Attachment 861787 Details for Bug 1036883 – /etc/libvirt/qemu.conf

/etc/libvirt/qemu.conf

qemu.conf (text/plain), 14.47 KB, created by Xavier on 2014-02-11 13:38:28 UTC

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Creator: Xavier

Created: 2014-02-11 13:38:28 UTC

Size: 14.47 KB

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obsolete

># Master configuration file for the QEMU driver.
># All settings described here are optional - if omitted, sensible
># defaults are used.
>
># VNC is configured to listen on 127.0.0.1 by default.
># To make it listen on all public interfaces, uncomment
># this next option.
>#
># NB, strong recommendation to enable TLS + x509 certificate
># verification when allowing public access
>#
>#vnc_listen = "0.0.0.0"
>
># Enable this option to have VNC served over an automatically created
># unix socket. This prevents unprivileged access from users on the
># host machine, though most VNC clients do not support it.
>#
># This will only be enabled for VNC configurations that do not have
># a hardcoded 'listen' or 'socket' value. This setting takes preference
># over vnc_listen.
>#
>#vnc_auto_unix_socket = 1
>
># Enable use of TLS encryption on the VNC server. This requires
># a VNC client which supports the VeNCrypt protocol extension.
># Examples include vinagre, virt-viewer, virt-manager and vencrypt
># itself. UltraVNC, RealVNC, TightVNC do not support this
>#
># It is necessary to setup CA and issue a server certificate
># before enabling this.
>#
>#vnc_tls = 1
>
>
># Use of TLS requires that x509 certificates be issued. The
># default it to keep them in /etc/pki/libvirt-vnc. This directory
># must contain
>#
>#  ca-cert.pem - the CA master certificate
>#  server-cert.pem - the server certificate signed with ca-cert.pem
>#  server-key.pem  - the server private key
>#
># This option allows the certificate directory to be changed
>#
>#vnc_tls_x509_cert_dir = "/etc/pki/libvirt-vnc"
>
>
># The default TLS configuration only uses certificates for the server
># allowing the client to verify the server's identity and establish
># an encrypted channel.
>#
># It is possible to use x509 certificates for authentication too, by
># issuing a x509 certificate to every client who needs to connect.
>#
># Enabling this option will reject any client who does not have a
># certificate signed by the CA in /etc/pki/libvirt-vnc/ca-cert.pem
>#
>#vnc_tls_x509_verify = 1
>
>
># The default VNC password. Only 8 letters are significant for
># VNC passwords. This parameter is only used if the per-domain
># XML config does not already provide a password. To allow
># access without passwords, leave this commented out. An empty
># string will still enable passwords, but be rejected by QEMU,
># effectively preventing any use of VNC. Obviously change this
># example here before you set this.
>#
>#vnc_password = "XYZ12345"
>
>
># Enable use of SASL encryption on the VNC server. This requires
># a VNC client which supports the SASL protocol extension.
># Examples include vinagre, virt-viewer and virt-manager
># itself. UltraVNC, RealVNC, TightVNC do not support this
>#
># It is necessary to configure /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf to choose
># the desired SASL plugin (eg, GSSPI for Kerberos)
>#
>#vnc_sasl = 1
>
>
># The default SASL configuration file is located in /etc/sasl2/
># When running libvirtd unprivileged, it may be desirable to
># override the configs in this location. Set this parameter to
># point to the directory, and create a qemu.conf in that location
>#
>#vnc_sasl_dir = "/some/directory/sasl2"
>
>
># QEMU implements an extension for providing audio over a VNC connection,
># though if your VNC client does not support it, your only chance for getting
># sound output is through regular audio backends. By default, libvirt will
># disable all QEMU sound backends if using VNC, since they can cause
># permissions issues. Enabling this option will make libvirtd honor the
># QEMU_AUDIO_DRV environment variable when using VNC.
>#
>#vnc_allow_host_audio = 0
>
>
>
># SPICE is configured to listen on 127.0.0.1 by default.
># To make it listen on all public interfaces, uncomment
># this next option.
>#
># NB, strong recommendation to enable TLS + x509 certificate
># verification when allowing public access
>#
>#spice_listen = "0.0.0.0"
>
>
># Enable use of TLS encryption on the SPICE server.
>#
># It is necessary to setup CA and issue a server certificate
># before enabling this.
>#
>#spice_tls = 1
>
>
># Use of TLS requires that x509 certificates be issued. The
># default it to keep them in /etc/pki/libvirt-spice. This directory
># must contain
>#
>#  ca-cert.pem - the CA master certificate
>#  server-cert.pem - the server certificate signed with ca-cert.pem
>#  server-key.pem  - the server private key
>#
># This option allows the certificate directory to be changed.
>#
>#spice_tls_x509_cert_dir = "/etc/pki/libvirt-spice"
>
>
># The default SPICE password. This parameter is only used if the
># per-domain XML config does not already provide a password. To
># allow access without passwords, leave this commented out. An
># empty string will still enable passwords, but be rejected by
