Attachment 947484 Details for Bug 1153548 – pluto.log

pluto.log

pluto.log (text/plain), 48.78 KB, created by Hangbin Liu on 2014-10-16 07:59:15 UTC

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Creator: Hangbin Liu

Created: 2014-10-16 07:59:15 UTC

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patch

obsolete

>nss directory plutomain: /etc/ipsec.d
>NSS Initialized
>libcap-ng support [enabled]
>FIPS HMAC integrity verification test passed
>FIPS: pluto daemon NOT running in FIPS mode
>Linux audit support [disabled]
>Starting Pluto (Libreswan Version 3.10 XFRM(netkey) KLIPS NSS DNSSEC FIPS_CHECK LABELED_IPSEC LIBCAP_NG XAUTH_PAM NETWORKMANAGER KLIPS_MAST CURL(non-NSS) LDAP(non-NSS)) pid:18719
>core dump dir: /var/run/pluto
>secrets file: /etc/ipsec.secrets
>leak-detective disabled
>SAref support [disabled]: Protocol not available
>SAbind support [disabled]: Protocol not available
>NSS crypto [enabled]
>XAUTH PAM support [enabled]
>   NAT-Traversal support  [enabled]
>| inserting event EVENT_REINIT_SECRET, timeout in 3600 seconds
>| event added at head of queue
>| inserting event EVENT_PENDING_DDNS, timeout in 60 seconds
>| event added at head of queue
>| inserting event EVENT_PENDING_PHASE2, timeout in 120 seconds
>| event added after event EVENT_PENDING_DDNS
>ike_alg_register_enc(): Activating OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC_SSH: Ok (ret=0)
>ike_alg_register_enc(): Activating OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC: Ok (ret=0)
>ike_alg_register_enc(): Activating OAKLEY_SERPENT_CBC: Ok (ret=0)
>ike_alg_register_enc(): Activating OAKLEY_AES_CBC: Ok (ret=0)
>ike_alg_register_hash(): Activating OAKLEY_SHA2_512: Ok (ret=0)
>ike_alg_register_hash(): Activating OAKLEY_SHA2_384: Ok (ret=0)
>ike_alg_register_hash(): Activating OAKLEY_SHA2_256: Ok (ret=0)
>starting up 3 crypto helpers
>started thread for crypto helper 0 (master fd 7)
>| status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 0) 22
>| crypto helper 0 waiting on fd 8
>| status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 1) 22
>| crypto helper 1 waiting on fd 10
>started thread for crypto helper 1 (master fd 9)
>started thread for crypto helper 2 (master fd 11)
>| status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 2) 22
>| crypto helper 2 waiting on fd 13
>Using Linux XFRM/NETKEY IPsec interface code on 3.10.0-175.el7.x86_64
>| process 18719 listening for PF_KEY_V2 on file descriptor 16
>| finish_pfkey_msg: K_SADB_REGISTER message 1 for AH 
>|   02 07 00 02  02 00 00 00  01 00 00 00  1f 49 00 00
>| pfkey_get: K_SADB_REGISTER message 1
>| AH registered with kernel.
>| finish_pfkey_msg: K_SADB_REGISTER message 2 for ESP 
>|   02 07 00 03  02 00 00 00  02 00 00 00  1f 49 00 00
>| pfkey_get: K_SADB_REGISTER message 2
>| kernel_alg_init(): memset(0x7f0d2b4d5840, 0, 2048) memset(0x7f0d2b4d6040, 0, 2048)
>| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: sadb_msg_len=22 sadb_supported_len=72
>| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=14, alg_id=251(ESP_KAME_NULL)
>| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: alg[0], exttype=14, satype=3, alg_id=251, alg_ivlen=0, alg_minbits=0, alg_maxbits=0, res=0, ret=1
>| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=14, alg_id=2(ESP_DES)
>| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: alg[1], exttype=14, satype=3, alg_id=2, alg_ivlen=0, alg_minbits=128, alg_maxbits=128, res=0, ret=1
>| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=14, alg_id=3(ESP_3DES)
>| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: alg[2], exttype=14, satype=3, alg_id=3, alg_ivlen=0, alg_minbits=160, alg_maxbits=160, res=0, ret=1
>| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=14, alg_id=5(ESP_IDEA)
>| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: alg[3], exttype=14, satype=3, alg_id=5, alg_ivlen=0, alg_minbits=256, alg_maxbits=256, res=0, ret=1
>| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=14, alg_id=6(ESP_CAST)
>| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: alg[4], exttype=14, satype=3, alg_id=6, alg_ivlen=0, alg_minbits=384, alg_maxbits=384, res=0, ret=1
>| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=14, alg_id=7(ESP_BLOWFISH)
>| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: alg[5], exttype=14, satype=3, alg_id=7, alg_ivlen=0, alg_minbits=512, alg_maxbits=512, res=0, ret=1
>| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=14, alg_id=8(ESP_3IDEA)
>| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: alg[6], exttype=14, satype=3, alg_id=8, alg_ivlen=0, alg_minbits=160, alg_maxbits=160, res=0, ret=1
>| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=14, alg_id=9(ESP_DES_IV32)
>| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: alg[7], exttype=14, satype=3, alg_id=9, alg_ivlen=0, alg_minbits=128, alg_maxbits=128, res=0, ret=1
>| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: sadb_msg_len=22 sadb_supported_len=88
>| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=15, alg_id=11(ESP_NULL)
>| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: alg[8], exttype=15, satype=3, alg_id=11, alg_ivlen=0, alg_minbits=0, alg_maxbits=0, res=0, ret=1
>| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=15, alg_id=2(ESP_DES)
>| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: alg[9], exttype=15, satype=3, alg_id=2, alg_ivlen=8, alg_minbits=64, alg_maxbits=64, res=0, ret=1
>| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=15, alg_id=3(ESP_3DES)
>| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: alg[10], exttype=15, satype=3, alg_id=3, alg_ivlen=8, alg_minbits=192, alg_maxbits=192, res=0, ret=1
>| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=15, alg_id=6(ESP_CAST)
>| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: alg[11], exttype=15, satype=3, alg_id=6, alg_ivlen=8, alg_minbits=40, alg_maxbits=128, res=0, ret=1
>| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=15, alg_id=7(ESP_BLOWFISH)
>| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: alg[12], exttype=15, satype=3, alg_id=7, alg_ivlen=8, alg_minbits=40, alg_maxbits=448, res=0, ret=1
>| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=15, alg_id=12(ESP_AES)
>| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: alg[13], exttype=15, satype=3, alg_id=12, alg_ivlen=8, alg_minbits=128, alg_maxbits=256, res=0, ret=1
>| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=15, alg_id=252(ESP_SERPENT)
>| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: alg[14], exttype=15, satype=3, alg_id=252, alg_ivlen=8, alg_minbits=128, alg_maxbits=256, res=0, ret=1
>| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=15, alg_id=22(ESP_CAMELLIA)
>| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: alg[15], exttype=15, satype=3, alg_id=22, alg_ivlen=8, alg_minbits=128, alg_maxbits=256, res=0, ret=1
>| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=15, alg_id=253(ESP_TWOFISH)
>| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: alg[16], exttype=15, satype=3, alg_id=253, alg_ivlen=8, alg_minbits=128, alg_maxbits=256, res=0, ret=1
>| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=15, alg_id=13(ESP_AES_CTR)
>| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: alg[17], exttype=15, satype=3, alg_id=13, alg_ivlen=8, alg_minbits=160, alg_maxbits=288, res=0, ret=1
>| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=15, alg_id=18(ESP_AES_GCM_A)
>| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=15, alg_id=19(ESP_AES_GCM_B)
>| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=15, alg_id=20(ESP_AES_GCM_C)
>| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=15, alg_id=14(ESP_AES_CCM_A)
>| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=15, alg_id=15(ESP_AES_CCM_B)
>| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=15, alg_id=16(ESP_AES_CCM_C)
>ike_alg_register_enc(): Activating aes_ccm_8: Ok (ret=0)
>Warning: failed to register algo_aes_ccm_8 for IKE
>ike_alg_register_enc(): Activating aes_ccm_12: Ok (ret=0)
>Warning: failed to register algo_aes_ccm_12 for IKE
>ike_alg_register_enc(): Activating aes_ccm_16: Ok (ret=0)
>Warning: failed to register algo_aes_ccm_16 for IKE
>ike_alg_register_enc(): Activating aes_gcm_8: Ok (ret=0)
>Warning: failed to register algo_aes_gcm_8 for IKE
>ike_alg_register_enc(): Activating aes_gcm_12: Ok (ret=0)
>Warning: failed to register algo_aes_gcm_12 for IKE
>ike_alg_register_enc(): Activating aes_gcm_16: Ok (ret=0)
>Warning: failed to register algo_aes_gcm_16 for IKE
>| Registered AEAD AES CCM/GCM algorithms
>| ESP registered with kernel.
