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Red Hat Bugzilla – Attachment 950892 Details for
Bug 1157379
[TAHI][IKEv2] IKEv2.EN.R.1.3.3.1: Non RESERVED fields in INFORMATIONAL request
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pluto.log
pluto.log (text/plain), 102.53 KB, created by
Hangbin Liu
on 2014-10-27 06:50:24 UTC
(
hide
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Description:
pluto.log
Filename:
MIME Type:
Creator:
Hangbin Liu
Created:
2014-10-27 06:50:24 UTC
Size:
102.53 KB
patch
obsolete
>nss directory plutomain: /etc/ipsec.d >NSS Initialized >libcap-ng support [enabled] >FIPS HMAC integrity verification test passed >FIPS: pluto daemon NOT running in FIPS mode >Linux audit support [disabled] >Starting Pluto (Libreswan Version 3.10 XFRM(netkey) KLIPS NSS DNSSEC FIPS_CHECK LABELED_IPSEC LIBCAP_NG XAUTH_PAM NETWORKMANAGER KLIPS_MAST CURL(non-NSS) LDAP(non-NSS)) pid:10771 >core dump dir: /var/run/pluto >secrets file: /etc/ipsec.secrets >leak-detective disabled >SAref support [disabled]: Protocol not available >SAbind support [disabled]: Protocol not available >NSS crypto [enabled] >XAUTH PAM support [enabled] > NAT-Traversal support [enabled] >| inserting event EVENT_REINIT_SECRET, timeout in 3600 seconds >| event added at head of queue >| inserting event EVENT_PENDING_DDNS, timeout in 60 seconds >| event added at head of queue >| inserting event EVENT_PENDING_PHASE2, timeout in 120 seconds >| event added after event EVENT_PENDING_DDNS >ike_alg_register_enc(): Activating OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC_SSH: Ok (ret=0) >ike_alg_register_enc(): Activating OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC: Ok (ret=0) >ike_alg_register_enc(): Activating OAKLEY_SERPENT_CBC: Ok (ret=0) >ike_alg_register_enc(): Activating OAKLEY_AES_CBC: Ok (ret=0) >ike_alg_register_hash(): Activating OAKLEY_SHA2_512: Ok (ret=0) >ike_alg_register_hash(): Activating OAKLEY_SHA2_384: Ok (ret=0) >ike_alg_register_hash(): Activating OAKLEY_SHA2_256: Ok (ret=0) >starting up 3 crypto helpers >started thread for crypto helper 0 (master fd 7) >| status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 0) 22 >| crypto helper 0 waiting on fd 8 >| status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 1) 22 >| crypto helper 1 waiting on fd 10 >started thread for crypto helper 1 (master fd 9) >started thread for crypto helper 2 (master fd 11) >| status value returned by setting the priority of this thread (crypto helper 2) 22 >| crypto helper 2 waiting on fd 13 >Using Linux XFRM/NETKEY IPsec interface code on 3.10.0-188.el7.x86_64 >| process 10771 listening for PF_KEY_V2 on file descriptor 16 >| finish_pfkey_msg: K_SADB_REGISTER message 1 for AH >| 02 07 00 02 02 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 13 2a 00 00 >| pfkey_get: K_SADB_REGISTER message 1 >| AH registered with kernel. >| finish_pfkey_msg: K_SADB_REGISTER message 2 for ESP >| 02 07 00 03 02 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 13 2a 00 00 >| pfkey_get: K_SADB_REGISTER message 2 >| kernel_alg_init(): memset(0x7f25698ae840, 0, 2048) memset(0x7f25698af040, 0, 2048) >| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: sadb_msg_len=22 sadb_supported_len=72 >| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=14, alg_id=251(ESP_KAME_NULL) >| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: alg[0], exttype=14, satype=3, alg_id=251, alg_ivlen=0, alg_minbits=0, alg_maxbits=0, res=0, ret=1 >| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=14, alg_id=2(ESP_DES) >| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: alg[1], exttype=14, satype=3, alg_id=2, alg_ivlen=0, alg_minbits=128, alg_maxbits=128, res=0, ret=1 >| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=14, alg_id=3(ESP_3DES) >| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: alg[2], exttype=14, satype=3, alg_id=3, alg_ivlen=0, alg_minbits=160, alg_maxbits=160, res=0, ret=1 >| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=14, alg_id=5(ESP_IDEA) >| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: alg[3], exttype=14, satype=3, alg_id=5, alg_ivlen=0, alg_minbits=256, alg_maxbits=256, res=0, ret=1 >| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=14, alg_id=6(ESP_CAST) >| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: alg[4], exttype=14, satype=3, alg_id=6, alg_ivlen=0, alg_minbits=384, alg_maxbits=384, res=0, ret=1 >| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=14, alg_id=7(ESP_BLOWFISH) >| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: alg[5], exttype=14, satype=3, alg_id=7, alg_ivlen=0, alg_minbits=512, alg_maxbits=512, res=0, ret=1 >| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=14, alg_id=8(ESP_3IDEA) >| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: alg[6], exttype=14, satype=3, alg_id=8, alg_ivlen=0, alg_minbits=160, alg_maxbits=160, res=0, ret=1 >| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=14, alg_id=9(ESP_DES_IV32) >| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: alg[7], exttype=14, satype=3, alg_id=9, alg_ivlen=0, alg_minbits=128, alg_maxbits=128, res=0, ret=1 >| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: sadb_msg_len=22 sadb_supported_len=88 >| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=15, alg_id=11(ESP_NULL) >| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: alg[8], exttype=15, satype=3, alg_id=11, alg_ivlen=0, alg_minbits=0, alg_maxbits=0, res=0, ret=1 >| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=15, alg_id=2(ESP_DES) >| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: alg[9], exttype=15, satype=3, alg_id=2, alg_ivlen=8, alg_minbits=64, alg_maxbits=64, res=0, ret=1 >| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=15, alg_id=3(ESP_3DES) >| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: alg[10], exttype=15, satype=3, alg_id=3, alg_ivlen=8, alg_minbits=192, alg_maxbits=192, res=0, ret=1 >| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=15, alg_id=6(ESP_CAST) >| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: alg[11], exttype=15, satype=3, alg_id=6, alg_ivlen=8, alg_minbits=40, alg_maxbits=128, res=0, ret=1 >| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=15, alg_id=7(ESP_BLOWFISH) >| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: alg[12], exttype=15, satype=3, alg_id=7, alg_ivlen=8, alg_minbits=40, alg_maxbits=448, res=0, ret=1 >| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=15, alg_id=12(ESP_AES) >| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: alg[13], exttype=15, satype=3, alg_id=12, alg_ivlen=8, alg_minbits=128, alg_maxbits=256, res=0, ret=1 >| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=15, alg_id=252(ESP_SERPENT) >| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: alg[14], exttype=15, satype=3, alg_id=252, alg_ivlen=8, alg_minbits=128, alg_maxbits=256, res=0, ret=1 >| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=15, alg_id=22(ESP_CAMELLIA) >| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: alg[15], exttype=15, satype=3, alg_id=22, alg_ivlen=8, alg_minbits=128, alg_maxbits=256, res=0, ret=1 >| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=15, alg_id=253(ESP_TWOFISH) >| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: alg[16], exttype=15, satype=3, alg_id=253, alg_ivlen=8, alg_minbits=128, alg_maxbits=256, res=0, ret=1 >| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=15, alg_id=13(ESP_AES_CTR) >| kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_ESP: alg[17], exttype=15, satype=3, alg_id=13, alg_ivlen=8, alg_minbits=160, alg_maxbits=288, res=0, ret=1 >| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=15, alg_id=18(ESP_AES_GCM_A) >| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=15, alg_id=19(ESP_AES_GCM_B) >| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=15, alg_id=20(ESP_AES_GCM_C) >| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=15, alg_id=14(ESP_AES_CCM_A) >| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=15, alg_id=15(ESP_AES_CCM_B) >| kernel_alg_add(): satype=3, exttype=15, alg_id=16(ESP_AES_CCM_C) >ike_alg_register_enc(): Activating aes_ccm_8: Ok (ret=0) >Warning: failed to register algo_aes_ccm_8 for IKE >ike_alg_register_enc(): Activating aes_ccm_12: Ok (ret=0) >Warning: failed to register algo_aes_ccm_12 for IKE >ike_alg_register_enc(): Activating aes_ccm_16: Ok (ret=0) >Warning: failed to register algo_aes_ccm_16 for IKE >ike_alg_register_enc(): Activating aes_gcm_8: Ok (ret=0) >Warning: failed to register algo_aes_gcm_8 for IKE >ike_alg_register_enc(): Activating aes_gcm_12: Ok (ret=0) >Warning: failed to register algo_aes_gcm_12 for IKE >ike_alg_register_enc(): Activating aes_gcm_16: Ok (ret=0) >Warning: failed to register algo_aes_gcm_16 for IKE >| Registered AEAD AES CCM/GCM algorithms >| ESP registered with kernel. >| finish_pfkey_msg: K_SADB_REGISTER message 3 for IPCOMP >| 02 07 00 09 02 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 13 2a 00 00 >| pfkey_get: K_SADB_REGISTER message 3 >| IPCOMP registered with kernel. >| Registered AH, ESP and IPCOMP >| Changed path to directory '/etc/ipsec.d/cacerts' >| Changing to directory '/etc/ipsec.d/crls' >| selinux support is enabled. >| inserting event EVENT_LOG_DAILY, timeout in 34172 seconds >| event added after event EVENT_REINIT_SECRET >| next event EVENT_PENDING_DDNS in 60 seconds >| calling addconn helper using execve >| >| *received whack message >| entering aalg_getbyname_ike() >| raw_alg_info_ike_add() ealg=5 aalg=2 modp_id=2, cnt=1 >| Added new connection ikev2 with policy PSK+ENCRYPT+PFS+IKEV1_DISABLE+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_PROPOSE+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW >| from whack: got --esp=3des-sha1 >| esp string values: 3DES(3)_000-SHA1(2)_000 >| ike (phase1) algorithm values: 3DES_CBC(5)_000-SHA1(2)_000-MODP1024(2) >| counting wild cards for 2001:db8:1:1::1234 is 0 >| counting wild cards for 2001:db8:f:1::1 is 0 >added connection description "ikev2" >| 2001:db8:1:1::1234<2001:0db8:0001:0001::1234>...2001:db8:f:1::1<2001:0db8:000f:0001::1> >| ike_life: 3600s; ipsec_life: 28800s; rekey_margin: 540s; rekey_fuzz: 100%; keyingtries: 0; policy: PSK+ENCRYPT+PFS+IKEV1_DISABLE+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_PROPOSE+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW >| * processed 0 messages from cryptographic helpers >| next event EVENT_PENDING_DDNS in 59 seconds >| next event EVENT_PENDING_DDNS in 59 seconds >| >| *received whack message >listening for IKE messages >| Inspecting interface lo >| found lo with address 127.0.0.1 >| Inspecting interface p7p1 >| found p7p1 with address 10.66.13.22 >adding interface p7p1/p7p1 10.66.13.22:500 >| NAT-Traversal: Trying new style NAT-T >| NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup failed for new style NAT-T family IPv4 (errno=19) >| NAT-Traversal: Trying old style NAT-T >| NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup succeeded for old style NAT-T family IPv4 >adding interface p7p1/p7p1 10.66.13.22:4500 >adding interface lo/lo 127.0.0.1:500 >| NAT-Traversal: Trying new style NAT-T >| NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup failed for new style NAT-T family IPv4 (errno=19) >| NAT-Traversal: Trying old style NAT-T >| NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(2) setup succeeded for old style NAT-T family IPv4 >adding interface lo/lo 127.0.0.1:4500 >| found lo with address 0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0001 >| found p6p1 with address 2001:0db8:0001:0001:0000:0000:0000:1234 >adding interface p6p1/p6p1 2001:db8:1:1::1234:500 >adding interface lo/lo ::1:500 >| connect_to_host_pair: 2001:db8:1:1::1234:500 2001:db8:f:1::1:500 -> hp:none >| certs and keys locked by 'free_preshared_secrets' >| certs and keys unlocked by 'free_preshard_secrets' >loading secrets from "/etc/ipsec.secrets" >| id type added to secret(0x7f256afb9f20) PPK_PSK: %any >| id type added to secret(0x7f256afb9f20) PPK_PSK: %any >| Processing PSK at line 1: passed >| certs and keys locked by 'process_secret' >| certs and keys unlocked by 'process_secret' >| * processed 0 messages from cryptographic helpers >| next event EVENT_PENDING_DDNS in 59 seconds >| next event EVENT_PENDING_DDNS in 59 seconds >| >| *received whack message >| processing connection ikev2 >| kernel_alg_db_new() initial trans_cnt=128 >| kernel_alg_db_new() will return p_new->protoid=3, p_new->trans_cnt=1 >| kernel_alg_db_new() trans[0]: transid=3, attr_cnt=1, attrs[0].type=5, attrs[0].val=2 >| returning new proposal from esp_info >| creating state object #1 at 0x7f256afba0b0 >| processing connection ikev2 >| ICOOKIE: a5 6c 9f 5e 29 9d e7 03 >| RCOOKIE: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >| state hash entry 6 >| inserting state object #1 >| inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 0 seconds for #1 >| event added at head of queue >| processing connection ikev2 >| Queuing pending Quick Mode with 2001:db8:f:1::1 "ikev2" >"ikev2" #1: initiating v2 parent SA >| crypto helper 0: pcw_work: 0 >| asking crypto helper 0 to do build_kenonce; request ID 1 (len=2768, pcw_work=0) >| #1 send_crypto_helper_request:519 st->st_calculating = TRUE; >| deleting event for #1 >| inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_FAILED, timeout in 300 seconds for #1 >| event added after event EVENT_PENDING_PHASE2 >| crypto helper 0 read fd: 8 >| crypto helper 0 doing build_kenonce; request ID 1 >| NSS: Value of Prime: >| ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 >| c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 >| 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd >| ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 >| 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 >| f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed >| ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 >| 49 28 66 51 ec e6 53 81 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff >| NSS: Value of base: >| 02 >| * processed 0 messages from cryptographic helpers >| next event EVENT_PENDING_DDNS in 59 seconds >| next event EVENT_PENDING_DDNS in 59 seconds >| NSS: generated dh priv and pub keys: 128 >| NSS: Local DH secret (pointer): 0x7f255c005b20 >| NSS: Public DH value sent(computed in NSS): >| c9 80 f5 50 4a 4e f4 72 86 49 03 64 7e ff ae 74 >| b5 00 de 04 72 3b 3f 73 8a fd d2 ec 42 d4 3b da >| 01 1e b6 ef 94 b9 ab 58 93 93 54 32 d6 29 53 86 >| d3 5c 47 49 19 7c 8f 1d b0 a2 14 dd e4 a1 67 a8 >| 8b 89 ad 40 7d fb 98 1e 22 d9 2b 0d 63 33 41 1b >| 85 14 79 1f b4 03 c9 44 d9 3a 36 41 cc 92 e9 72 >| 72 d4 79 ae 78 01 3d 5d 42 3d b4 b0 c3 40 3d 0f >| 1c 36 5f ce 7f db f0 c0 09 d8 72 7f dc 7a cc 40 >| NSS: Local DH public value (pointer): 0x7f255c005310 >| reaped addconn helper child >| Generated nonce: >| 4b d1 d6 74 07 e1 f6 a7 2f 87 d5 1d 7a 84 d3 b2 >| >| crypto helper 0 has finished work (pcw_work now 1) >| crypto helper 0 replies to request ID 1 >| calling continuation function 0x7f25695d42b0 >| ikev2_parent_outI1_continue for #1: calculated ke+nonce, sending I1 >| processing connection ikev2 >| #1 ikev2_parent_outI1_continue:284 st->st_calculating = FALSE; >| ikev2_parent_outI1_tail for #1 >| saving DH priv (local secret) and pub key into state struct >| **emit ISAKMP Message: >| initiator cookie: >| a5 6c 9f 5e 29 9d e7 03 >| responder cookie: >| 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >| next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA >| ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) >| exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_SA_INIT >| flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_IKE_INIT >| message ID: 00 00 00 00 >| ***emit IKEv2 Security Association Payload: >| next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE >| critical bit: none >| ****emit IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: >| last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_LAST >| prop #: 1 >| proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE >| spi size: 0 >| # transforms: 4 >| *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: >| last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST >| IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR >| IKEv2 transform ID: 3DES >| emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8 >| *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: >| last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST >| IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG >| IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96 >| emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8 >| *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: >| last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST >| IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF >| IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA1 >| emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8 >| *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: >| last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST >| IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH >| IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1024 >| emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8 >| emitting length of IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: 40 >| emitting length of IKEv2 Security Association Payload: 44 >| ***emit IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload: >| IKEv2 next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni >| critical bit: none >| DH group: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1024 >| emitting 128 raw bytes of ikev2 g^x into IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload >| ikev2 g^x c9 80 f5 50 4a 4e f4 72 86 49 03 64 7e ff ae 74 >| ikev2 g^x b5 00 de 04 72 3b 3f 73 8a fd d2 ec 42 d4 3b da >| ikev2 g^x 01 1e b6 ef 94 b9 ab 58 93 93 54 32 d6 29 53 86 >| ikev2 g^x d3 5c 47 49 19 7c 8f 1d b0 a2 14 dd e4 a1 67 a8 >| ikev2 g^x 8b 89 ad 40 7d fb 98 1e 22 d9 2b 0d 63 33 41 1b >| ikev2 g^x 85 14 79 1f b4 03 c9 44 d9 3a 36 41 cc 92 e9 72 >| ikev2 g^x 72 d4 79 ae 78 01 3d 5d 42 3d b4 b0 c3 40 3d 0f >| ikev2 g^x 1c 36 5f ce 7f db f0 c0 09 d8 72 7f dc 7a cc 40 >| emitting length of IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload: 136 >| ***emit IKEv2 Nonce Payload: >| next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N >| critical bit: none >| emitting 16 raw bytes of IKEv2 nonce into IKEv2 Nonce Payload >| IKEv2 nonce 4b d1 d6 74 07 e1 f6 a7 2f 87 d5 1d 7a 84 d3 b2 >| emitting length of IKEv2 Nonce Payload: 20 >| NAT-Traversal support [enabled] add v2N payloads. >| natd_hash: Warning, rcookie is zero !! >| natd_hash: hasher=0x7f25698935c0(20) >| natd_hash: icookie= a5 6c 9f 5e 29 9d e7 03 >| natd_hash: rcookie= 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >| natd_hash: port=500 >| natd_hash: hash= 53 e5 0e 67 ea 06 0d a8 71 b6 98 a9 1f 03 01 dc >| natd_hash: hash= 30 af ff 9d >| Adding a v2N Payload >| ***emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: >| next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N >| critical bit: none >| Protocol ID: PROTO_RESERVED >| SPI size: 0 >| Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP >| emitting 20 raw bytes of Notify data into IKEv2 Notify Payload >| Notify data 53 e5 0e 67 ea 06 0d a8 71 b6 98 a9 1f 03 01 dc >| Notify data 30 af ff 9d >| emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 28 >| natd_hash: Warning, rcookie is zero !! >| natd_hash: hasher=0x7f25698935c0(20) >| natd_hash: icookie= a5 6c 9f 5e 29 9d e7 03 >| natd_hash: rcookie= 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >| natd_hash: port=500 >| natd_hash: hash= 8a d7 8b 69 1d 57 4f bd f4 b6 48 df 1b a8 bf f0 >| natd_hash: hash= c5 da 2b 65 >| Adding a v2N Payload >| ***emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: >| next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE >| critical bit: none >| Protocol ID: PROTO_RESERVED >| SPI size: 0 >| Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP >| emitting 20 raw bytes of Notify data into IKEv2 Notify Payload >| Notify data 8a d7 8b 69 1d 57 4f bd f4 b6 48 df 1b a8 bf f0 >| Notify data c5 da 2b 65 >| emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 28 >| no IKE message padding required >| emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 284 >| sending 284 bytes for ikev2_parent_outI1_common through p6p1:500 to 2001:db8:f:1::1:500 (using #1) >| a5 6c 9f 5e 29 9d e7 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >| 21 20 22 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 1c 22 00 00 2c >| 00 00 00 28 01 01 00 04 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 03 >| 03 00 00 08 03 00 00 02 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 02 >| 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 02 28 00 00 88 00 02 00 00 >| c9 80 f5 50 4a 4e f4 72 86 49 03 64 7e ff ae 74 >| b5 00 de 04 72 3b 3f 73 8a fd d2 ec 42 d4 3b da >| 01 1e b6 ef 94 b9 ab 58 93 93 54 32 d6 29 53 86 >| d3 5c 47 49 19 7c 8f 1d b0 a2 14 dd e4 a1 67 a8 >| 8b 89 ad 40 7d fb 98 1e 22 d9 2b 0d 63 33 41 1b >| 85 14 79 1f b4 03 c9 44 d9 3a 36 41 cc 92 e9 72 >| 72 d4 79 ae 78 01 3d 5d 42 3d b4 b0 c3 40 3d 0f >| 1c 36 5f ce 7f db f0 c0 09 d8 72 7f dc 7a cc 40 >| 29 00 00 14 4b d1 d6 74 07 e1 f6 a7 2f 87 d5 1d >| 7a 84 d3 b2 29 00 00 1c 00 00 40 04 53 e5 0e 67 >| ea 06 0d a8 71 b6 98 a9 1f 03 01 dc 30 af ff 9d >| 00 00 00 1c 00 00 40 05 8a d7 8b 69 1d 57 4f bd >| f4 b6 48 df 1b a8 bf f0 c5 da 2b 65 >| deleting event for #1 >| inserting event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 10 seconds for #1 >| event added at head of queue >| complete v2 state transition with STF_OK >"ikev2" #1: transition from state STATE_IKEv2_START to state STATE_PARENT_I1 >"ikev2" #1: STATE_PARENT_I1: sent v2I1, expected v2R1 >| V2 microcode entry (initiate IKE_SA_INIT) has unspecified timeout_event >| * processed 1 messages from cryptographic helpers >| next event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT in 10 seconds for #1 >| next event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT in 10 seconds for #1 >| >| next event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT in 0 seconds for #1 >| *time to handle event >| handling event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT >| event after this is EVENT_PENDING_DDNS in 49 seconds >| processing connection ikev2 >| handling event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT for 2001:db8:f:1::1 "ikev2" #1 attempt 2 of 0 >| sending 284 bytes for EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT through p6p1:500 to 2001:db8:f:1::1:500 (using #1) >| a5 6c 9f 5e 29 9d e7 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >| 21 20 22 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 1c 22 00 00 2c >| 00 00 00 28 01 01 00 04 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 03 >| 03 00 00 08 03 00 00 02 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 02 >| 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 02 28 00 00 88 00 02 00 00 >| c9 80 f5 50 4a 4e f4 72 86 49 03 64 7e ff ae 74 >| b5 00 de 04 72 3b 3f 73 8a fd d2 ec 42 d4 3b da >| 01 1e b6 ef 94 b9 ab 58 93 93 54 32 d6 29 53 86 >| d3 5c 47 49 19 7c 8f 1d b0 a2 14 dd e4 a1 67 a8 >| 8b 89 ad 40 7d fb 98 1e 22 d9 2b 0d 63 33 41 1b >| 85 14 79 1f b4 03 c9 44 d9 3a 36 41 cc 92 e9 72 >| 72 d4 79 ae 78 01 3d 5d 42 3d b4 b0 c3 40 3d 0f >| 1c 36 5f ce 7f db f0 c0 09 d8 72 7f dc 7a cc 40 >| 29 00 00 14 4b d1 d6 74 07 e1 f6 a7 2f 87 d5 1d >| 7a 84 d3 b2 29 00 00 1c 00 00 40 04 53 e5 0e 67 >| ea 06 0d a8 71 b6 98 a9 1f 03 01 dc 30 af ff 9d >| 00 00 00 1c 00 00 40 05 8a d7 8b 69 1d 57 4f bd >| f4 b6 48 df 1b a8 bf f0 c5 da 2b 65 >| inserting event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 10 seconds for #1 >| event added at head of queue >| next event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT in 10 seconds for #1 >| >| next event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT in 0 seconds for #1 >| *time to handle event >| handling event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT >| event after this is EVENT_PENDING_DDNS in 39 seconds >| processing connection ikev2 >| handling event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT for 2001:db8:f:1::1 "ikev2" #1 attempt 2 of 0 >| sending 284 bytes for EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT through p6p1:500 to 2001:db8:f:1::1:500 (using #1) >| a5 6c 9f 5e 29 9d e7 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >| 21 20 22 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 1c 22 00 00 2c >| 00 00 00 28 01 01 00 04 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 03 >| 03 00 00 08 03 00 00 02 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 