Attachment 926622 Details for Bug 1129950 – 1.4 patch

[patch] 1.4 patch

reverse-1.4.diff (text/plain), 3.17 KB, created by Murray McAllister on 2014-08-14 04:39:17 UTC

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Creator: Murray McAllister

Created: 2014-08-14 04:39:17 UTC

Size: 3.17 KB

patch

obsolete

>commit c2fe73133b62a1d9e8f7a6b43966570b14618d7e
>Author: Florian Apolloner <florian@apolloner.eu>
>Date:   Thu Jul 17 21:59:28 2014 +0200
>
>    [1.4.x] Prevented reverse() from generating URLs pointing to other hosts.
>    
>    This is a security fix. Disclosure following shortly.
>
>diff --git a/django/core/urlresolvers.py b/django/core/urlresolvers.py
>index 6d75cb7..006bb19 100644
>--- a/django/core/urlresolvers.py
>+++ b/django/core/urlresolvers.py
>@@ -406,6 +406,8 @@ class RegexURLResolver(LocaleRegexProvider):
>                     unicode_kwargs = dict([(k, force_unicode(v)) for (k, v) in kwargs.items()])
>                     candidate = (prefix_norm + result) % unicode_kwargs
>                 if re.search(u'^%s%s' % (_prefix, pattern), candidate, re.UNICODE):
>+                    if candidate.startswith('//'):
>+                        candidate = '/%%2F%s' % candidate[2:]
>                     return candidate
>         # lookup_view can be URL label, or dotted path, or callable, Any of
>         # these can be passed in at the top, but callables are not friendly in
>diff --git a/docs/releases/1.4.14.txt b/docs/releases/1.4.14.txt
>index d0032e5..28390c9 100644
>--- a/docs/releases/1.4.14.txt
>+++ b/docs/releases/1.4.14.txt
>@@ -5,3 +5,16 @@ Django 1.4.14 release notes
> *Under development*
> 
> Django 1.4.14 fixes several security issues in 1.4.13.
>+
>+:func:`~django.core.urlresolvers.reverse()` could generate URLs pointing to other hosts
>+=======================================================================================
>+
>+In certain situations, URL reversing could generate scheme-relative URLs  (URLs
>+starting with two slashes), which could unexpectedly redirect a user  to a
>+different host. An attacker could exploit this, for example, by redirecting
>+users to a phishing site designed to ask for user's passwords.
>+
>+To remedy this, URL reversing now ensures that no URL starts with two slashes
>+(//), replacing the second slash with its URL encoded counterpart (%2F). This
>+approach ensures that semantics stay the same, while making the URL relative to
>+the domain and not to the scheme.
>diff --git a/tests/regressiontests/urlpatterns_reverse/tests.py b/tests/regressiontests/urlpatterns_reverse/tests.py
>index 0ea732b..6b4a06f 100644
>--- a/tests/regressiontests/urlpatterns_reverse/tests.py
>+++ b/tests/regressiontests/urlpatterns_reverse/tests.py
>@@ -142,6 +142,9 @@ test_data = (
>     ('defaults', '/defaults_view2/3/', [], {'arg1': 3, 'arg2': 2}),
>     ('defaults', NoReverseMatch, [], {'arg1': 3, 'arg2': 3}),
>     ('defaults', NoReverseMatch, [], {'arg2': 1}),
>+
>+    # Security tests
>+    ('security', '/%2Fexample.com/security/', ['/example.com'], {}),
> )
> 
> class NoURLPatternsTests(TestCase):
>diff --git a/tests/regressiontests/urlpatterns_reverse/urls.py b/tests/regressiontests/urlpatterns_reverse/urls.py
>index 7aae7c4..0d3f8c3 100644
>--- a/tests/regressiontests/urlpatterns_reverse/urls.py
>+++ b/tests/regressiontests/urlpatterns_reverse/urls.py
>@@ -71,4 +71,7 @@ urlpatterns = patterns('',
>     (r'defaults_view2/(?P<arg1>\d+)/', 'defaults_view', {'arg2': 2}, 'defaults'),
> 
>     url('^includes/', include(other_patterns)),
>+
>+    # Security tests
>+    url('(.+)/security/$', empty_view, name='security'),
> )

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Attachments on bug 1129950: 926622 | 926623 | 926625