>| finish_pfkey_msg: K_SADB_REGISTER message 3 for IPCOMP 
>|   02 07 00 09  02 00 00 00  03 00 00 00  1f 49 00 00
>| pfkey_get: K_SADB_REGISTER message 3
>| IPCOMP registered with kernel.
>| Registered AH, ESP and IPCOMP
>| Changed path to directory '/etc/ipsec.d/cacerts'
>| Changing to directory '/etc/ipsec.d/crls'
>| selinux support is enabled. 
>| inserting event EVENT_LOG_DAILY, timeout in 32001 seconds
>| event added after event EVENT_REINIT_SECRET
>| next event EVENT_PENDING_DDNS in 59 seconds
>| calling addconn helper using execve
>|  
>| *received whack message
>| entering aalg_getbyname_ike()
>| raw_alg_info_ike_add() ealg=5 aalg=2 modp_id=2, cnt=1
>| Added new connection ikev2 with policy PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_DISABLE+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_PROPOSE+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW
>| from whack: got --esp=3des-sha1
>| esp string values: 3DES(3)_000-SHA1(2)_000
>| ike (phase1) algorithm values: 3DES_CBC(5)_000-SHA1(2)_000-MODP1024(2)
>| counting wild cards for 2001:db8:1:1::1234 is 0
>| counting wild cards for 2001:db8:f:1::1 is 0
>added connection description "ikev2"
>| 2001:db8:1:1::1234<2001:0db8:0001:0001::1234>...2001:db8:f:1::1<2001:0db8:000f:0001::1>
>| ike_life: 3600s; ipsec_life: 28800s; rekey_margin: 540s; rekey_fuzz: 100%; keyingtries: 0; policy: PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+IKEV1_DISABLE+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_PROPOSE+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW
>| * processed 0 messages from cryptographic helpers 
>| next event EVENT_PENDING_DDNS in 58 seconds
>| next event EVENT_PENDING_DDNS in 58 seconds
>|  
>| *received whack message
>listening for IKE messages
>| Inspecting interface lo 
>| found lo with address 127.0.0.1
>| Inspecting interface p7p1 
>| found p7p1 with address 10.66.13.22
>| Inspecting interface p6p1 
>| found p6p1 with address 192.168.0.10
>adding interface p6p1/p6p1 192.168.0.10:500
>| NAT-Traversal: Trying new style NAT-T
>| NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup failed for new style NAT-T family IPv4 (errno=19)
>| NAT-Traversal: Trying old style NAT-T
>| NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup succeeded for old style NAT-T family IPv4
>adding interface p6p1/p6p1 192.168.0.10:4500
>adding interface p7p1/p7p1 10.66.13.22:500
>| NAT-Traversal: Trying new style NAT-T
>| NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup failed for new style NAT-T family IPv4 (errno=19)
>| NAT-Traversal: Trying old style NAT-T
>| NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup succeeded for old style NAT-T family IPv4
>adding interface p7p1/p7p1 10.66.13.22:4500
>adding interface lo/lo 127.0.0.1:500
>| NAT-Traversal: Trying new style NAT-T
>| NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup failed for new style NAT-T family IPv4 (errno=19)
>| NAT-Traversal: Trying old style NAT-T
>| NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup succeeded for old style NAT-T family IPv4
>adding interface lo/lo 127.0.0.1:4500
>| found lo with address 0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0001
>| found p6p2 with address 3ffe:0501:ffff:0101:0215:17ff:fe3c:c669
>| found p6p1 with address 3ffe:0501:ffff:0100:0215:17ff:fe3c:c668
>| found p6p1 with address 2001:0db8:0001:0001:0000:0000:0000:1234
>adding interface p6p1/p6p1 2001:db8:1:1::1234:500
>adding interface p6p1/p6p1 3ffe:501:ffff:100:215:17ff:fe3c:c668:500
>adding interface p6p2/p6p2 3ffe:501:ffff:101:215:17ff:fe3c:c669:500
>adding interface lo/lo ::1:500
>| connect_to_host_pair: 2001:db8:1:1::1234:500 2001:db8:f:1::1:500 -> hp:none 
>| certs and keys locked by 'free_preshared_secrets'
>| certs and keys unlocked by 'free_preshard_secrets'
>loading secrets from "/etc/ipsec.secrets"
>| id type added to secret(0x7f0d2c771290) PPK_PSK: %any
>| id type added to secret(0x7f0d2c771290) PPK_PSK: %any
>| Processing PSK at line 1: passed
>| certs and keys locked by 'process_secret'
>| certs and keys unlocked by 'process_secret'
>| * processed 0 messages from cryptographic helpers 
>| next event EVENT_PENDING_DDNS in 58 seconds
>| next event EVENT_PENDING_DDNS in 58 seconds
>|  
>| *received whack message
>| processing connection ikev2
>| kernel_alg_db_new() initial trans_cnt=128
>| kernel_alg_db_new() will return p_new->protoid=3, p_new->trans_cnt=1
>| kernel_alg_db_new()     trans[0]: transid=3, attr_cnt=1, attrs[0].type=5, attrs[0].val=2
>| returning new proposal from esp_info
>| creating state object #1 at 0x7f0d2c7716e0
>| processing connection ikev2
>| ICOOKIE:  77 2e f1 39  d7 5b 13 ed
>| RCOOKIE:  00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00
>| state hash entry 29
>| inserting state object #1
>| inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 0 seconds for #1
>| event added at head of queue
>| processing connection ikev2
>| Queuing pending Quick Mode with 2001:db8:f:1::1 "ikev2"
>"ikev2" #1: initiating v2 parent SA
>| crypto helper 0: pcw_work: 0
>| asking crypto helper 0 to do build_kenonce; request ID 1 (len=2768, pcw_work=0)
>| crypto helper 0 read fd: 8
>| crypto helper 0 doing build_kenonce; request ID 1
>| NSS: Value of Prime:
>|   ff ff ff ff  ff ff ff ff  c9 0f da a2  21 68 c2 34
>|   c4 c6 62 8b  80 dc 1c d1  29 02 4e 08  8a 67 cc 74
>|   02 0b be a6  3b 13 9b 22  51 4a 08 79  8e 34 04 dd
>|   ef 95 19 b3  cd 3a 43 1b  30 2b 0a 6d  f2 5f 14 37
>|   4f e1 35 6d  6d 51 c2 45  e4 85 b5 76  62 5e 7e c6
>|   f4 4c 42 e9  a6 37 ed 6b  0b ff 5c b6  f4 06 b7 ed
>|   ee 38 6b fb  5a 89 9f a5  ae 9f 24 11  7c 4b 1f e6
>|   49 28 66 51  ec e6 53 81  ff ff ff ff  ff ff ff ff
>| NSS: Value of base:
>|   02
>| #1 send_crypto_helper_request:519 st->st_calculating = TRUE;
>| deleting event for #1
>| inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_FAILED, timeout in 300 seconds for #1
>| event added after event EVENT_PENDING_PHASE2
>| NSS: generated dh priv and pub keys: 128 
>| NSS: Local DH secret (pointer): 0x7f0d1c005b20 
>| NSS: Public DH value sent(computed in NSS):
>|   ea ef 3e db  f0 29 f9 0c  f6 93 68 a2  83 ca 83 06
>|   5d b1 c4 1c  27 a0 a7 4c  2a 26 11 64  1c 10 c3 54
>|   9c f1 35 b0  83 70 94 0c  84 63 5b 8e  b5 c7 da 36
>|   5a 34 78 56  49 50 73 58  e7 2a 49 5c  e6 0f 67 0b
>|   64 e5 e5 c8  f4 fb 13 95  25 2e 5a 0a  b4 33 fc f8
>|   25 3b d3 86  1e 2c c4 10  60 f4 3a 38  eb 99 0c 65
>|   80 29 8b 25  0c 69 95 44  02 3c e7 cf  60 5a 60 14
>|   dc 0a 25 14  f7 b2 37 2b  ec 6a d9 98  2e 73 e2 b8
>| NSS: Local DH public value (pointer): 0x7f0d1c005310 
>| * processed 0 messages from cryptographic helpers 
>| next event EVENT_PENDING_DDNS in 58 seconds
>| next event EVENT_PENDING_DDNS in 58 seconds
>| Generated nonce:
>|   a1 23 d7 0a  41 90 9a f9  d8 e3 55 09  86 4e 34 e4
>| reaped addconn helper child
>|  
>| crypto helper 0 has finished work (pcw_work now 1)
>| crypto helper 0 replies to request ID 1
>| calling continuation function 0x7f0d2b1fb2b0
>| ikev2_parent_outI1_continue for #1: calculated ke+nonce, sending I1
>| processing connection ikev2
>| #1 ikev2_parent_outI1_continue:284 st->st_calculating = FALSE;
>| ikev2_parent_outI1_tail for #1
>| saving DH priv (local secret) and pub key into state struct
>| **emit ISAKMP Message:
>|    initiator cookie:
>|   77 2e f1 39  d7 5b 13 ed