02 >| 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 02 28 00 00 88 00 02 00 00 >| c9 80 f5 50 4a 4e f4 72 86 49 03 64 7e ff ae 74 >| b5 00 de 04 72 3b 3f 73 8a fd d2 ec 42 d4 3b da >| 01 1e b6 ef 94 b9 ab 58 93 93 54 32 d6 29 53 86 >| d3 5c 47 49 19 7c 8f 1d b0 a2 14 dd e4 a1 67 a8 >| 8b 89 ad 40 7d fb 98 1e 22 d9 2b 0d 63 33 41 1b >| 85 14 79 1f b4 03 c9 44 d9 3a 36 41 cc 92 e9 72 >| 72 d4 79 ae 78 01 3d 5d 42 3d b4 b0 c3 40 3d 0f >| 1c 36 5f ce 7f db f0 c0 09 d8 72 7f dc 7a cc 40 >| 29 00 00 14 4b d1 d6 74 07 e1 f6 a7 2f 87 d5 1d >| 7a 84 d3 b2 29 00 00 1c 00 00 40 04 53 e5 0e 67 >| ea 06 0d a8 71 b6 98 a9 1f 03 01 dc 30 af ff 9d >| 00 00 00 1c 00 00 40 05 8a d7 8b 69 1d 57 4f bd >| f4 b6 48 df 1b a8 bf f0 c5 da 2b 65 >| inserting event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 20 seconds for #1 >| event added at head of queue >| next event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT in 20 seconds for #1 >| >| *received 423 bytes from 2001:db8:f:1::1:500 on p6p1 (port=500) >| e4 d9 bd e8 36 f6 51 77 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >| 21 20 22 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 a7 22 00 00 2c >| 00 00 00 28 01 01 00 04 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 03 >| 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 02 03 00 00 08 03 00 00 02 >| 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 02 28 00 00 88 00 02 00 00 >| ca 38 ca c1 e5 cd 35 3d 07 90 c9 c9 44 7f c1 58 >| 01 73 4e b1 4d 7a 02 7b 8e b7 c0 06 0a 84 39 51 >| e9 88 ac 14 dc eb 29 f4 e4 b8 c0 ac d8 f7 13 75 >| 30 89 84 42 94 60 fa cc 57 4f 24 e7 f9 bf 10 5b >| 0a a1 59 4c 93 ae 79 c5 76 9c 6f 8e a2 29 40 9d >| 8c 31 d8 f6 f7 a7 8b aa c3 fc 0e 35 9b 2e be 42 >| 61 aa 61 68 25 a0 a3 ad 43 62 9f 72 8b 86 3c 72 >| cb d5 97 1b a2 50 0c ea c3 ec 3f fe b6 65 f9 c9 >| 00 00 00 d7 e7 df 53 36 c2 41 b6 f5 a1 ba 61 36 >| 0a 30 e8 5e 31 3b 63 bf 80 90 f3 cf 3e 54 6a 6f >| c5 d7 17 77 8d 70 22 37 74 d0 bb a8 e0 02 a3 fd >| 03 c4 c8 b0 8a da d9 53 67 4d 9d 81 e0 70 c6 78 >| 4a 68 dd 8a 71 dd 89 7a 6c 8f c6 15 d7 17 a2 88 >| fb 97 f9 89 d0 bb a6 70 1d 97 7d 35 ec 51 bf 62 >| e2 a8 7a fd 3e ed 10 d9 04 4a 9d ed d4 54 e6 ba >| a0 34 e8 ea 82 d8 59 75 ca f4 5b a2 a0 f6 2a a8 >| ff d7 0d f5 a9 95 b1 68 8c 9d de b8 37 ae 40 30 >| 4a ea 20 17 6f 13 49 c4 36 be 00 b6 f5 57 52 8c >| 27 66 72 09 f2 e8 bf 99 6c 0a e8 b7 96 cc 4b ba >| fd 8c af f3 ef 42 a9 19 e7 32 f9 c5 ec 95 b7 19 >| 98 06 72 03 f3 41 ce 64 53 11 80 ff 22 01 4f e9 >| 01 ad 0e 61 58 a3 fe >| **parse ISAKMP Message: >| initiator cookie: >| e4 d9 bd e8 36 f6 51 77 >| responder cookie: >| 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >| next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA >| ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) >| exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_SA_INIT >| flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_IKE_INIT >| message ID: 00 00 00 00 >| length: 423 >| processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_SA_INIT (34) >| I am receiving an IKE Request >| I am the IKE SA Original Responder >| ICOOKIE: e4 d9 bd e8 36 f6 51 77 >| RCOOKIE: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >| state hash entry 22 >| parent v2 state object not found >| ICOOKIE: e4 d9 bd e8 36 f6 51 77 >| RCOOKIE: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >| state hash entry 22 >| parent_init v2 state object not found >| selected state microcode Respond to IKE_SA_INIT >| Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA) >| ***parse IKEv2 Security Association Payload: >| next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE >| critical bit: none >| length: 44 >| processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (len=44) >| Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE) >| ***parse IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload: >| IKEv2 next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni >| critical bit: none >| length: 136 >| DH group: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1024 >| processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE (len=136) >| Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni) >| ***parse IKEv2 Nonce Payload: >| next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE >| critical bit: none >| length: 215 >| processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni (len=215) >| Now lets proceed with state specific processing >| calling processor Respond to IKE_SA_INIT >| will not send/process a dcookie >| find_host_connection me=2001:db8:1:1::1234:500 him=2001:db8:f:1::1:500 policy=IKEV2_ALLOW >| find_host_pair: comparing to 2001:db8:1:1::1234:500 2001:db8:f:1::1:500 >| find_host_pair_conn (find_host_connection): 2001:db8:1:1::1234:500 2001:db8:f:1::1:500 -> hp:ikev2 >| searching for connection with policy = IKEV2_ALLOW >| found policy = PSK+ENCRYPT+PFS+UP+IKEV1_DISABLE+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_PROPOSE+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW (ikev2) >| find_host_connection returns ikev2 >| found connection: ikev2 >| creating state object #2 at 0x7f256afbc080 >| processing connection ikev2 >| ICOOKIE: e4 d9 bd e8 36 f6 51 77 >| RCOOKIE: d4 86 3e 17 b8 49 d6 ca >| state hash entry 22 >| inserting state object #2 >| inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 0 seconds for #2 >| event added at head of queue >| processing connection ikev2 >| crypto helper 0: pcw_work: 0 >| asking crypto helper 0 to do build_kenonce; request ID 2 (len=2768, pcw_work=0) >| #2 send_crypto_helper_request:519 st->st_calculating = TRUE; >| deleting event for #2 >| crypto helper 0 read fd: 8 >| crypto helper 0 doing build_kenonce; request ID 2 >| inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_FAILED, timeout in 300 seconds for #2 >| event added after event EVENT_PENDING_PHASE2 >| complete v2 state transition with STF_SUSPEND >| * processed 0 messages from cryptographic helpers >| next event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT in 19 seconds for #1 >| next event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT in 19 seconds for #1 >| NSS: Value of Prime: >| ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c9 0f da a2 21 68 c2 34 >| c4 c6 62 8b 80 dc 1c d1 29 02 4e 08 8a 67 cc 74 >| 02 0b be a6 3b 13 9b 22 51 4a 08 79 8e 34 04 dd >| ef 95 19 b3 cd 3a 43 1b 30 2b 0a 6d f2 5f 14 37 >| 4f e1 35 6d 6d 51 c2 45 e4 85 b5 76 62 5e 7e c6 >| f4 4c 42 e9 a6 37 ed 6b 0b ff 5c b6 f4 06 b7 ed >| ee 38 6b fb 5a 89 9f a5 ae 9f 24 11 7c 4b 1f e6 >| 49 28 66 51 ec e6 53 81 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff >| NSS: Value of base: >| 02 >| NSS: generated dh priv and pub keys: 128 >| NSS: Local DH secret (pointer): 0x7f255c00aeb0 >| NSS: Public DH value sent(computed in NSS): >| fe 9b 00 43 13 56 3c a6 44 75 4b 9a 0c 54 cc 0d >| 34 62 f2 66 b5 a3 cc 79 4d 1b 81 7b 49 79 b4 bb >| 23 3e 5e 16 fa b0 01 c4 38 62 e6 28 f8 ca 14 d0 >| 32 eb 80 0c 62 e0 d6 9c 98 45 0f 61 10 9f 6a 72 >| a8 2a eb 6d ab 07 83 3d 06 36 44 07 b5 f2 ea 5b >| 2f eb b0 69 eb 15 ba 52 75 20 df 19 7a 89 e9 63 >| 1c 95 fa c6 66 0d 74 af 6c 59 0a b7 c7 b1 22 e7 >| ea d9 8d f1 20 2d 3f 6a 33 92 57 09 1d 49 fb e9 >| NSS: Local DH public value (pointer): 0x7f255c00a6a0 >| Generated nonce: >| 4e 9d 57 74 25 de ad f7 5f 25 05 e2 83 6a fd 95 >| >| crypto helper 0 has finished work (pcw_work now 1) >| crypto helper 0 replies to request ID 2 >| calling continuation function 0x7f25695d2050 >| ikev2_parent_inI1outR1_continue for #2: calculated ke+nonce, sending R1 >| processing connection ikev2 >| #2 ikev2_parent_inI1outR1_continue:847 st->st_calculating = FALSE; >| **emit ISAKMP Message: >| initiator cookie: >| e4 d9 bd e8 36 f6 51 77 >| responder cookie: >| d4 86 3e 17 b8 49 d6 ca >| next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA >| ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) >| exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_SA_INIT >| flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_MSG_RESPONSE >| message ID: 00 00 00 00 >| ***emit IKEv2 Security Association Payload: >| next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2KE >| critical bit: none >| ****parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: >| last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_LAST >| length: 40 >| prop #: 1 >| proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE >| spi size: 0 >| # transforms: 4 >| *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: >| last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST >| length: 8 >| IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR >| IKEv2 transform ID: 3DES >| *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: >| last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST >| length: 8 >| IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF >| IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA1 >| *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: >| last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST >| length: 8 >| IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG >| IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96 >| *****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: >| last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST >| length: 8 >| IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH >| IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1024 >| ipprotoid is '1' >| considering Transform Type TRANS_TYPE_ENCR, TransID 3 >| encrid(3), keylen(-1), encr_keylen(-1) >| proposal 1 succeeded encr= (policy:3DES(-1) vs offered:3DES(-1)) >| considering Transform Type TRANS_TYPE_INTEG, TransID 2 >| succeeded integ=(policy:AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96(-1) vs offered:AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96(-1)) >| considering Transform Type TRANS_TYPE_PRF, TransID 2 >| succeeded prf= (policy:PRF_HMAC_SHA1(-1) vs offered:PRF_HMAC_SHA1(-1)) >| considering Transform Type TRANS_TYPE_DH, TransID 2 >| succeeded dh= (policy:OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1024 vs offered:OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1024) >| ****emit IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: >| last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_LAST >| prop #: 1 >| proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_IKE >| spi size: 0 >| # transforms: 4 >| *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: >| last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST >| IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR >| IKEv2 transform ID: 3DES >| emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8 >| *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: >| last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST >| IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG >| IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96 >| emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8 >| *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: >| last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST >| IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_PRF >| IKEv2 transform ID: PRF_HMAC_SHA1 >| emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8 >| *****emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: >| last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST >| IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_DH >| IKEv2 transform ID: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1024 >| emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8 >| emitting length of IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: 40 >| emitting length of IKEv2 Security Association Payload: 44 >| DH public value received: >| ca 38 ca c1 e5 cd 35 3d 07 90 c9 c9 44 7f c1 58 >| 01 73 4e b1 4d 7a 02 7b 8e b7 c0 06 0a 84 39 51 >| e9 88 ac 14 dc eb 29 f4 e4 b8 c0 ac d8 f7 13 75 >| 30 89 84 42 94 60 fa cc 57 4f 24 e7 f9 bf 10 5b >| 0a a1 59 4c 93 ae 79 c5 76 9c 6f 8e a2 29 40 9d >| 8c 31 d8 f6 f7 a7 8b aa c3 fc 0e 35 9b 2e be 42 >| 61 aa 61 68 25 a0 a3 ad 43 62 9f 72 8b 86 3c 72 >| cb d5 97 1b a2 50 0c ea c3 ec 3f fe b6 65 f9 c9 >| saving DH priv (local secret) and pub key into state struct >| ***emit IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload: >| IKEv2 next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2Ni >| critical bit: none >| DH group: OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1024 >| emitting 128 raw bytes of ikev2 g^x into IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload >| ikev2 g^x fe 9b 00 43 13 56 3c a6 44 75 4b 9a 0c 54 cc 0d >| ikev2 g^x 34 62 f2 66 b5 a3 cc 79 4d 1b 81 7b 49 79 b4 bb >| ikev2 g^x 23 3e 5e 16 fa b0 01 c4 38 62 e6 28 f8 ca 14 d0 >| ikev2 g^x 32 eb 80 0c 62 e0 d6 9c 98 45 0f 61 10 9f 6a 72 >| ikev2 g^x a8 2a eb 6d ab 07 83 3d 06 36 44 07 b5 f2 ea 5b >| ikev2 g^x 2f eb b0 69 eb 15 ba 52 75 20 df 19 7a 89 e9 63 >| ikev2 g^x 1c 95 fa c6 66 0d 74 af 6c 59 0a b7 c7 b1 22 e7 >| ikev2 g^x ea d9 8d f1 20 2d 3f 6a 33 92 57 09 1d 49 fb e9 >| emitting length of IKEv2 Key Exchange Payload: 136 >| ***emit IKEv2 Nonce Payload: >| next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N >| critical bit: none >| emitting 16 raw bytes of IKEv2 nonce into IKEv2 Nonce Payload >| IKEv2 nonce 4e 9d 57 74 25 de ad f7 5f 25 05 e2 83 6a fd 95 >| emitting length of IKEv2 Nonce Payload: 20 >| NAT-Traversal support [enabled] add v2N payloads. >| natd_hash: hasher=0x7f25698935c0(20) >| natd_hash: icookie= e4 d9 bd e8 36 f6 51 77 >| natd_hash: rcookie= d4 86 3e 17 b8 49 d6 ca >| natd_hash: port=500 >| natd_hash: hash= 0a e6 76 5a 3a 20 37 26 59 0d 9e 52 71 f7 73 fc >| natd_hash: hash= ef 1a 1a a0 >| Adding a v2N Payload >| ***emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: >| next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N >| critical bit: none >| Protocol ID: PROTO_RESERVED >| SPI size: 0 >| Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP >| emitting 20 raw bytes of Notify data into IKEv2 Notify Payload >| Notify data 0a e6 76 5a 3a 20 37 26 59 0d 9e 52 71 f7 73 fc >| Notify data ef 1a 1a a0 >| emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 28 >| natd_hash: hasher=0x7f25698935c0(20) >| natd_hash: icookie= e4 d9 bd e8 36 f6 51 77 >| natd_hash: rcookie= d4 86 3e 17 b8 49 d6 ca >| natd_hash: port=500 >| natd_hash: hash= 37 ca 76 20 d9 bd 42 ff 8f 31 8e 16 e9 d0 20 65 >| natd_hash: hash= e4 35 da eb >| Adding a v2N Payload >| ***emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: >| next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE >| critical bit: none >| Protocol ID: PROTO_RESERVED >| SPI size: 0 >| Notify Message Type: v2N_NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP >| emitting 20 raw bytes of Notify data into IKEv2 Notify Payload >| Notify data 37 ca 76 20 d9 bd 42 ff 8f 31 8e 16 e9 d0 20 65 >| Notify data e4 35 da eb >| emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 28 >| no IKE message padding required >| emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 284 >| complete v2 state transition with STF_OK >"ikev2" #2: transition from state STATE_IKEv2_START to state STATE_PARENT_R1 >"ikev2" #2: STATE_PARENT_R1: received v2I1, sent v2R1 {auth=IKEv2 cipher=oakley_3des_cbc_192 integ=sha1_96 prf=sha group=MODP1024} >| sending reply packet to 2001:db8:f:1::1:500 (from port 500) >| sending 284 bytes for STATE_IKEv2_START through p6p1:500 to 2001:db8:f:1::1:500 (using #2) >| e4 d9 bd e8 36 f6 51 77 d4 86 3e 17 b8 49 d6 ca >| 21 20 22 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 1c 22 00 00 2c >| 00 00 00 28 01 01 00 04 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 03 >| 03 00 00 08 03 00 00 02 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 02 >| 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 02 28 00 00 88 00 02 00 00 >| fe 9b 00 43 13 56 3c a6 44 75 4b 9a 0c 54 cc 0d >| 34 62 f2 66 b5 a3 cc 79 4d 1b 81 7b 49 79 b4 bb >| 23 3e 5e 16 fa b0 01 c4 38 62 e6 28 f8 ca 14 d0 >| 32 eb 80 0c 62 e0 d6 9c 98 45 0f 61 10 9f 6a 72 >| a8 2a eb 6d ab 07 83 3d 06 36 44 07 b5 f2 ea 5b >| 2f eb b0 69 eb 15 ba 52 75 20 df 19 7a 89 e9 63 >| 1c 95 fa c6 66 0d 74 af 6c 59 0a b7 c7 b1 22 e7 >| ea d9 8d f1 20 2d 3f 6a 33 92 57 09 1d 49 fb e9 >| 29 00 00 14 4e 9d 57 74 25 de ad f7 5f 25 05 e2 >| 83 6a fd 95 29 00 00 1c 00 00 40 04 0a e6 76 5a >| 3a 20 37 26 59 0d 9e 52 71 f7 73 fc ef 1a 1a a0 >| 00 00 00 1c 00 00 40 05 37 ca 76 20 d9 bd 42 ff >| 8f 31 8e 