Attachment 901373 Details for Bug 1103586 – Upstream patch

[patch] Upstream patch

openssl-CVE-2014-0224.patch (text/plain), 3.32 KB, created by Huzaifa S. Sidhpurwala on 2014-06-02 08:30:26 UTC

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Creator: Huzaifa S. Sidhpurwala

Created: 2014-06-02 08:30:26 UTC

Size: 3.32 KB

patch

obsolete

>commit a5852a6db4b36f91d6254b2d8757f125e6e8e5cb
>Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
>Date:   Fri May 16 12:55:16 2014 +0100
>
>    Additional CVE-2014-0224 protection.
>    
>    Return a fatal error if an attempt is made to use a zero length
>    master secret.
>
>diff --git a/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
>index 98c36e6..59011e3 100644
>--- a/ssl/s3_pkt.c
>+++ b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
>@@ -1459,7 +1459,7 @@ int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
> 
> 	if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
> 		{
>-		if (s->session == NULL) 
>+		if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0)
> 			{
> 			/* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
> 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
>
>commit eaa71076511eab5e84ed36ddecbfc6cc20a48952
>Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
>Date:   Fri May 16 12:49:48 2014 +0100
>
>    Fix for CVE-2014-0224
>    
>    Only accept change cipher spec when it is expected instead of at any
>    time. This prevents premature setting of session keys before the master
>    secret is determined which an attacker could use as a MITM attack.
>    
>    Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for reporting this issue
>    and providing the initial fix this patch is based on.
>
>diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
>index a6b3c01..d35376d 100644
>--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
>+++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
>@@ -559,6 +559,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
> 		case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
> 		case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
> 
>+			s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
> 			ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
> 				SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
> 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
>diff --git a/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
>index 6bc8bf9..98c36e6 100644
>--- a/ssl/s3_pkt.c
>+++ b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
>@@ -1316,6 +1316,15 @@ start:
> 			goto f_err;
> 			}
> 
>+		if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK))
>+			{
>+			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
>+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
>+			goto f_err;
>+			}
>+
>+		s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
>+
> 		rr->length=0;
> 
> 		if (s->msg_callback)
>diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
>index 4de9d19..29f8b14 100644
>--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
>+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
>@@ -673,6 +673,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
> 		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
> 		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
> 
>+			s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
> 			/* we should decide if we expected this one */
> 			ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
> 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
>@@ -700,6 +701,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
> 
> 		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
> 		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
>+			s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
> 			ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
> 				SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
> 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
>@@ -770,7 +772,10 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
> 				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
> #else
> 				if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
>+					{
>+					s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
> 					s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
>+					}
> 				else
> 					s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
> #endif
>diff --git a/ssl/ssl3.h b/ssl/ssl3.h
>index cb8b249..4ac4199 100644
>--- a/ssl/ssl3.h
>+++ b/ssl/ssl3.h
>@@ -388,6 +388,7 @@ typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st
> #define TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG		0x0008
> #define TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY		0x0010
> #define TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE		0x0020
>+#define SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK			0x0040
>  
> /* SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE is set when we
>  * restart a handshake because of MS SGC and so prevents us
>

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Attachments on bug 1103586: 901373