>|    responder cookie:
>|   00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00
>|    next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA
>|    ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996)
>|    exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_SA_INIT
>|    flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_IKE_INIT
>|    message ID:  00 00 00 00
>| ***emit IKEv2 Security Association Payload:
>|    next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE
>|    critical bit: none
>| ****emit IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload:
>|    last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_LAST
>|    prop #: 1
>|    proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE
>|    spi size: 0
>|    # transforms: 4
>| *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload:
>|    last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST
>|    IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR
>|    IKEv2 transform ID: 3DES
>| emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8
>| *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload:
>|    last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST
>|    IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG
>|    IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96
>| emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8
>| *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload:
>|    last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST
>|    IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF
>|    IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA1
>| emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8
>| *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload:
>|    last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST
>|    IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH
>|    IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1024
>| emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8
>| emitting length of IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: 40
>| emitting length of IKEv2 Security Association Payload: 44
>| ***emit IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload:
>|    IKEv2 next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni
>|    critical bit: none
>|    DH group: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1024
>| emitting 128 raw bytes of ikev2 g^x into IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload
>| ikev2 g^x  ea ef 3e db  f0 29 f9 0c  f6 93 68 a2  83 ca 83 06
>| ikev2 g^x  5d b1 c4 1c  27 a0 a7 4c  2a 26 11 64  1c 10 c3 54
>| ikev2 g^x  9c f1 35 b0  83 70 94 0c  84 63 5b 8e  b5 c7 da 36
>| ikev2 g^x  5a 34 78 56  49 50 73 58  e7 2a 49 5c  e6 0f 67 0b
>| ikev2 g^x  64 e5 e5 c8  f4 fb 13 95  25 2e 5a 0a  b4 33 fc f8
>| ikev2 g^x  25 3b d3 86  1e 2c c4 10  60 f4 3a 38  eb 99 0c 65
>| ikev2 g^x  80 29 8b 25  0c 69 95 44  02 3c e7 cf  60 5a 60 14
>| ikev2 g^x  dc 0a 25 14  f7 b2 37 2b  ec 6a d9 98  2e 73 e2 b8
>| emitting length of IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload: 136
>| ***emit IKEv2 Nonce Payload:
>|    next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N
>|    critical bit: none
>| emitting 16 raw bytes of IKEv2 nonce into IKEv2 Nonce Payload
>| IKEv2 nonce  a1 23 d7 0a  41 90 9a f9  d8 e3 55 09  86 4e 34 e4
>| emitting length of IKEv2 Nonce Payload: 20
>|  NAT-Traversal support  [enabled] add v2N payloads.
>| natd_hash: Warning, rcookie is zero !!
>| natd_hash: hasher=0x7f0d2b4ba5c0(20)
>| natd_hash: icookie=  77 2e f1 39  d7 5b 13 ed
>| natd_hash: rcookie=  00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00
>| natd_hash: port=500
>| natd_hash: hash=  0a c6 f5 b9  8f 34 b7 c0  ab ca 31 3c  12 3b 35 16
>| natd_hash: hash=  6a 1a 9d e1
>| Adding a v2N Payload
>| ***emit IKEv2 Notify Payload:
>|    next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N
>|    critical bit: none
>|    Protocol ID: PROTO_RESERVED
>|    SPI size: 0
>|    Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP
>| emitting 20 raw bytes of Notify data into IKEv2 Notify Payload
>| Notify data  0a c6 f5 b9  8f 34 b7 c0  ab ca 31 3c  12 3b 35 16
>| Notify data  6a 1a 9d e1
>| emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 28
>| natd_hash: Warning, rcookie is zero !!
>| natd_hash: hasher=0x7f0d2b4ba5c0(20)
>| natd_hash: icookie=  77 2e f1 39  d7 5b 13 ed
>| natd_hash: rcookie=  00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00
>| natd_hash: port=500
>| natd_hash: hash=  c5 55 be 66  85 49 c6 9f  61 c5 c4 d5  4a 06 78 bd
>| natd_hash: hash=  a9 04 d0 75
>| Adding a v2N Payload
>| ***emit IKEv2 Notify Payload:
>|    next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE
>|    critical bit: none
>|    Protocol ID: PROTO_RESERVED
>|    SPI size: 0
>|    Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP
>| emitting 20 raw bytes of Notify data into IKEv2 Notify Payload
>| Notify data  c5 55 be 66  85 49 c6 9f  61 c5 c4 d5  4a 06 78 bd
>| Notify data  a9 04 d0 75
>| emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 28
>| no IKE message padding required
>| emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 284
>| sending 284 bytes for ikev2_parent_outI1_common through p6p1:500 to 2001:db8:f:1::1:500 (using #1)
>|   77 2e f1 39  d7 5b 13 ed  00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00
>|   21 20 22 08  00 00 00 00  00 00 01 1c  22 00 00 2c
>|   00 00 00 28  01 01 00 04  03 00 00 08  01 00 00 03
>|   03 00 00 08  03 00 00 02  03 00 00 08  02 00 00 02
>|   00 00 00 08  04 00 00 02  28 00 00 88  00 02 00 00
>|   ea ef 3e db  f0 29 f9 0c  f6 93 68 a2  83 ca 83 06
>|   5d b1 c4 1c  27 a0 a7 4c  2a 26 11 64  1c 10 c3 54
>|   9c f1 35 b0  83 70 94 0c  84 63 5b 8e  b5 c7 da 36
>|   5a 34 78 56  49 50 73 58  e7 2a 49 5c  e6 0f 67 0b
>|   64 e5 e5 c8  f4 fb 13 95  25 2e 5a 0a  b4 33 fc f8
>|   25 3b d3 86  1e 2c c4 10  60 f4 3a 38  eb 99 0c 65
>|   80 29 8b 25  0c 69 95 44  02 3c e7 cf  60 5a 60 14
>|   dc 0a 25 14  f7 b2 37 2b  ec 6a d9 98  2e 73 e2 b8
>|   29 00 00 14  a1 23 d7 0a  41 90 9a f9  d8 e3 55 09
>|   86 4e 34 e4  29 00 00 1c  00 00 40 04  0a c6 f5 b9
>|   8f 34 b7 c0  ab ca 31 3c  12 3b 35 16  6a 1a 9d e1
>|   00 00 00 1c  00 00 40 05  c5 55 be 66  85 49 c6 9f
>|   61 c5 c4 d5  4a 06 78 bd  a9 04 d0 75
>| deleting event for #1
>| inserting event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 10 seconds for #1
>| event added at head of queue
>| complete v2 state transition with STF_OK
>"ikev2" #1: transition from state STATE_IKEv2_START to state STATE_PARENT_I1
>"ikev2" #1: STATE_PARENT_I1: sent v2I1, expected v2R1
>| V2 microcode entry (initiate IKE_SA_INIT) has unspecified timeout_event
>| * processed 1 messages from cryptographic helpers 
>| next event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT in 10 seconds for #1
>| next event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT in 10 seconds for #1
>|  
>| next event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT in 0 seconds for #1
>| *time to handle event
>| handling event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT
>| event after this is EVENT_PENDING_DDNS in 48 seconds
>| processing connection ikev2
>| handling event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT for 2001:db8:f:1::1 "ikev2" #1 attempt 2 of 0