16 e9 d0 20 65 e4 35 da eb >| deleting event for #2 >| inserting event EVENT_v2_RESPONDER_TIMEOUT, timeout in 200 seconds for #2 >| event added after event EVENT_PENDING_PHASE2 >| * processed 1 messages from cryptographic helpers >| next event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT in 19 seconds for #1 >| next event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT in 19 seconds for #1 >| >| *received 252 bytes from 2001:db8:f:1::1:500 on p6p1 (port=500) >| e4 d9 bd e8 36 f6 51 77 d4 86 3e 17 b8 49 d6 ca >| 2e 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 fc 23 00 00 e0 >| 08 9c bf 56 ce bf 90 32 0e 6a 3c 5b 16 f2 d9 f5 >| 6e e7 da 84 82 b4 bd 2a 63 74 84 fe 2a f2 cc 17 >| 47 fa 4e 50 c4 8f 09 f5 64 c9 20 1b 57 03 3d 68 >| 89 d9 3d 8b 1e 52 04 88 6e 19 e8 e7 12 16 dc cd >| 62 5b ef 77 0d 32 5b 36 05 d0 bc 1d 78 83 f3 ce >| 8b 92 f7 d4 a9 86 ab c1 76 58 4d 0e 9d 1c e3 a6 >| 2c 95 32 a9 d8 bd 40 4a d0 08 37 0e a4 93 5e ea >| 21 96 10 08 3f 65 93 50 a2 7e 5a 8d 8b 9b ee 1d >| f8 11 0d 64 af 4e 72 f0 90 79 db 09 a7 8a a9 ae >| 79 d5 6d 72 35 40 7e 18 05 54 23 51 e5 fc 36 89 >| ab 49 c5 bc 57 63 9e 6b 4d bb ce 13 b2 47 d5 f0 >| f7 88 a7 33 46 e5 5b 51 43 c7 8a c8 8e c2 a3 91 >| 9d 73 c7 ba d2 67 20 c7 5b be c0 3b 43 54 a0 c3 >| 06 b3 89 cf 5b 59 37 2f 8b e5 0c 67 >| **parse ISAKMP Message: >| initiator cookie: >| e4 d9 bd e8 36 f6 51 77 >| responder cookie: >| d4 86 3e 17 b8 49 d6 ca >| next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2E >| ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) >| exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_AUTH >| flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_IKE_INIT >| message ID: 00 00 00 01 >| length: 252 >| processing version=2.0 packet with exchange type=ISAKMP_v2_AUTH (35) >| I am receiving an IKE Request >| I am the IKE SA Original Responder >| ICOOKIE: e4 d9 bd e8 36 f6 51 77 >| RCOOKIE: d4 86 3e 17 b8 49 d6 ca >| state hash entry 22 >| parent v2 peer and cookies match on #2 >| v2 state object #2 found, in STATE_PARENT_R1 >| state found and its state is STATE_PARENT_R1 >| selected state microcode respond to IKE_AUTH >| #2 state_busy:1855 st != NULL && st->st_calculating == FALSE; >| processing connection ikev2 >| Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2E) >| ***parse IKEv2 Encryption Payload: >| next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDi >| critical bit: none >| length: 224 >| processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2E (len=224) >| Now lets proceed with state specific processing >| calling processor respond to IKE_AUTH >| ikev2 parent inI2outR2: calculating g^{xy} in order to decrypt I2 >| calculating skeyseed using prf=PRF_HMAC_SHA1 integ=AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96 cipherkey=3DES >| Copying DH pub key pointer to be sent to a thread helper >| crypto helper 0: pcw_work: 0 >| asking crypto helper 0 to do compute dh (V2); request ID 3 (len=2768, pcw_work=0) >| #2 send_crypto_helper_request:519 st->st_calculating = TRUE; >| deleting event for #2 >| inserting event EVENT_CRYPTO_FAILED, timeout in 300 seconds for #2 >| event added after event EVENT_PENDING_PHASE2 >| complete v2 state transition with STF_SUSPEND >| * processed 0 messages from cryptographic helpers >| next event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT in 18 seconds for #1 >| next event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT in 18 seconds for #1 >| crypto helper 0 read fd: 8 >| crypto helper 0 doing compute dh (V2); request ID 3 >| peer's g: ca 38 ca c1 e5 cd 35 3d 07 90 c9 c9 44 7f c1 58 >| peer's g: 01 73 4e b1 4d 7a 02 7b 8e b7 c0 06 0a 84 39 51 >| peer's g: e9 88 ac 14 dc eb 29 f4 e4 b8 c0 ac d8 f7 13 75 >| peer's g: 30 89 84 42 94 60 fa cc 57 4f 24 e7 f9 bf 10 5b >| peer's g: 0a a1 59 4c 93 ae 79 c5 76 9c 6f 8e a2 29 40 9d >| peer's g: 8c 31 d8 f6 f7 a7 8b aa c3 fc 0e 35 9b 2e be 42 >| peer's g: 61 aa 61 68 25 a0 a3 ad 43 62 9f 72 8b 86 3c 72 >| peer's g: cb d5 97 1b a2 50 0c ea c3 ec 3f fe b6 65 f9 c9 >| Started DH shared-secret computation in NSS: >| Dropped no leading zeros 128 >| calc_dh_shared(): time elapsed (OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1024): 734 usec >| NSS: Started key computation >| calculating skeyseed using prf=PRF_HMAC_SHA1 integ=AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96 cipherkey=24 >| skeyid inputs (digi+NI+NR+shared) hasher: oakley_sha >| ni: e7 df 53 36 c2 41 b6 f5 a1 ba 61 36 0a 30 e8 5e >| ni: 31 3b 63 bf 80 90 f3 cf 3e 54 6a 6f c5 d7 17 77 >| ni: 8d 70 22 37 74 d0 bb a8 e0 02 a3 fd 03 c4 c8 b0 >| ni: 8a da d9 53 67 4d 9d 81 e0 70 c6 78 4a 68 dd 8a >| ni: 71 dd 89 7a 6c 8f c6 15 d7 17 a2 88 fb 97 f9 89 >| ni: d0 bb a6 70 1d 97 7d 35 ec 51 bf 62 e2 a8 7a fd >| ni: 3e ed 10 d9 04 4a 9d ed d4 54 e6 ba a0 34 e8 ea >| ni: 82 d8 59 75 ca f4 5b a2 a0 f6 2a a8 ff d7 0d f5 >| ni: a9 95 b1 68 8c 9d de b8 37 ae 40 30 4a ea 20 17 >| ni: 6f 13 49 c4 36 be 00 b6 f5 57 52 8c 27 66 72 09 >| ni: f2 e8 bf 99 6c 0a e8 b7 96 cc 4b ba fd 8c af f3 >| ni: ef 42 a9 19 e7 32 f9 c5 ec 95 b7 19 98 06 72 03 >| ni: f3 41 ce 64 53 11 80 ff 22 01 4f e9 01 ad 0e 61 >| ni: 58 a3 fe >| nr: 4e 9d 57 74 25 de ad f7 5f 25 05 e2 83 6a fd 95 >| NSS: digisig skeyid pointer: 0x7f255c012400 >| PRF+ input >| Ni e7 df 53 36 c2 41 b6 f5 a1 ba 61 36 0a 30 e8 5e >| Ni 31 3b 63 bf 80 90 f3 cf 3e 54 6a 6f c5 d7 17 77 >| Ni 8d 70 22 37 74 d0 bb a8 e0 02 a3 fd 03 c4 c8 b0 >| Ni 8a da d9 53 67 4d 9d 81 e0 70 c6 78 4a 68 dd 8a >| Ni 71 dd 89 7a 6c 8f c6 15 d7 17 a2 88 fb 97 f9 89 >| Ni d0 bb a6 70 1d 97 7d 35 ec 51 bf 62 e2 a8 7a fd >| Ni 3e ed 10 d9 04 4a 9d ed d4 54 e6 ba a0 34 e8 ea >| Ni 82 d8 59 75 ca f4 5b a2 a0 f6 2a a8 ff d7 0d f5 >| Ni a9 95 b1 68 8c 9d de b8 37 ae 40 30 4a ea 20 17 >| Ni 6f 13 49 c4 36 be 00 b6 f5 57 52 8c 27 66 72 09 >| Ni f2 e8 bf 99 6c 0a e8 b7 96 cc 4b ba fd 8c af f3 >| Ni ef 42 a9 19 e7 32 f9 c5 ec 95 b7 19 98 06 72 03 >| Ni f3 41 ce 64 53 11 80 ff 22 01 4f e9 01 ad 0e 61 >| Ni 58 a3 fe >| Nr 4e 9d 57 74 25 de ad f7 5f 25 05 e2 83 6a fd 95 >| SPIi e4 d9 bd e8 36 f6 51 77 >| SPIr d4 86 3e 17 b8 49 d6 ca >| Total keysize needed 148 >| NSS ikev2: finished computing key material for IKEv2 SA >| NSS ikev2: finished computing individual keys for IKEv2 SA >| calc_skeyseed_v2 pointers: shared 0x7f255c00bff0, skeyseed 0x7f255c012400, SK_d 0x7f255c013c80, SK_ai 0x7f255c010ac0, SK_ar 0x7f255c013d10, SK_ei 0x7f255c00f130, SK_er 0x7f255c000d40, SK_pi 0x7f255c015730, SK_pr 0x7f255c017100 >| >| crypto helper 0 has finished work (pcw_work now 1) >| crypto helper 0 replies to request ID 3 >| calling continuation function 0x7f25695d18e0 >| ikev2_parent_inI2outR2_continue for #2: calculating g^{xy}, sending R2 >| processing connection ikev2 >| #2 ikev2_parent_inI2outR2_continue:1864 st->st_calculating = FALSE; >| hmac_update data value: >| e4 d9 bd e8 36 f6 51 77 d4 86 3e 17 b8 49 d6 ca >| 2e 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 fc 23 00 00 e0 >| 08 9c bf 56 ce bf 90 32 0e 6a 3c 5b 16 f2 d9 f5 >| 6e e7 da 84 82 b4 bd 2a 63 74 84 fe 2a f2 cc 17 >| 47 fa 4e 50 c4 8f 09 f5 64 c9 20 1b 57 03 3d 68 >| 89 d9 3d 8b 1e 52 04 88 6e 19 e8 e7 12 16 dc cd >| 62 5b ef 77 0d 32 5b 36 05 d0 bc 1d 78 83 f3 ce >| 8b 92 f7 d4 a9 86 ab c1 76 58 4d 0e 9d 1c e3 a6 >| 2c 95 32 a9 d8 bd 40 4a d0 08 37 0e a4 93 5e ea >| 21 96 10 08 3f 65 93 50 a2 7e 5a 8d 8b 9b ee 1d >| f8 11 0d 64 af 4e 72 f0 90 79 db 09 a7 8a a9 ae >| 79 d5 6d 72 35 40 7e 18 05 54 23 51 e5 fc 36 89 >| ab 49 c5 bc 57 63 9e 6b 4d bb ce 13 b2 47 d5 f0 >| f7 88 a7 33 46 e5 5b 51 43 c7 8a c8 8e c2 a3 91 >| 9d 73 c7 ba d2 67 20 c7 5b be c0 3b 43 54 a0 c3 >| hmac_update: inside if >| hmac_update: after digest >| hmac_update: after assert >| data being hmac: e4 d9 bd e8 36 f6 51 77 d4 86 3e 17 b8 49 d6 ca >| data being hmac: 2e 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 fc 23 00 00 e0 >| data being hmac: 08 9c bf 56 ce bf 90 32 0e 6a 3c 5b 16 f2 d9 f5 >| data being hmac: 6e e7 da 84 82 b4 bd 2a 63 74 84 fe 2a f2 cc 17 >| data being hmac: 47 fa 4e 50 c4 8f 09 f5 64 c9 20 1b 57 03 3d 68 >| data being hmac: 89 d9 3d 8b 1e 52 04 88 6e 19 e8 e7 12 16 dc cd >| data being hmac: 62 5b ef 77 0d 32 5b 36 05 d0 bc 1d 78 83 f3 ce >| data being hmac: 8b 92 f7 d4 a9 86 ab c1 76 58 4d 0e 9d 1c e3 