Login
[x]
Log in using an account from:
Fedora Account System
Red Hat Associate
Red Hat Customer
Or login using a Red Hat Bugzilla account
Forgot Password
Login:
Hide Forgot
Create an Account
Red Hat Bugzilla – Attachment 924724 Details for
Bug 1127504
CVE-2014-3511 openssl: TLS protocol downgrade attack
[?]
New
Simple Search
Advanced Search
My Links
Browse
Requests
Reports
Current State
Search
Tabular reports
Graphical reports
Duplicates
Other Reports
User Changes
Plotly Reports
Bug Status
Bug Severity
Non-Defaults
|
Product Dashboard
Help
Page Help!
Bug Writing Guidelines
What's new
Browser Support Policy
5.0.4.rh83 Release notes
FAQ
Guides index
User guide
Web Services
Contact
Legal
This site requires JavaScript to be enabled to function correctly, please enable it.
[patch]
CVE-2014-3511 patch
file_1127504.txt (text/plain), 2.10 KB, created by
Loganaden Velvindron
on 2014-08-07 07:13:40 UTC
(
hide
)
Description:
CVE-2014-3511 patch
Filename:
MIME Type:
Creator:
Loganaden Velvindron
Created:
2014-08-07 07:13:40 UTC
Size:
2.10 KB
patch
obsolete
>--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s23_srvr.c.orig 2013-02-11 19:26:04.000000000 +0400 >+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s23_srvr.c 2014-08-07 11:08:32.747362924 +0400 >@@ -348,23 +348,19 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s) > * Client Hello message, this would be difficult, and we'd have > * to read more records to find out. > * No known SSL 3.0 client fragments ClientHello like this, >- * so we simply assume TLS 1.0 to avoid protocol version downgrade >- * attacks. */ >+ * so we simply reject such connections to avoid >+ * protocol version downgrade attacks. */ > if (p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 6) > { >-#if 0 > SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL); > goto err; >-#else >- v[1] = TLS1_VERSION_MINOR; >-#endif > } > /* if major version number > 3 set minor to a value > * which will use the highest version 3 we support. > * If TLS 2.0 ever appears we will need to revise > * this.... > */ >- else if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) >+ if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) > v[1]=0xff; > else > v[1]=p[10]; /* minor version according to client_version */ >@@ -444,14 +440,34 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s) > v[0] = p[3]; /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */ > v[1] = p[4]; > >+ /* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2 >+ * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS >+ * record. It's format is: >+ * Byte Content >+ * 0-1 msg_length >+ * 2 msg_type >+ * 3-4 version >+ * 5-6 cipher_spec_length >+ * 7-8 session_id_length >+ * 9-10 challenge_length >+ * ... ... >+ */ > n=((p[0]&0x7f)<<8)|p[1]; > if (n > (1024*4)) > { > SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE); > goto err; > } >+ if (n < 9) >+ { >+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); >+ goto err; >+ } > > j=ssl23_read_bytes(s,n+2); >+ /* We previously read 11 bytes, so if j > 0, we must have >+ * j == n+2 == s->packet_length. We have at least 11 valid >+ * packet bytes. */ > if (j <= 0) return(j); > > ssl3_finish_mac(s, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2);
You cannot view the attachment while viewing its details because your browser does not support IFRAMEs.
View the attachment on a separate page
.
View Attachment As Diff
View Attachment As Raw
Actions:
View
|
Diff
Attachments on
bug 1127504
: 924724