>| sending 284 bytes for EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT through p6p1:500 to 2001:db8:f:1::1:500 (using #1)
>|   77 2e f1 39  d7 5b 13 ed  00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00
>|   21 20 22 08  00 00 00 00  00 00 01 1c  22 00 00 2c
>|   00 00 00 28  01 01 00 04  03 00 00 08  01 00 00 03
>|   03 00 00 08  03 00 00 02  03 00 00 08  02 00 00 02
>|   00 00 00 08  04 00 00 02  28 00 00 88  00 02 00 00
>|   ea ef 3e db  f0 29 f9 0c  f6 93 68 a2  83 ca 83 06
>|   5d b1 c4 1c  27 a0 a7 4c  2a 26 11 64  1c 10 c3 54
>|   9c f1 35 b0  83 70 94 0c  84 63 5b 8e  b5 c7 da 36
>|   5a 34 78 56  49 50 73 58  e7 2a 49 5c  e6 0f 67 0b
>|   64 e5 e5 c8  f4 fb 13 95  25 2e 5a 0a  b4 33 fc f8
>|   25 3b d3 86  1e 2c c4 10  60 f4 3a 38  eb 99 0c 65
>|   80 29 8b 25  0c 69 95 44  02 3c e7 cf  60 5a 60 14
>|   dc 0a 25 14  f7 b2 37 2b  ec 6a d9 98  2e 73 e2 b8
>|   29 00 00 14  a1 23 d7 0a  41 90 9a f9  d8 e3 55 09
>|   86 4e 34 e4  29 00 00 1c  00 00 40 04  0a c6 f5 b9
>|   8f 34 b7 c0  ab ca 31 3c  12 3b 35 16  6a 1a 9d e1
>|   00 00 00 1c  00 00 40 05  c5 55 be 66  85 49 c6 9f
>|   61 c5 c4 d5  4a 06 78 bd  a9 04 d0 75
>| inserting event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 10 seconds for #1
>| event added at head of queue
>| next event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT in 10 seconds for #1
>|  
>| next event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT in 0 seconds for #1
>| *time to handle event
>| handling event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT
>| event after this is EVENT_PENDING_DDNS in 38 seconds
>| processing connection ikev2
>| handling event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT for 2001:db8:f:1::1 "ikev2" #1 attempt 2 of 0
>| sending 284 bytes for EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT through p6p1:500 to 2001:db8:f:1::1:500 (using #1)
>|   77 2e f1 39  d7 5b 13 ed  00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00
>|   21 20 22 08  00 00 00 00  00 00 01 1c  22 00 00 2c
>|   00 00 00 28  01 01 00 04  03 00 00 08  01 00 00 03
>|   03 00 00 08  03 00 00 02  03 00 00 08  02 00 00 02
>|   00 00 00 08  04 00 00 02  28 00 00 88  00 02 00 00
>|   ea ef 3e db  f0 29 f9 0c  f6 93 68 a2  83 ca 83 06
>|   5d b1 c4 1c  27 a0 a7 4c  2a 26 11 64  1c 10 c3 54
>|   9c f1 35 b0  83 70 94 0c  84 63 5b 8e  b5 c7 da 36
>|   5a 34 78 56  49 50 73 58  e7 2a 49 5c  e6 0f 67 0b
>|   64 e5 e5 c8  f4 fb 13 95  25 2e 5a 0a  b4 33 fc f8
>|   25 3b d3 86  1e 2c c4 10  60 f4 3a 38  eb 99 0c 65
>|   80 29 8b 25  0c 69 95 44  02 3c e7 cf  60 5a 60 14
>|   dc 0a 25 14  f7 b2 37 2b  ec 6a d9 98  2e 73 e2 b8
>|   29 00 00 14  a1 23 d7 0a  41 90 9a f9  d8 e3 55 09
>|   86 4e 34 e4  29 00 00 1c  00 00 40 04  0a c6 f5 b9
>|   8f 34 b7 c0  ab ca 31 3c  12 3b 35 16  6a 1a 9d e1
>|   00 00 00 1c  00 00 40 05  c5 55 be 66  85 49 c6 9f
>|   61 c5 c4 d5  4a 06 78 bd  a9 04 d0 75
>| inserting event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 20 seconds for #1
>| event added at head of queue
>| next event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT in 20 seconds for #1
>|  
>| *received 338 bytes from 2001:db8:f:1::1:500 on p6p1 (port=500)
>|   77 2e f1 39  d7 5b 13 ed  ad 40 ae 5c  0d 2e 0e ae
>|   21 20 22 20  00 00 00 00  00 00 01 52  22 00 00 2c
>|   00 00 00 28  01 01 00 04  03 00 00 08  01 00 00 03
>|   03 00 00 08  02 00 00 02  03 00 00 08  03 00 00 02
>|   00 00 00 08  04 00 00 02  28 00 00 88  00 02 00 00
>|   56 1d da 1a  9a 79 d2 2e  82 0a 81 bc  8e 7c 86 63
>|   48 19 de b2  2a 18 d2 5c  aa 44 a5 f3  d6 4a 84 4e
>|   f4 b1 17 5e  36 e6 a3 d6  a0 2f bd 57  ce 83 f0 8e
>|   d3 61 63 cf  77 b7 d0 0a  f2 a6 07 fd  1c 9d c6 69
>|   ec c8 77 97  6a 25 18 57  c3 a2 86 c8  d6 93 cf 2d
>|   c3 b9 c3 21  12 63 d6 7a  45 7b 7a a6  a3 87 62 a9
>|   bd 87 8b 98  f5 fb 81 33  df 0f b9 cd  1e 92 7d f6
>|   03 92 62 ff  90 96 24 f3  c1 5e 3b 09  da b4 0c 9b
>|   00 00 00 82  c3 3e 5d 19  7b f5 7a fc  f9 b6 7e 7c
>|   84 40 5c ed  12 9e ef 37  fe 50 cc 51  fb 24 77 19
>|   df 96 88 c9  4b c2 b5 6b  30 8b db f1  e7 23 84 88
>|   f6 86 40 84  60 40 35 3e  e6 90 5d 58  4d c0 64 a3
>|   29 13 ff ea  ec 18 e1 27  77 c3 c6 8d  25 05 9f 35
>|   51 dc e0 f0  86 a0 e9 ae  2b e2 2e 8f  cb ad 63 ff
>|   fb 1c 29 61  4d bd bf fa  95 cd 31 43  70 1d 50 ba
>|   0f 63 ba 7f  3b 5c fe 5c  f3 e7 c3 d9  41 5d 65 14
>|   af f8
>| **parse ISAKMP Message:
>|    initiator cookie:
>|   77 2e f1 39  d7 5b 13 ed
>|    responder cookie:
>|   ad 40 ae 5c  0d 2e 0e ae
>|    next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA
>|    ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996)
>|    exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_SA_INIT
>|    flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_MSG_RESPONSE
>|    message ID:  00 00 00 00
>|    length: 338
>|  processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_SA_INIT (34)
>| I am receiving an IKE Response
>| I am the IKE SA Original Initiator
>| ICOOKIE:  77 2e f1 39  d7 5b 13 ed
>| RCOOKIE:  ad 40 ae 5c  0d 2e 0e ae
>| state hash entry 15
>| parent v2 state object not found
>| ICOOKIE:  77 2e f1 39  d7 5b 13 ed
>| RCOOKIE:  00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00
>| state hash entry 29
>| parent v2 peer and cookies match on #1
>| v2 state object #1 found, in STATE_PARENT_I1
>| ICOOKIE:  77 2e f1 39  d7 5b 13 ed
>| RCOOKIE:  00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00
>| state hash entry 29
>| ICOOKIE:  77 2e f1 39  d7 5b 13 ed
>| RCOOKIE:  ad 40 ae 5c  0d 2e 0e ae
>| state hash entry 15
>| inserting state object #1
>| state found and its state is STATE_PARENT_I1
>| selected state microcode Initiator: process anti-spoofing cookie
>| #1 state_busy:1855 st != NULL && st->st_calculating == FALSE;
>| processing connection ikev2
>| Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA)
>| ***parse IKEv2 Security Association Payload:
>|    next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE
>|    critical bit: none
>|    length: 44
>| processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (len=44) 
>| Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE)
>| ***parse IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload:
>|    IKEv2 next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni
>|    critical bit: none
>|    length: 136
>|    DH group: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1024
>| processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE (len=136) 
>| Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni)
>| ***parse IKEv2 Nonce Payload:
>|    next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE
>|    critical bit: none
>|    length: 130
>| processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni (len=130) 
>| ikev2_process_payload trying next svm: Initiator: process IKE_SA_INIT reply, initiate IKE_AUTH
>| Now lets proceed with state specific processing
>| calling processor Initiator: process IKE_SA_INIT reply, initiate IKE_AUTH
>| ikev2 parent inR1: calculating g^{xy} in order to send I2
>| DH public value received:
>|   56 1d da 1a  9a 79 d2 2e  82 0a 81 bc  8e 7c 86 63
>|   48 19 de b2  2a 18 d2 5c  aa 44 a5 f3  d6 4a 84 4e
>|   f4 b1 17 5e  36 e6 a3 d6  a0 2f bd 57  ce 83 f0 8e
>|   d3 61 63 cf  77 b7 d0 0a  f2 a6 07 fd  1c 9d c6 69
>|   ec c8 77 97  6a 25 18 57  c3 a2 86 c8  d6 93 cf 2d