a6 >| data being hmac: 2c 95 32 a9 d8 bd 40 4a d0 08 37 0e a4 93 5e ea >| data being hmac: 21 96 10 08 3f 65 93 50 a2 7e 5a 8d 8b 9b ee 1d >| data being hmac: f8 11 0d 64 af 4e 72 f0 90 79 db 09 a7 8a a9 ae >| data being hmac: 79 d5 6d 72 35 40 7e 18 05 54 23 51 e5 fc 36 89 >| data being hmac: ab 49 c5 bc 57 63 9e 6b 4d bb ce 13 b2 47 d5 f0 >| data being hmac: f7 88 a7 33 46 e5 5b 51 43 c7 8a c8 8e c2 a3 91 >| data being hmac: 9d 73 c7 ba d2 67 20 c7 5b be c0 3b 43 54 a0 c3 >| R2 calculated auth: 06 b3 89 cf 5b 59 37 2f 8b e5 0c 67 >| R2 provided auth: 06 b3 89 cf 5b 59 37 2f 8b e5 0c 67 >| authenticator matched >| data before decryption: >| 0e 6a 3c 5b 16 f2 d9 f5 6e e7 da 84 82 b4 bd 2a >| 63 74 84 fe 2a f2 cc 17 47 fa 4e 50 c4 8f 09 f5 >| 64 c9 20 1b 57 03 3d 68 89 d9 3d 8b 1e 52 04 88 >| 6e 19 e8 e7 12 16 dc cd 62 5b ef 77 0d 32 5b 36 >| 05 d0 bc 1d 78 83 f3 ce 8b 92 f7 d4 a9 86 ab c1 >| 76 58 4d 0e 9d 1c e3 a6 2c 95 32 a9 d8 bd 40 4a >| d0 08 37 0e a4 93 5e ea 21 96 10 08 3f 65 93 50 >| a2 7e 5a 8d 8b 9b ee 1d f8 11 0d 64 af 4e 72 f0 >| 90 79 db 09 a7 8a a9 ae 79 d5 6d 72 35 40 7e 18 >| 05 54 23 51 e5 fc 36 89 ab 49 c5 bc 57 63 9e 6b >| 4d bb ce 13 b2 47 d5 f0 f7 88 a7 33 46 e5 5b 51 >| 43 c7 8a c8 8e c2 a3 91 9d 73 c7 ba d2 67 20 c7 >| 5b be c0 3b 43 54 a0 c3 >| NSS: do_3des init start >| NSS: do_3des init end >| decrypted payload: 27 00 00 18 05 00 00 00 20 01 0d b8 00 0f 00 01 >| decrypted payload: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 29 00 00 1c 02 00 00 00 >| decrypted payload: 75 6c 98 1a 20 cd b3 d5 74 77 fb 3a 14 a7 5a ba >| decrypted payload: da 94 1c 7d 21 00 00 08 00 00 40 07 2c 00 00 28 >| decrypted payload: 00 00 00 24 01 03 04 03 91 09 92 2e 03 00 00 08 >| decrypted payload: 01 00 00 03 03 00 00 08 03 00 00 02 00 00 00 08 >| decrypted payload: 05 00 00 00 2d 00 00 30 01 00 00 00 08 00 00 28 >| decrypted payload: 00 00 ff ff 20 01 0d b8 00 0f 00 01 00 00 00 00 >| decrypted payload: 00 00 00 01 20 01 0d b8 00 0f 00 01 00 00 00 00 >| decrypted payload: 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 30 01 00 00 00 08 00 00 28 >| decrypted payload: 00 00 ff ff 20 01 0d b8 00 01 00 01 00 00 00 00 >| decrypted payload: 00 00 12 34 20 01 0d b8 00 01 00 01 00 00 00 00 >| decrypted payload: 00 00 12 34 be 30 b8 03 >| striping 4 bytes as pad >| Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDi) >| **parse IKEv2 Identification Payload: >| next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH >| critical bit: none >| length: 24 >| id_type: ID_IPV6_ADDR >| processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDi (len=24) >| Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH) >| **parse IKEv2 Authentication Payload: >| next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N >| critical bit: none >| length: 28 >| auth method: IKEv2_AUTH_SHARED >| processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH (len=28) >| Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N) >| **parse IKEv2 Notify Payload: >| next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA >| critical bit: none >| length: 8 >| Protocol ID: PROTO_RESERVED >| SPI size: 0 >| Notify Message Type: v2N_USE_TRANSPORT_MODE >| processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N (len=8) >| Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA) >| **parse IKEv2 Security Association Payload: >| next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi >| critical bit: none >| length: 40 >| processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA (len=40) >| Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi) >| **parse IKEv2 Traffic Selector Payload: >| next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr >| critical bit: none >| length: 48 >| number of TS: 1 >| processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi (len=48) >| Now let's proceed with payload (ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr) >| **parse IKEv2 Traffic Selector Payload: >| next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE >| critical bit: none >| length: 48 >| number of TS: 1 >| processing payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr (len=48) >"ikev2" #2: IKEv2 mode peer ID is ID_IPV6_ADDR: '2001:db8:f:1::1' >| idhash verify I2 05 00 00 00 20 01 0d b8 00 0f 00 01 00 00 00 00 >| idhash verify I2 00 00 00 01 >| hmac_update data value: >| 05 00 00 00 20 01 0d b8 00 0f 00 01 00 00 00 00 >| 00 00 00 01 >| hmac_update: inside if >| hmac_update: after digest >| hmac_update: after assert >| started looking for secret for 2001:db8:1:1::1234->2001:db8:f:1::1 of kind PPK_PSK >| actually looking for secret for 2001:db8:1:1::1234->2001:db8:f:1::1 of kind PPK_PSK >| line 1: key type PPK_PSK(2001:db8:1:1::1234) to type PPK_PSK >| 1: compared key %any to 2001:db8:1:1::1234 / 2001:db8:f:1::1 -> 2 >| 2: compared key %any to 2001:db8:1:1::1234 / 2001:db8:f:1::1 -> 2 >| line 1: match=2 >| best_match 0>2 best=0x7f256afb9f20 (line=1) >| concluding with best_match=2 best=0x7f256afb9f20 (lineno=1) >| hmac_update data value: >| 4b 65 79 20 50 61 64 20 66 6f 72 20 49 4b 45 76 >| 32 >| hmac_update: inside if >| hmac_update: after digest >| hmac_update: after assert >| negotiated prf: oakley_sha hash length: 20 >| inner prf output 39 cf c8 93 0c 25 cb 0e 02 cc 09 14 9e 4e 66 ea >| inner prf output 6b 6a a6 1e >| hmac_update data value: >| e4 d9 bd e8 36 f6 51 77 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >| 21 20 22 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 a7 22 00 00 2c >| 00 00 00 28 01 01 00 04 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 03 >| 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 02 03 00 00 08 03 00 00 02 >| 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 02 28 00 00 88 00 02 00 00 >| ca 38 ca c1 e5 cd 35 3d 07 90 c9 c9 44 7f c1 58 >| 01 73 4e b1 4d 7a 02 7b 8e b7 c0 06 0a 84 39 51 >| e9 88 ac 14 dc eb 29 f4 e4 b8 c0 ac d8 f7 13 75 >| 30 89 84 42 94 60 fa cc 57 4f 24 e7 f9 bf 10 5b >| 0a a1 59 4c 93 ae 79 c5 76 9c 6f 8e a2 29 40 9d >| 8c 31 d8 f6 f7 a7 8b aa c3 fc 0e 35 9b 2e be 42 >| 61 aa 61 68 25 a0 a3 ad 43 62 9f 72 8b 86 3c 72 >| cb d5 97 1b a2 50 0c ea c3 ec 3f fe b6 65 f9 c9 >| 00 00 00 d7 e7 df 53 36 c2 41 b6 f5 a1 ba 61 36 >| 0a 30 e8 5e 31 3b 63 bf 80 90 f3 cf 3e 54 6a 6f >| c5 d7 17 77 8d 70 22 37 74 d0 bb a8 e0 02 a3 fd >| 03 c4 c8 b0 8a da d9 53 67 4d 9d 81 e0 70 c6 78 >| 4a 68 dd 8a 71 dd 89 7a 6c 8f c6 15 d7 17 a2 88 >| fb 97 f9 89 d0 bb a6 70 1d 97 7d 35 ec 51 bf 62 >| e2 a8 7a fd 3e ed 10 d9 04 4a 9d ed d4 54 e6 ba >| a0 34 e8 ea 82 d8 59 75 ca f4 5b a2 a0 f6 2a a8 >| ff d7 0d f5 a9 95 b1 68 8c 9d de b8 37 ae 40 30 >| 4a ea 20 17 6f 13 49 c4 36 be 00 b6 f5 57 52 8c >| 27 66 72 09 f2 e8 bf 99 6c 0a e8 b7 96 cc 4b ba >| fd 8c af f3 ef 42 a9 19 e7 32 f9 c5 ec 95 b7 19 >| 98 06 72 03 f3 41 ce 64 53 11 80 ff 22 01 4f e9 >| 01 ad 0e 61 58 a3 fe >| hmac_update: inside if >| hmac_update: after digest >| hmac_update: after assert >| hmac_update data value: >| 4e 9d 57 74 25 de ad f7 5f 25 05 e2 83 6a fd 95 >| hmac_update: inside if >| hmac_update: after digest >| hmac_update: after assert >| hmac_update data value: >| cb 9c fa 81 65 ea f9 2d fc b7 c3 2d 59 ca 7a 36 >| fd d7 95 57 >| hmac_update: inside if >| hmac_update: after digest >| hmac_update: after assert >| inputs to hash1 (first packet) >| e4 d9 bd e8 36 f6 51 77 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >| 21 20 22 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 a7 22 00 00 2c >| 00 00 00 28 01 01 00 04 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 03 >| 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 02 03 00 00 08 03 00 00 02 >| 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 02 28 00 00 88 00 02 00 00 >| ca 38 ca c1 e5 cd 35 3d 07 90 c9 c9 44 7f c1 58 >| 01 73 4e b1 4d 7a 02 7b 8e b7 c0 06 0a 84 39 51 >| e9 88 ac 14 dc eb 29 f4 e4 b8 c0 ac d8 f7 13 75 >| 30 89 84 42 94 60 fa cc 57 4f 24 e7 f9 bf 10 5b >| 0a a1 59 4c 93 ae 79 c5 76 9c 6f 8e a2 29 40 9d >| 8c 31 d8 f6 f7 a7 8b aa c3 fc 0e 35 9b 2e be 42 >| 61 aa 61 68 25 a0 a3 ad 43 62 9f 72 8b 86 3c 72 >| cb d5 97 1b a2 50 0c ea c3 ec 3f fe b6 65 f9 c9 >| 00 00 00 d7 e7 df 53 36 c2 41 b6 f5 a1 ba 61 36 >| 0a 30 e8 5e 31 3b 63 bf 80 90 f3 cf 3e 54 6a 6f >| c5 d7 17 77 8d 70 22 37 74 d0 bb a8 