rh83 Release notes
FAQ
Guides index
User guide
Web Services
Contact
Legal
This site requires JavaScript to be enabled to function correctly, please enable it.
[patch]
Patch for CVE-2012-3447 for folsom
CVE-2012-3447-folsom.patch (text/plain), 1.35 KB, created by
Kurt Seifried
on 2012-08-01 19:17:37 UTC
(
hide
)
Description:
Patch for CVE-2012-3447 for folsom
Filename:
MIME Type:
Creator:
Kurt Seifried
Created:
2012-08-01 19:17:37 UTC
Size:
1.35 KB
patch
obsolete
>From 6f4751d6bddc12c910b7d72ec1354d3b9d6d884a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >From: =?UTF-8?q?P=C3=A1draig=20Brady?= <pbrady@redhat.com> >Date: Tue, 31 Jul 2012 14:05:35 +0100 >Subject: [PATCH] Prohibit file injection writing to host filesystem > >This is a refinement of the previous fix in commit 2427d4a9, >which does the file name canonicalization as the root user. >This is required so that guest images could not for example, >protect malicious symlinks in a directory only readable by root. > >Change-Id: I7f7cdeeffadebae7451e1e13f73f1313a7df9c5c >--- > nova/virt/disk/api.py | 4 +++- > 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) > >diff --git a/nova/virt/disk/api.py b/nova/virt/disk/api.py >index af14e3f..5b79e14 100644 >--- a/nova/virt/disk/api.py >+++ b/nova/virt/disk/api.py >@@ -335,7 +335,9 @@ def _join_and_check_path_within_fs(fs, *args): > mounted guest fs. Trying to be clever and specifying a > path with '..' in it will hit this safeguard. > ''' >- absolute_path = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(fs, *args)) >+ absolute_path, _err = utils.execute('readlink', '-m', >+ os.path.join(fs, *args), >+ run_as_root=True) > if not absolute_path.startswith(os.path.realpath(fs) + '/'): > raise exception.Invalid(_('injected file path not valid')) > return absolute_path >-- >1.7.6.4 >
You cannot view the attachment while viewing its details because your browser does not support IFRAMEs.
View the attachment on a separate page
.
View Attachment As Diff
View Attachment As Raw
Actions:
View
|
Diff
Attachments on
bug 845106
:
601803
| 601804