>|   c3 b9 c3 21  12 63 d6 7a  45 7b 7a a6  a3 87 62 a9
>|   bd 87 8b 98  f5 fb 81 33  df 0f b9 cd  1e 92 7d f6
>|   03 92 62 ff  90 96 24 f3  c1 5e 3b 09  da b4 0c 9b
>| ****parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload:
>|    last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_LAST
>|    length: 40
>|    prop #: 1
>|    proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE
>|    spi size: 0
>|    # transforms: 4
>| *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload:
>|    last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST
>|    length: 8
>|    IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR
>|    IKEv2 transform ID: 3DES
>| *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload:
>|    last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST
>|    length: 8
>|    IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF
>|    IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA1
>| *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload:
>|    last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST
>|    length: 8
>|    IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG
>|    IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96
>| *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload:
>|    last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST
>|    length: 8
>|    IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH
>|    IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1024
>| ipprotoid is '1'
>| considering Transform Type TRANS_TYPE_ENCR, TransID 3
>| encrid(3), keylen(-1), encr_keylen(-1)
>| proposal 1 succeeded encr= (policy:3DES(-1) vs offered:3DES(-1))
>| considering Transform Type TRANS_TYPE_INTEG, TransID 2
>|             succeeded integ=(policy:AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96(-1) vs offered:AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96(-1))
>| considering Transform Type TRANS_TYPE_PRF, TransID 2
>|             succeeded prf=  (policy:PRF_HMAC_SHA1(-1) vs offered:PRF_HMAC_SHA1(-1))
>| considering Transform Type TRANS_TYPE_DH, TransID 2
>|             succeeded dh=   (policy:OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1024 vs offered:OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1024)
>| calculating skeyseed using prf=PRF_HMAC_SHA1 integ=AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96 cipherkey=3DES
>| Copying DH pub key pointer to be sent to a thread helper
>| crypto helper 0: pcw_work: 0
>| asking crypto helper 0 to do compute dh (V2); request ID 2 (len=2768, pcw_work=0)
>| #1 send_crypto_helper_request:519 st->st_calculating = TRUE;
>| deleting event for #1
>| inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_FAILED, timeout in 300 seconds for #1
>| event added after event EVENT_PENDING_PHASE2
>| complete v2 state transition with STF_SUSPEND
>| * processed 0 messages from cryptographic helpers 
>| next event EVENT_PENDING_DDNS in 38 seconds
>| next event EVENT_PENDING_DDNS in 38 seconds
>| crypto helper 0 read fd: 8
>| crypto helper 0 doing compute dh (V2); request ID 2
>| peer's g:   56 1d da 1a  9a 79 d2 2e  82 0a 81 bc  8e 7c 86 63
>| peer's g:   48 19 de b2  2a 18 d2 5c  aa 44 a5 f3  d6 4a 84 4e
>| peer's g:   f4 b1 17 5e  36 e6 a3 d6  a0 2f bd 57  ce 83 f0 8e
>| peer's g:   d3 61 63 cf  77 b7 d0 0a  f2 a6 07 fd  1c 9d c6 69
>| peer's g:   ec c8 77 97  6a 25 18 57  c3 a2 86 c8  d6 93 cf 2d
>| peer's g:   c3 b9 c3 21  12 63 d6 7a  45 7b 7a a6  a3 87 62 a9
>| peer's g:   bd 87 8b 98  f5 fb 81 33  df 0f b9 cd  1e 92 7d f6
>| peer's g:   03 92 62 ff  90 96 24 f3  c1 5e 3b 09  da b4 0c 9b
>| Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: 
>| Dropped no leading zeros 128
>| calc_dh_shared(): time elapsed (OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1024): 731 usec
>| NSS: Started key computation 
>| calculating skeyseed using prf=PRF_HMAC_SHA1 integ=AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96 cipherkey=24
>| skeyid inputs (digi+NI+NR+shared) hasher: oakley_sha
>| ni:   a1 23 d7 0a  41 90 9a f9  d8 e3 55 09  86 4e 34 e4
>| nr:   c3 3e 5d 19  7b f5 7a fc  f9 b6 7e 7c  84 40 5c ed
>| nr:   12 9e ef 37  fe 50 cc 51  fb 24 77 19  df 96 88 c9
>| nr:   4b c2 b5 6b  30 8b db f1  e7 23 84 88  f6 86 40 84
>| nr:   60 40 35 3e  e6 90 5d 58  4d c0 64 a3  29 13 ff ea
>| nr:   ec 18 e1 27  77 c3 c6 8d  25 05 9f 35  51 dc e0 f0
>| nr:   86 a0 e9 ae  2b e2 2e 8f  cb ad 63 ff  fb 1c 29 61
>| nr:   4d bd bf fa  95 cd 31 43  70 1d 50 ba  0f 63 ba 7f
>| nr:   3b 5c fe 5c  f3 e7 c3 d9  41 5d 65 14  af f8
>| NSS: digisig skeyid pointer: 0x7f0d1c00d060
>| PRF+ input
>| Ni  a1 23 d7 0a  41 90 9a f9  d8 e3 55 09  86 4e 34 e4
>| Nr  c3 3e 5d 19  7b f5 7a fc  f9 b6 7e 7c  84 40 5c ed
>| Nr  12 9e ef 37  fe 50 cc 51  fb 24 77 19  df 96 88 c9
>| Nr  4b c2 b5 6b  30 8b db f1  e7 23 84 88  f6 86 40 84
>| Nr  60 40 35 3e  e6 90 5d 58  4d c0 64 a3  29 13 ff ea
>| Nr  ec 18 e1 27  77 c3 c6 8d  25 05 9f 35  51 dc e0 f0
>| Nr  86 a0 e9 ae  2b e2 2e 8f  cb ad 63 ff  fb 1c 29 61
>| Nr  4d bd bf fa  95 cd 31 43  70 1d 50 ba  0f 63 ba 7f
>| Nr  3b 5c fe 5c  f3 e7 c3 d9  41 5d 65 14  af f8
>| SPIi  77 2e f1 39  d7 5b 13 ed
>| SPIr  ad 40 ae 5c  0d 2e 0e ae
>| Total keysize needed 148
>| NSS ikev2: finished computing key material for IKEv2 SA 
>| NSS ikev2: finished computing individual keys for IKEv2 SA 
>| calc_skeyseed_v2 pointers: shared 0x7f0d1c006c60, skeyseed 0x7f0d1c00d060, SK_d 0x7f0d1c00e8e0, SK_ai 0x7f0d1c00b720, SK_ar 0x7f0d1c010290, SK_ei 0x7f0d1c009d90, SK_er 0x7f0d1c005240, SK_pi 0x7f0d1c011c40, SK_pr 0x7f0d1c013610
>|  
>| crypto helper 0 has finished work (pcw_work now 1)
>| crypto helper 0 replies to request ID 2
>| calling continuation function 0x7f0d2b1fbe80
>| ikev2_parent_inR1outI2_continue for #1: calculating g^{xy}, sending I2
>| processing connection ikev2
>| #1 ikev2_parent_inR1outI2_continue:1234 st->st_calculating = FALSE;
>| duplicating state object #1
>| creating state object #2 at 0x7f0d2c7735e0
>| ICOOKIE:  77 2e f1 39  d7 5b 13 ed
>| RCOOKIE:  ad 40 ae 5c  0d 2e 0e ae
>| state hash entry 15
>| inserting state object #2
>| inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 0 seconds for #2
>| event added at head of queue
>| deleting event for #1
>| inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 27807 seconds for #1
>| event added after event EVENT_REINIT_SECRET
>| **emit ISAKMP Message:
>|    initiator cookie:
>|   77 2e f1 39  d7 5b 13 ed
>|    responder cookie:
>|   ad 40 ae 5c  0d 2e 0e ae
>|    next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2E
>|    ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996)
>|    exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_AUTH
>|    flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_IKE_INIT
>|    message ID:  00 00 00 01
>| ***emit IKEv2 Encryption Payload:
>|    next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDi
>|    critical bit: none
>| emitting 8 zero bytes of iv into IKEv2 Encryption Payload
>| IKEv2 thinking whether to send my certificate:
>|  my policy has no RSASIG, the policy is : PSK+ENCRYPT+TUNNEL+PFS+UP+IKEV1_DISABLE+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_PROPOSE+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW
>|  sendcert: CERT_ALWAYSSEND and I did not get a certificate request 
>|  so do not send cert.