># QEMU, effectively preventing any use of SPICE. Obviously change
># this example here before you set this.
>#
>#spice_password = "XYZ12345"
>
>
># Override the port for creating both VNC and SPICE sessions (min).
># This defaults to 5900 and increases for consecutive sessions
># or when ports are occupied, until it hits the maximum.
>#
># Minimum must be greater than or equal to 5900 as lower number would
># result into negative vnc display number.
>#
># Maximum must be less than 65536, because higher numbers do not make
># sense as a port number.
>#
>#remote_display_port_min = 5900
>#remote_display_port_max = 65535
>
>
># The default security driver is SELinux. If SELinux is disabled
># on the host, then the security driver will automatically disable
># itself. If you wish to disable QEMU SELinux security driver while
># leaving SELinux enabled for the host in general, then set this
># to 'none' instead. It's also possible to use more than one security
># driver at the same time, for this use a list of names separated by
># comma and delimited by square brackets. For example:
>#
>#       security_driver = [ "selinux", "apparmor" ]
>#
># Notes: The DAC security driver is always enabled; as a result, the
># value of security_driver cannot contain "dac".  The value "none" is
># a special value; security_driver can be set to that value in
># isolation, but it cannot appear in a list of drivers.
>#
>#security_driver = "selinux"
>
># If set to non-zero, then the default security labeling
># will make guests confined. If set to zero, then guests
># will be unconfined by default. Defaults to 1.
>#security_default_confined = 1
>
># If set to non-zero, then attempts to create unconfined
># guests will be blocked. Defaults to 0.
>#security_require_confined = 1
>
># The user for QEMU processes run by the system instance. It can be
># specified as a user name or as a user id. The qemu driver will try to
># parse this value first as a name and then, if the name doesn't exist,
># as a user id.
>#
># Since a sequence of digits is a valid user name, a leading plus sign
># can be used to ensure that a user id will not be interpreted as a user
># name.
>#
># Some examples of valid values are:
>#
>#       user = "qemu"   # A user named "qemu"
>#       user = "+0"     # Super user (uid=0)
>#       user = "100"    # A user named "100" or a user with uid=100
>#
>#user = "root"
>
># The group for QEMU processes run by the system instance. It can be
># specified in a similar way to user.
>#group = "root"
>
># Whether libvirt should dynamically change file ownership
># to match the configured user/group above. Defaults to 1.
># Set to 0 to disable file ownership changes.
>#dynamic_ownership = 1
>
>
># What cgroup controllers to make use of with QEMU guests
>#
>#  - 'cpu' - use for schedular tunables
>#  - 'devices' - use for device whitelisting
>#  - 'memory' - use for memory tunables
>#  - 'blkio' - use for block devices I/O tunables
>#  - 'cpuset' - use for CPUs and memory nodes
>#  - 'cpuacct' - use for CPUs statistics.
>#
># NB, even if configured here, they won't be used unless
># the administrator has mounted cgroups, e.g.:
>#
>#  mkdir /dev/cgroup
>#  mount -t cgroup -o devices,cpu,memory,blkio,cpuset none /dev/cgroup
>#
># They can be mounted anywhere, and different controllers
># can be mounted in different locations. libvirt will detect
># where they are located.
>#
>#cgroup_controllers = [ "cpu", "devices", "memory", "blkio", "cpuset", "cpuacct" ]
>
># This is the basic set of devices allowed / required by
># all virtual machines.
>#
># As well as this, any configured block backed disks,
># all sound device, and all PTY devices are allowed.
>#
># This will only need setting if newer QEMU suddenly
># wants some device we don't already know about.
>#
>#cgroup_device_acl = [
>#    "/dev/null", "/dev/full", "/dev/zero",
>#    "/dev/random", "/dev/urandom",
>#    "/dev/ptmx", "/dev/kvm", "/dev/kqemu",
>#    "/dev/rtc","/dev/hpet"
>#]
>
>
># The default format for Qemu/KVM guest save images is raw; that is, the
># memory from the domain is dumped out directly to a file.  If you have
># guests with a large amount of memory, however, this can take up quite
># a bit of space.  If you would like to compress the images while they
># are being saved to disk, you can also set "lzop", "gzip", "bzip2", or "xz"
># for save_image_format.  Note that this means you slow down the process of
># saving a domain in order to save disk space; the list above is in descending
># order by performance and ascending order by compression ratio.
>#
># save_image_format is used when you use 'virsh save' at scheduled
># saving, and it is an error if the specified save_image_format is
># not valid, or the requested compression program can't be found.
>#
># dump_image_format is used when you use 'virsh dump' at emergency
># crashdump, and if the specified dump_image_format is not valid, or
># the requested compression program can't be found, this falls
># back to "raw" compression.
>#
>#save_image_format = "raw"
>#dump_image_format = "raw"
>
># When a domain is configured to be auto-dumped when libvirtd receives a
># watchdog event from qemu guest, libvirtd will save dump files in directory
