Attachment 848381 Details for Bug 1051670 – CVE-2014-0006-havana.diff

[patch] CVE-2014-0006-havana.diff

CVE-2014-0006-havana.diff (text/plain), 2.34 KB, created by Kurt Seifried on 2014-01-10 20:46:48 UTC

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Creator: Kurt Seifried

Created: 2014-01-10 20:46:48 UTC

Size: 2.34 KB

patch

obsolete

>commit 6c378b4b65524ea3b485c47d829ed0aebbdb86c0
>Author: Samuel Merritt <sam@swiftstack.com>
>Date:   Fri Jan 3 09:26:11 2014 -0800
>
>    Backported tempurl const time compare for 1.10.0
>    
>    Change-Id: I6db8f9a568dab8403ed74a83ba0c9548f06425e1
>
>diff --git a/swift/common/middleware/tempurl.py b/swift/common/middleware/tempurl.py
>index ffc1431..ae2f4a1 100644
>--- a/swift/common/middleware/tempurl.py
>+++ b/swift/common/middleware/tempurl.py
>@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ from urlparse import parse_qs
> 
> from swift.proxy.controllers.base import get_account_info
> from swift.common.swob import HeaderKeyDict
>-from swift.common.utils import split_path
>+from swift.common.utils import split_path, streq_const_time
> 
> 
> #: Default headers to remove from incoming requests. Simply a whitespace
>@@ -267,17 +267,20 @@ class TempURL(object):
>         if not keys:
>             return self._invalid(env, start_response)
>         if env['REQUEST_METHOD'] == 'HEAD':
>-            hmac_vals = self._get_hmacs(env, temp_url_expires, keys,
>-                                        request_method='GET')
>-            if temp_url_sig not in hmac_vals:
>-                hmac_vals = self._get_hmacs(env, temp_url_expires, keys,
>-                                            request_method='PUT')
>-                if temp_url_sig not in hmac_vals:
>-                    return self._invalid(env, start_response)
>+            hmac_vals = (self._get_hmacs(env, temp_url_expires, keys,
>+                                         request_method='GET') +
>+                         self._get_hmacs(env, temp_url_expires, keys,
>+                                         request_method='PUT'))
>         else:
>             hmac_vals = self._get_hmacs(env, temp_url_expires, keys)
>-            if temp_url_sig not in hmac_vals:
>-                return self._invalid(env, start_response)
>+
>+        # While it's true that any() will short-circuit, this doesn't affect
>+        # the timing-attack resistance since the only way this will
>+        # short-circuit is when a valid signature is passed in.
>+        is_valid_hmac = any(streq_const_time(temp_url_sig, h)
>+                            for h in hmac_vals)
>+        if not is_valid_hmac:
>+            return self._invalid(env, start_response)
>         self._clean_incoming_headers(env)
>         env['swift.authorize'] = lambda req: None
>         env['swift.authorize_override'] = True

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