>| I did not send a certificate because digital signatures are not being used. (PSK)
>| *****emit IKEv2 Identification Payload:
>|    next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH
>|    critical bit: none
>|    id_type: ID_IPV6_ADDR
>| emitting 16 raw bytes of my identity into IKEv2 Identification Payload
>| my identity  20 01 0d b8  00 01 00 01  00 00 00 00  00 00 12 34
>| emitting length of IKEv2 Identification Payload: 24
>| idhash calc I2  05 00 00 00  20 01 0d b8  00 01 00 01  00 00 00 00
>| idhash calc I2  00 00 12 34
>| hmac_update data value: 
>|   05 00 00 00  20 01 0d b8  00 01 00 01  00 00 00 00
>|   00 00 12 34
>| hmac_update: inside if
>| hmac_update: after digest
>| hmac_update: after assert
>| *****emit IKEv2 Authentication Payload:
>|    next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA
>|    critical bit: none
>|    auth method: IKEv2_AUTH_SHARED
>| started looking for secret for 2001:db8:1:1::1234->2001:db8:f:1::1 of kind PPK_PSK
>| actually looking for secret for 2001:db8:1:1::1234->2001:db8:f:1::1 of kind PPK_PSK
>| line 1: key type PPK_PSK(2001:db8:1:1::1234) to type PPK_PSK 
>| 1: compared key %any to 2001:db8:1:1::1234 / 2001:db8:f:1::1 -> 2
>| 2: compared key %any to 2001:db8:1:1::1234 / 2001:db8:f:1::1 -> 2
>| line 1: match=2 
>| best_match 0>2 best=0x7f0d2c771290 (line=1)
>| concluding with best_match=2 best=0x7f0d2c771290 (lineno=1)
>| hmac_update data value: 
>|   4b 65 79 20  50 61 64 20  66 6f 72 20  49 4b 45 76
>|   32
>| hmac_update: inside if
>| hmac_update: after digest
>| hmac_update: after assert
>| negotiated prf: oakley_sha hash length: 20
>| inner prf output  39 cf c8 93  0c 25 cb 0e  02 cc 09 14  9e 4e 66 ea
>| inner prf output  6b 6a a6 1e
>| hmac_update data value: 
>|   77 2e f1 39  d7 5b 13 ed  00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00
>|   21 20 22 08  00 00 00 00  00 00 01 1c  22 00 00 2c
>|   00 00 00 28  01 01 00 04  03 00 00 08  01 00 00 03
>|   03 00 00 08  03 00 00 02  03 00 00 08  02 00 00 02
>|   00 00 00 08  04 00 00 02  28 00 00 88  00 02 00 00
>|   ea ef 3e db  f0 29 f9 0c  f6 93 68 a2  83 ca 83 06
>|   5d b1 c4 1c  27 a0 a7 4c  2a 26 11 64  1c 10 c3 54
>|   9c f1 35 b0  83 70 94 0c  84 63 5b 8e  b5 c7 da 36
>|   5a 34 78 56  49 50 73 58  e7 2a 49 5c  e6 0f 67 0b
>|   64 e5 e5 c8  f4 fb 13 95  25 2e 5a 0a  b4 33 fc f8
>|   25 3b d3 86  1e 2c c4 10  60 f4 3a 38  eb 99 0c 65
>|   80 29 8b 25  0c 69 95 44  02 3c e7 cf  60 5a 60 14
>|   dc 0a 25 14  f7 b2 37 2b  ec 6a d9 98  2e 73 e2 b8
>|   29 00 00 14  a1 23 d7 0a  41 90 9a f9  d8 e3 55 09
>|   86 4e 34 e4  29 00 00 1c  00 00 40 04  0a c6 f5 b9
>|   8f 34 b7 c0  ab ca 31 3c  12 3b 35 16  6a 1a 9d e1
>|   00 00 00 1c  00 00 40 05  c5 55 be 66  85 49 c6 9f
>|   61 c5 c4 d5  4a 06 78 bd  a9 04 d0 75
>| hmac_update: inside if
>| hmac_update: after digest
>| hmac_update: after assert
>| hmac_update data value: 
>|   c3 3e 5d 19  7b f5 7a fc  f9 b6 7e 7c  84 40 5c ed
>|   12 9e ef 37  fe 50 cc 51  fb 24 77 19  df 96 88 c9
>|   4b c2 b5 6b  30 8b db f1  e7 23 84 88  f6 86 40 84
>|   60 40 35 3e  e6 90 5d 58  4d c0 64 a3  29 13 ff ea
>|   ec 18 e1 27  77 c3 c6 8d  25 05 9f 35  51 dc e0 f0
>|   86 a0 e9 ae  2b e2 2e 8f  cb ad 63 ff  fb 1c 29 61
>|   4d bd bf fa  95 cd 31 43  70 1d 50 ba  0f 63 ba 7f
>|   3b 5c fe 5c  f3 e7 c3 d9  41 5d 65 14  af f8
>| hmac_update: inside if
>| hmac_update: after digest
>| hmac_update: after assert
>| hmac_update data value: 
>|   d4 85 af 3c  82 49 64 15  b8 42 72 68  14 cb eb f0
>|   9b 24 d7 7b
>| hmac_update: inside if
>| hmac_update: after digest
>| hmac_update: after assert
>| inputs to hash1 (first packet)
>|   77 2e f1 39  d7 5b 13 ed  00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00
>|   21 20 22 08  00 00 00 00  00 00 01 1c  22 00 00 2c
>|   00 00 00 28  01 01 00 04  03 00 00 08  01 00 00 03
>|   03 00 00 08  03 00 00 02  03 00 00 08  02 00 00 02
>|   00 00 00 08  04 00 00 02  28 00 00 88  00 02 00 00
>|   ea ef 3e db  f0 29 f9 0c  f6 93 68 a2  83 ca 83 06
>|   5d b1 c4 1c  27 a0 a7 4c  2a 26 11 64  1c 10 c3 54
>|   9c f1 35 b0  83 70 94 0c  84 63 5b 8e  b5 c7 da 36
>|   5a 34 78 56  49 50 73 58  e7 2a 49 5c  e6 0f 67 0b
>|   64 e5 e5 c8  f4 fb 13 95  25 2e 5a 0a  b4 33 fc f8
>|   25 3b d3 86  1e 2c c4 10  60 f4 3a 38  eb 99 0c 65
>|   80 29 8b 25  0c 69 95 44  02 3c e7 cf  60 5a 60 14
>|   dc 0a 25 14  f7 b2 37 2b  ec 6a d9 98  2e 73 e2 b8
>|   29 00 00 14  a1 23 d7 0a  41 90 9a f9  d8 e3 55 09
>|   86 4e 34 e4  29 00 00 1c  00 00 40 04  0a c6 f5 b9
>|   8f 34 b7 c0  ab ca 31 3c  12 3b 35 16  6a 1a 9d e1
>|   00 00 00 1c  00 00 40 05  c5 55 be 66  85 49 c6 9f
>|   61 c5 c4 d5  4a 06 78 bd  a9 04 d0 75
>| inputs to hash2 (responder nonce)
>|   c3 3e 5d 19  7b f5 7a fc  f9 b6 7e 7c  84 40 5c ed
>|   12 9e ef 37  fe 50 cc 51  fb 24 77 19  df 96 88 c9
>|   4b c2 b5 6b  30 8b db f1  e7 23 84 88  f6 86 40 84
>|   60 40 35 3e  e6 90 5d 58  4d c0 64 a3  29 13 ff ea
>|   ec 18 e1 27  77 c3 c6 8d  25 05 9f 35  51 dc e0 f0
>|   86 a0 e9 ae  2b e2 2e 8f  cb ad 63 ff  fb 1c 29 61
>|   4d bd bf fa  95 cd 31 43  70 1d 50 ba  0f 63 ba 7f
>|   3b 5c fe 5c  f3 e7 c3 d9  41 5d 65 14  af f8
>| idhash  d4 85 af 3c  82 49 64 15  b8 42 72 68  14 cb eb f0
>| idhash  9b 24 d7 7b
>| PSK auth octets  2a c2 42 6d  d3 6c 0f 73  f1 f0 61 09  1d 94 83 c4
>| PSK auth octets  e1 db b1 05
>| emitting 20 raw bytes of PSK auth into IKEv2 Authentication Payload
>| PSK auth  2a c2 42 6d  d3 6c 0f 73  f1 f0 61 09  1d 94 83 c4
>| PSK auth  e1 db b1 05
>| emitting length of IKEv2 Authentication Payload: 28
>| getting first pending from state #1
>| kernel_alg_db_new() initial trans_cnt=128
>| kernel_alg_db_new() will return p_new->protoid=3, p_new->trans_cnt=1
>| kernel_alg_db_new()     trans[0]: transid=3, attr_cnt=1, attrs[0].type=5, attrs[0].val=2
>| returning new proposal from esp_info
>| *****emit IKEv2 Security Association Payload:
>|    next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi
>|    critical bit: none
>| netlink_get_spi: allocated 0x9f8a9380 for esp:0@2001:db8:1:1::1234
>| ******emit IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload:
>|    last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_LAST
>|    prop #: 1
>|    proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_ESP
>|    spi size: 4
>|    # transforms: 3
>| emitting 4 raw bytes of our spi into IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload
>| our spi  9f 8a 93 80
>| *******emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload:
>|    last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST
>|    IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR
>|    IKEv2 transform ID: 3DES
>| emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8
>| *******emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload:
>|    last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST
>|    IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG
>|    IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96
>| emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8
>| *******emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload:
>|    last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST
>|    IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ESN
>|    IKEv2 transform ID: ESN_DISABLED
>| emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8
>| emitting length of IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: 36
>| emitting length of IKEv2 Security Association Payload: 40
>| *****emit IKEv2 Traffic Selector Payload:
>|    next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr
>|    critical bit: none
>|    number of TS: 1
>| ******emit IKEv2 Traffic Selector:
>|    TS type: IKEv2_TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE
>|    IP Protocol ID: 0
>|    start port: 0
>|    end port: 65535
>| emitting 16 raw bytes of ipv6 low into IKEv2 Traffic Selector
>| ipv6 low  20 01 0d b8  00 01 00 01  00 00 00 00  00 00 12 34
>| emitting 16 raw bytes of ipv6 high into IKEv2 Traffic Selector
>| ipv6 high  20 01 0d b8  00 01 00 01  00 00 00 00  00 00 12 34
>| emitting length of IKEv2 Traffic Selector: 40
>| emitting length of IKEv2 Traffic Selector Payload: 48
>| *****emit IKEv2 Traffic Selector Payload:
>|    next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE
>|    critical bit: none
>|    number of TS: 1
>| ******emit IKEv2 Traffic Selector:
>|    TS type: IKEv2_TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE
>|    IP Protocol ID: 0
>|    start port: 0
>|    end port: 65535
>| emitting 16 raw bytes of ipv6 low into IKEv2 Traffic Selector
>| ipv6 low  20 01 0d b8  00 0f 00 01  00 00 00 00  00 00 00 01
>| emitting 16 raw bytes of ipv6 high into IKEv2 Traffic Selector
>| ipv6 high  20 01 0d b8  00 0f 00 01  00 00 00 00  00 00 00 01
>| emitting length of IKEv2 Traffic Selector: 40
>| emitting length of IKEv2 Traffic Selector Payload: 48
>| emitting 4 raw bytes of padding and length into cleartext
>| padding and length  00 01 02 03
>| emitting 12 zero bytes of length of truncated HMAC into IKEv2 Encryption Payload
>| emitting length of IKEv2 Encryption Payload: 216
>| emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 244
>| data before encryption:
>|   27 00 00 18  05 00 00 00  20 01 0d b8  00 01 00 01
>|   00 00 00 00  00 00 12 34  21 00 00 1c  02 00 00 00
>|   2a c2 42 6d  d3 6c 0f 73  f1 f0 61 09  1d 94 83 c4
>|   e1 db b1 05  2c 00 00 28  00 00 00 24  01 03 04 03
>|   9f 8a 93 80  03 00 00 08  01 00 00 03  03 00 00 08
>|   03 00 00 02  00 00 00 08  05 00 00 00  2d 00 00 30
>|   01 00 00 00  08 00 00 28  00 00 ff ff  20 01 0d b8
>|   00 01 00 01  00 00 00 00  00 00 12 34  20 01 0d b8
>|   00 01 00 01  00 00 00 00  00 00 12 34  00 00 00 30
>|   01 00 00 00  08 00 00 28  00 00 ff ff  20 01 0d b8
>|   00 0f 00 01  00 00 00 00  00 00 00 01  20 01 0d b8
>|   00 0f 00 01  00 00 00 00  00 00 00 01  00 01 02 03
>| NSS: do_3des init start
>| NSS: do_3des init end
>| data after encryption:
>|   4f 26 a6 0e  f3 74 33 46  9c 78 ac d2  f6 0b 6c 13
>|   8d d1 36 55  7c f0 4c 0e  38 16 ee 75  fe ad 97 09
>|   ae b9 8c cc  fe 57 9e 09  dd 49 64 fe  71 3e 0e 2c
>|   e1 b8 fa ed  7b d9 91 3a  b3 39 5f 9c  ea ce 59 7f
>|   f0 39 b6 3f  ec de 0e 35  a3 59 80 ae  c3 4f 28 19
>|   de e7 e0 43  d6 4c 87 09  5d b1 35 48  12 fc ee 53
>|   4b 14 71 08  35 97 1b b9  64 1b bb 81  50 40 19 9a
>|   94 d8 34 a0  bd 15 c7 ae  f3 7e 8f b9  3a 87 e6 01
>|   17 fb 86 70  d6 67 f3 5c  fa e9 43 33  5e f7 c3 e9
>|   99 05 cd ee  5a b8 0c bf  4f 8d ba 2b  56 24 68 5f
>|   13 24 ff f4  b7 9f 43 87  71 26 6c 86  ae a2 af c3
>|   52 6a 73 50  c0 66 a8 0e  66 6b 45 02  5d 09 51 84
>| Inside authloc
>| authkey pointer: 0x7f0d1c00b720
>| Inside authloc after init
>| hmac_update data value: 
>|   77 2e f1 39  d7 5b 13 ed  ad 40 ae 5c  0d 2e 0e ae
>|   2e 20 23 08  00 00 00 01  00 00 00 f4  23 00 00 d8
>|   d4 5d 41 cc  c1 6d 5d f1  4f 26 a6 0e  f3 74 33 46
>|   9c 78 ac d2  f6 0b 6c 13  8d d1 36 55  7c f0 4c 0e
>|   38 16 ee 75  fe ad 97 09  ae b9 8c cc  fe 57 9e 09
>|   dd 49 64 fe  71 3e 0e 2c  e1 b8 fa ed  7b d9 91 3a
>|   b3 39 5f 9c  ea ce 59 7f  f0 39 b6 3f  ec de 0e 35
>|   a3 59 80 ae  c3 4f 28 19  de e7 e0 43  d6 4c 87 09
>|   5d b1 35 48  12 fc ee 53  4b 14 71 08  35 97 1b b9
>|   64 1b bb 81  50 40 19 9a  94 d8 34 a0  bd 15 c7 ae
>|   f3 7e 8f b9  3a 87 e6 01  17 fb 86 70  d6 67 f3 5c
>|   fa e9 43 33  5e f7 c3 e9  99 05 cd ee  5a b8 0c bf
>|   4f 8d ba 2b  56 24 68 5f  13 24 ff f4  b7 9f 43 87
>|   71 26 6c 86  ae a2 af c3  52 6a 73 50  c0 66 a8 0e
>|   66 6b 45 02  5d 09 51 84
>| hmac_update: inside if
>| hmac_update: after digest
>| hmac_update: after assert
>| Inside authloc after update
>| Inside authloc after final
>| data being hmac:  77 2e f1 39  d7 5b 13 ed  ad 40 ae 5c  0d 2e 0e ae
>| data being hmac:  2e 20 23 08  00 00 00 01  00 00 00 f4  23 00 00 d8
>| data being hmac:  d4 5d 41 cc  c1 6d 5d f1  4f 26 a6 0e  f3 74 33 46