># specified by auto_dump_path. Default value is /var/lib/libvirt/qemu/dump
>#
>#auto_dump_path = "/var/lib/libvirt/qemu/dump"
>
># When a domain is configured to be auto-dumped, enabling this flag
># has the same effect as using the VIR_DUMP_BYPASS_CACHE flag with the
># virDomainCoreDump API.  That is, the system will avoid using the
># file system cache while writing the dump file, but may cause
># slower operation.
>#
>#auto_dump_bypass_cache = 0
>
># When a domain is configured to be auto-started, enabling this flag
># has the same effect as using the VIR_DOMAIN_START_BYPASS_CACHE flag
># with the virDomainCreateWithFlags API.  That is, the system will
># avoid using the file system cache when restoring any managed state
># file, but may cause slower operation.
>#
>#auto_start_bypass_cache = 0
>
># If provided by the host and a hugetlbfs mount point is configured,
># a guest may request huge page backing.  When this mount point is
># unspecified here, determination of a host mount point in /proc/mounts
># will be attempted.  Specifying an explicit mount overrides detection
># of the same in /proc/mounts.  Setting the mount point to "" will
># disable guest hugepage backing.
>#
># NB, within this mount point, guests will create memory backing files
># in a location of  $MOUNTPOINT/libvirt/qemu
>#
>#hugetlbfs_mount = "/dev/hugepages"
>
>
># If clear_emulator_capabilities is enabled, libvirt will drop all
># privileged capabilities of the QEmu/KVM emulator. This is enabled by
># default.
>#
># Warning: Disabling this option means that a compromised guest can
># exploit the privileges and possibly do damage to the host.
>#
>#clear_emulator_capabilities = 1
>
>
># If enabled, libvirt will have QEMU set its process name to
># "qemu:VM_NAME", where VM_NAME is the name of the VM. The QEMU
># process will appear as "qemu:VM_NAME" in process listings and
># other system monitoring tools. By default, QEMU does not set
># its process title, so the complete QEMU command (emulator and
># its arguments) appear in process listings.
>#
>#set_process_name = 1
>
>
># If max_processes is set to a positive integer, libvirt will use
># it to set the maximum number of processes that can be run by qemu
># user. This can be used to override default value set by host OS.
># The same applies to max_files which sets the limit on the maximum
># number of opened files.
>#
>#max_processes = 0
>#max_files = 0
>
>
>
># mac_filter enables MAC addressed based filtering on bridge ports.
># This currently requires ebtables to be installed.
>#
>#mac_filter = 1
>
>
># By default, PCI devices below non-ACS switch are not allowed to be assigned
># to guests. By setting relaxed_acs_check to 1 such devices will be allowed to
># be assigned to guests.
>#
>#relaxed_acs_check = 1
>
>
># If allow_disk_format_probing is enabled, libvirt will probe disk
># images to attempt to identify their format, when not otherwise
># specified in the XML. This is disabled by default.
>#
># WARNING: Enabling probing is a security hole in almost all
># deployments. It is strongly recommended that users update their
># guest XML <disk> elements to include  <driver type='XXXX'/>
># elements instead of enabling this option.
>#
>#allow_disk_format_probing = 1
>
>
># To enable 'Sanlock' project based locking of the file
># content (to prevent two VMs writing to the same
># disk), uncomment this
>#
>#lock_manager = "sanlock"
>
>
>
># Set limit of maximum APIs queued on one domain. All other APIs
># over this threshold will fail on acquiring job lock. Specially,
># setting to zero turns this feature off.
># Note, that job lock is per domain.
>#
>#max_queued = 0
>
>###################################################################
># Keepalive protocol:
># This allows qemu driver to detect broken connections to remote
># libvirtd during peer-to-peer migration.  A keepalive message is
># sent to the deamon after keepalive_interval seconds of inactivity
># to check if the deamon is still responding; keepalive_count is a
># maximum number of keepalive messages that are allowed to be sent
># to the deamon without getting any response before the connection
># is considered broken.  In other words, the connection is
># automatically closed approximately after
># keepalive_interval * (keepalive_count + 1) seconds since the last
># message received from the deamon.  If keepalive_interval is set to
># -1, qemu driver will not send keepalive requests during
># peer-to-peer migration; however, the remote libvirtd can still
># send them and source libvirtd will send responses.  When
># keepalive_count is set to 0, connections will be automatically
># closed after keepalive_interval seconds of inactivity without
># sending any keepalive messages.
>#
>#keepalive_interval = 5
>#keepalive_count = 5
>
>
>
># Use seccomp syscall whitelisting in QEMU.
># 1 = on, 0 = off, -1 = use QEMU default
># Defaults to -1.
>#
>#seccomp_sandbox = 1
>## beginning of configuration section by vdsm-4.10.3
>dynamic_ownership=0
>spice_tls=0
>save_image_format="lzop"
>lock_manager="sanlock"
>auto_dump_path="/var/log/core"
>## end of configuration section by vdsm-4.10.3

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Attachments on bug 1036883: 861771 | 861772 | 861786 | 861787