>| data being hmac:  9c 78 ac d2  f6 0b 6c 13  8d d1 36 55  7c f0 4c 0e
>| data being hmac:  38 16 ee 75  fe ad 97 09  ae b9 8c cc  fe 57 9e 09
>| data being hmac:  dd 49 64 fe  71 3e 0e 2c  e1 b8 fa ed  7b d9 91 3a
>| data being hmac:  b3 39 5f 9c  ea ce 59 7f  f0 39 b6 3f  ec de 0e 35
>| data being hmac:  a3 59 80 ae  c3 4f 28 19  de e7 e0 43  d6 4c 87 09
>| data being hmac:  5d b1 35 48  12 fc ee 53  4b 14 71 08  35 97 1b b9
>| data being hmac:  64 1b bb 81  50 40 19 9a  94 d8 34 a0  bd 15 c7 ae
>| data being hmac:  f3 7e 8f b9  3a 87 e6 01  17 fb 86 70  d6 67 f3 5c
>| data being hmac:  fa e9 43 33  5e f7 c3 e9  99 05 cd ee  5a b8 0c bf
>| data being hmac:  4f 8d ba 2b  56 24 68 5f  13 24 ff f4  b7 9f 43 87
>| data being hmac:  71 26 6c 86  ae a2 af c3  52 6a 73 50  c0 66 a8 0e
>| data being hmac:  66 6b 45 02  5d 09 51 84
>| out calculated auth:
>|   7c e1 3d 1e  1a c3 d4 47  d1 6b af 4d
>| deleting event for #2
>| inserting event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 10 seconds for #2
>| event added at head of queue
>| complete v2 state transition with STF_OK
>"ikev2" #2: transition from state STATE_PARENT_I1 to state STATE_PARENT_I2
>"ikev2" #2: STATE_PARENT_I2: sent v2I2, expected v2R2 {auth=IKEv2 cipher=oakley_3des_cbc_192 integ=sha1_96 prf=sha group=MODP1024}
>| sending reply packet to 2001:db8:f:1::1:500 (from port 500)
>| sending 244 bytes for STATE_PARENT_I1 through p6p1:500 to 2001:db8:f:1::1:500 (using #2)
>|   77 2e f1 39  d7 5b 13 ed  ad 40 ae 5c  0d 2e 0e ae
>|   2e 20 23 08  00 00 00 01  00 00 00 f4  23 00 00 d8
>|   d4 5d 41 cc  c1 6d 5d f1  4f 26 a6 0e  f3 74 33 46
>|   9c 78 ac d2  f6 0b 6c 13  8d d1 36 55  7c f0 4c 0e
>|   38 16 ee 75  fe ad 97 09  ae b9 8c cc  fe 57 9e 09
>|   dd 49 64 fe  71 3e 0e 2c  e1 b8 fa ed  7b d9 91 3a
>|   b3 39 5f 9c  ea ce 59 7f  f0 39 b6 3f  ec de 0e 35
>|   a3 59 80 ae  c3 4f 28 19  de e7 e0 43  d6 4c 87 09
>|   5d b1 35 48  12 fc ee 53  4b 14 71 08  35 97 1b b9
>|   64 1b bb 81  50 40 19 9a  94 d8 34 a0  bd 15 c7 ae
>|   f3 7e 8f b9  3a 87 e6 01  17 fb 86 70  d6 67 f3 5c
>|   fa e9 43 33  5e f7 c3 e9  99 05 cd ee  5a b8 0c bf
>|   4f 8d ba 2b  56 24 68 5f  13 24 ff f4  b7 9f 43 87
>|   71 26 6c 86  ae a2 af c3  52 6a 73 50  c0 66 a8 0e
>|   66 6b 45 02  5d 09 51 84  7c e1 3d 1e  1a c3 d4 47
>|   d1 6b af 4d
>| V2 microcode entry (Initiator: process IKE_SA_INIT reply, initiate IKE_AUTH) has unspecified timeout_event
>| * processed 1 messages from cryptographic helpers 
>| next event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT in 10 seconds for #2
>| next event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT in 10 seconds for #2
>|  
>| next event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT in 0 seconds for #2
>| *time to handle event
>| handling event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT
>| event after this is EVENT_PENDING_DDNS in 28 seconds
>| processing connection ikev2
>| handling event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT for 2001:db8:f:1::1 "ikev2" #2 attempt 1 of 0
>| sending 244 bytes for EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT through p6p1:500 to 2001:db8:f:1::1:500 (using #2)
>|   77 2e f1 39  d7 5b 13 ed  ad 40 ae 5c  0d 2e 0e ae
>|   2e 20 23 08  00 00 00 01  00 00 00 f4  23 00 00 d8
>|   d4 5d 41 cc  c1 6d 5d f1  4f 26 a6 0e  f3 74 33 46
>|   9c 78 ac d2  f6 0b 6c 13  8d d1 36 55  7c f0 4c 0e
>|   38 16 ee 75  fe ad 97 09  ae b9 8c cc  fe 57 9e 09
>|   dd 49 64 fe  71 3e 0e 2c  e1 b8 fa ed  7b d9 91 3a
>|   b3 39 5f 9c  ea ce 59 7f  f0 39 b6 3f  ec de 0e 35
>|   a3 59 80 ae  c3 4f 28 19  de e7 e0 43  d6 4c 87 09
>|   5d b1 35 48  12 fc ee 53  4b 14 71 08  35 97 1b b9
>|   64 1b bb 81  50 40 19 9a  94 d8 34 a0  bd 15 c7 ae
>|   f3 7e 8f b9  3a 87 e6 01  17 fb 86 70  d6 67 f3 5c
>|   fa e9 43 33  5e f7 c3 e9  99 05 cd ee  5a b8 0c bf
>|   4f 8d ba 2b  56 24 68 5f  13 24 ff f4  b7 9f 43 87
>|   71 26 6c 86  ae a2 af c3  52 6a 73 50  c0 66 a8 0e
>|   66 6b 45 02  5d 09 51 84  7c e1 3d 1e  1a c3 d4 47
>|   d1 6b af 4d
>| inserting event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 10 seconds for #2
>| event added at head of queue
>| next event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT in 10 seconds for #2
>|  
>| *received whack message
>shutting down
>| certs and keys locked by 'free_preshared_secrets'
>forgetting secrets
>| certs and keys unlocked by 'free_preshard_secrets'
>| processing connection ikev2
>"ikev2": deleting connection
>| removing pending policy for "none" {0x7f0d2c7713e0}
>| processing connection ikev2
>"ikev2" #2: deleting state (STATE_PARENT_I2)
>| deleting event for #2
>| deleting state #2
>| deleting event for #2
>| ICOOKIE:  77 2e f1 39  d7 5b 13 ed
>| RCOOKIE:  ad 40 ae 5c  0d 2e 0e ae
>| state hash entry 15
>| processing connection ikev2
>"ikev2" #1: deleting state (STATE_PARENT_I2)
>| deleting event for #1
>| deleting state #1
>| deleting event for #1
>| ICOOKIE:  77 2e f1 39  d7 5b 13 ed
>| RCOOKIE:  ad 40 ae 5c  0d 2e 0e ae
>| state hash entry 15
>| crl fetch request list locked by 'free_crl_fetch'
>| crl fetch request list unlocked by 'free_crl_fetch'
>| authcert list locked by 'free_authcerts'
>| authcert list unlocked by 'free_authcerts'
>| crl list locked by 'free_crls'
>| crl list unlocked by 'free_crls'
>shutting down interface lo/lo ::1:500
>shutting down interface p6p2/p6p2 3ffe:501:ffff:101:215:17ff:fe3c:c669:500
>shutting down interface p6p1/p6p1 3ffe:501:ffff:100:215:17ff:fe3c:c668:500
>shutting down interface p6p1/p6p1 2001:db8:1:1::1234:500
>shutting down interface lo/lo 127.0.0.1:4500
>shutting down interface lo/lo 127.0.0.1:500
>shutting down interface p7p1/p7p1 10.66.13.22:4500
>shutting down interface p7p1/p7p1 10.66.13.22:500
>shutting down interface p6p1/p6p1 192.168.0.10:4500
>shutting down interface p6p1/p6p1 192.168.0.10:500

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Attachments on bug 1153548: 947484