e0 02 a3 fd >| 03 c4 c8 b0 8a da d9 53 67 4d 9d 81 e0 70 c6 78 >| 4a 68 dd 8a 71 dd 89 7a 6c 8f c6 15 d7 17 a2 88 >| fb 97 f9 89 d0 bb a6 70 1d 97 7d 35 ec 51 bf 62 >| e2 a8 7a fd 3e ed 10 d9 04 4a 9d ed d4 54 e6 ba >| a0 34 e8 ea 82 d8 59 75 ca f4 5b a2 a0 f6 2a a8 >| ff d7 0d f5 a9 95 b1 68 8c 9d de b8 37 ae 40 30 >| 4a ea 20 17 6f 13 49 c4 36 be 00 b6 f5 57 52 8c >| 27 66 72 09 f2 e8 bf 99 6c 0a e8 b7 96 cc 4b ba >| fd 8c af f3 ef 42 a9 19 e7 32 f9 c5 ec 95 b7 19 >| 98 06 72 03 f3 41 ce 64 53 11 80 ff 22 01 4f e9 >| 01 ad 0e 61 58 a3 fe >| inputs to hash2 (responder nonce) >| 4e 9d 57 74 25 de ad f7 5f 25 05 e2 83 6a fd 95 >| idhash cb 9c fa 81 65 ea f9 2d fc b7 c3 2d 59 ca 7a 36 >| idhash fd d7 95 57 >| Received PSK auth octets >| 75 6c 98 1a 20 cd b3 d5 74 77 fb 3a 14 a7 5a ba >| da 94 1c 7d >| Calculated PSK auth octets >| 75 6c 98 1a 20 cd b3 d5 74 77 fb 3a 14 a7 5a ba >| da 94 1c 7d >| notify payload detected, should be processed.... >| deleting event for #2 >| inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 3330 seconds for #2 >| event added after event EVENT_PENDING_PHASE2 >| **emit ISAKMP Message: >| initiator cookie: >| e4 d9 bd e8 36 f6 51 77 >| responder cookie: >| d4 86 3e 17 b8 49 d6 ca >| next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2E >| ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) >| exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_AUTH >| flags: ISAKMP_FLAG_MSG_RESPONSE >| message ID: 00 00 00 01 >| ***emit IKEv2 Encryption Payload: >| next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2IDr >| critical bit: none >| emitting 8 zero bytes of iv into IKEv2 Encryption Payload >| IKEv2 thinking whether to send my certificate: >| my policy has no RSASIG, the policy is : PSK+ENCRYPT+PFS+UP+IKEV1_DISABLE+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_PROPOSE+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW >| sendcert: CERT_ALWAYSSEND and I did not get a certificate request >| so do not send cert. >| I did not send a certificate because digital signatures are not being used. (PSK) >| *****emit IKEv2 Identification Payload: >| next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2AUTH >| critical bit: none >| id_type: ID_IPV6_ADDR >| emitting 16 raw bytes of my identity into IKEv2 Identification Payload >| my identity 20 01 0d b8 00 01 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 12 34 >| emitting length of IKEv2 Identification Payload: 24 >| idhash calc R2 05 00 00 00 20 01 0d b8 00 01 00 01 00 00 00 00 >| idhash calc R2 00 00 12 34 >| hmac_update data value: >| 05 00 00 00 20 01 0d b8 00 01 00 01 00 00 00 00 >| 00 00 12 34 >| hmac_update: inside if >| hmac_update: after digest >| hmac_update: after assert >| assembled IDr payload -- CERT next >| CHILD SA proposals received >| going to assemble AUTH payload >| *****emit IKEv2 Authentication Payload: >| next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2SA >| critical bit: none >| auth method: IKEv2_AUTH_SHARED >| started looking for secret for 2001:db8:1:1::1234->2001:db8:f:1::1 of kind PPK_PSK >| actually looking for secret for 2001:db8:1:1::1234->2001:db8:f:1::1 of kind PPK_PSK >| line 1: key type PPK_PSK(2001:db8:1:1::1234) to type PPK_PSK >| 1: compared key %any to 2001:db8:1:1::1234 / 2001:db8:f:1::1 -> 2 >| 2: compared key %any to 2001:db8:1:1::1234 / 2001:db8:f:1::1 -> 2 >| line 1: match=2 >| best_match 0>2 best=0x7f256afb9f20 (line=1) >| concluding with best_match=2 best=0x7f256afb9f20 (lineno=1) >| hmac_update data value: >| 4b 65 79 20 50 61 64 20 66 6f 72 20 49 4b 45 76 >| 32 >| hmac_update: inside if >| hmac_update: after digest >| hmac_update: after assert >| negotiated prf: oakley_sha hash length: 20 >| inner prf output 39 cf c8 93 0c 25 cb 0e 02 cc 09 14 9e 4e 66 ea >| inner prf output 6b 6a a6 1e >| hmac_update data value: >| e4 d9 bd e8 36 f6 51 77 d4 86 3e 17 b8 49 d6 ca >| 21 20 22 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 1c 22 00 00 2c >| 00 00 00 28 01 01 00 04 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 03 >| 03 00 00 08 03 00 00 02 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 02 >| 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 02 28 00 00 88 00 02 00 00 >| fe 9b 00 43 13 56 3c a6 44 75 4b 9a 0c 54 cc 0d >| 34 62 f2 66 b5 a3 cc 79 4d 1b 81 7b 49 79 b4 bb >| 23 3e 5e 16 fa b0 01 c4 38 62 e6 28 f8 ca 14 d0 >| 32 eb 80 0c 62 e0 d6 9c 98 45 0f 61 10 9f 6a 72 >| a8 2a eb 6d ab 07 83 3d 06 36 44 07 b5 f2 ea 5b >| 2f eb b0 69 eb 15 ba 52 75 20 df 19 7a 89 e9 63 >| 1c 95 fa c6 66 0d 74 af 6c 59 0a b7 c7 b1 22 e7 >| ea d9 8d f1 20 2d 3f 6a 33 92 57 09 1d 49 fb e9 >| 29 00 00 14 4e 9d 57 74 25 de ad f7 5f 25 05 e2 >| 83 6a fd 95 29 00 00 1c 00 00 40 04 0a e6 76 5a >| 3a 20 37 26 59 0d 9e 52 71 f7 73 fc ef 1a 1a a0 >| 00 00 00 1c 00 00 40 05 37 ca 76 20 d9 bd 42 ff >| 8f 31 8e 16 e9 d0 20 65 e4 35 da eb >| hmac_update: inside if >| hmac_update: after digest >| hmac_update: after assert >| hmac_update data value: >| e7 df 53 36 c2 41 b6 f5 a1 ba 61 36 0a 30 e8 5e >| 31 3b 63 bf 80 90 f3 cf 3e 54 6a 6f c5 d7 17 77 >| 8d 70 22 37 74 d0 bb a8 e0 02 a3 fd 03 c4 c8 b0 >| 8a da d9 53 67 4d 9d 81 e0 70 c6 78 4a 68 dd 8a >| 71 dd 89 7a 6c 8f c6 15 d7 17 a2 88 fb 97 f9 89 >| d0 bb a6 70 1d 97 7d 35 ec 51 bf 62 e2 a8 7a fd >| 3e ed 10 d9 04 4a 9d ed d4 54 e6 ba a0 34 e8 ea >| 82 d8 59 75 ca f4 5b a2 a0 f6 2a a8 ff d7 0d f5 >| a9 95 b1 68 8c 9d de b8 37 ae 40 30 4a ea 20 17 >| 6f 13 49 c4 36 be 00 b6 f5 57 52 8c 27 66 72 09 >| f2 e8 bf 99 6c 0a e8 b7 96 cc 4b ba fd 8c af f3 >| ef 42 a9 19 e7 32 f9 c5 ec 95 b7 19 98 06 72 03 >| f3 41 ce 64 53 11 80 ff 22 01 4f e9 01 ad 0e 61 >| 58 a3 fe >| hmac_update: inside if >| hmac_update: after digest >| hmac_update: after assert >| hmac_update data value: >| f8 2b 53 00 0c bc 8c e6 8b ed f1 70 26 5e 54 f4 >| 85 21 93 1d >| hmac_update: inside if >| hmac_update: after digest >| hmac_update: after assert >| inputs to hash1 (first packet) >| e4 d9 bd e8 36 f6 51 77 d4 86 3e 17 b8 49 d6 ca >| 21 20 22 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 1c 22 00 00 2c >| 00 00 00 28 01 01 00 04 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 03 >| 03 00 00 08 03 00 00 02 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 02 >| 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 02 28 00 00 88 00 02 00 00 >| fe 9b 00 43 13 56 3c a6 44 75 4b 9a 0c 54 cc 0d >| 34 62 f2 66 b5 a3 cc 79 4d 1b 81 7b 49 79 b4 bb >| 23 3e 5e 16 fa b0 01 c4 38 62 e6 28 f8 ca 14 d0 >| 32 eb 80 0c 62 e0 d6 9c 98 45 0f 61 10 9f 6a 72 >| a8 2a eb 6d ab 07 83 3d 06 36 44 07 b5 f2 ea 5b >| 2f eb b0 69 eb 15 ba 52 75 20 df 19 7a 89 e9 63 >| 1c 95 fa c6 66 0d 74 af 6c 59 0a b7 c7 b1 22 e7 >| ea d9 8d f1 20 2d 3f 6a 33 92 57 09 1d 49 fb e9 >| 29 00 00 14 4e 9d 57 74 25 de ad f7 5f 25 05 e2 >| 83 6a fd 95 29 00 00 1c 00 00 40 04 0a e6 76 5a >| 3a 20 37 26 59 0d 9e 52 71 f7 73 fc ef 1a 1a a0 >| 00 00 00 1c 00 00 40 05 37 ca 76 20 d9 bd 42 ff >| 8f 31 8e 16 e9 d0 20 65 e4 35 da eb >| inputs to hash2 (initiator nonce) >| e7 df 53 36 c2 41 b6 f5 a1 ba 61 36 0a 30 e8 5e >| 31 3b 63 bf 80 90 f3 cf 3e 54 6a 6f c5 d7 17 77 >| 8d 70 22 37 74 d0 bb a8 e0 02 a3 fd 03 c4 c8 b0 >| 8a da d9 53 67 4d 9d 81 e0 70 c6 78 4a 68 dd 8a >| 71 dd 89 7a 6c 8f c6 15 d7 17 a2 88 fb 97 f9 89 >| d0 bb a6 70 1d 97 7d 35 ec 51 bf 62 e2 a8 7a fd >| 3e ed 10 d9 04 4a 9d ed d4 54 e6 ba a0 34 e8 ea >| 82 d8 59 75 ca f4 5b a2 a0 f6 2a a8 ff d7 0d f5 >| a9 95 b1 68 8c 9d de b8 37 ae 40 30 4a ea 20 17 >| 6f 13 49 c4 36 be 00 b6 f5 57 52 8c 27 66 72 09 >| f2 e8 bf 99 6c 0a e8 b7 96 cc 4b ba fd 8c af f3 >| ef 42 a9 19 e7 32 f9 c5 ec 95 b7 19 98 06 72 03 >| f3 41 ce 64 53 11 80 ff 22 01 4f e9 01 ad 0e 61 >| 58 a3 fe >| idhash f8 2b 53 00 0c bc 8c e6 8b ed f1 70 26 5e 54 f4 >| idhash 85 21 93 1d >| PSK auth octets e7 50 35 1a cd 5a cf 47 e0 11 dd fd d3 09 bf 51 >| PSK auth octets 71 83 39 7b >| emitting 20 raw bytes of PSK auth into IKEv2 Authentication Payload >| PSK auth e7 50 35 1a cd 5a cf 47 e0 11 dd fd d3 09 bf 51 >| PSK auth 71 83 39 7b >| emitting length of IKEv2 Authentication Payload: 28 >| ***parse IKEv2 Traffic Selector: >| TS type: IKEv2_TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE >| IP Protocol ID: 0 >| length: 40 >| start port: 0 >| end port: 65535 >| parsing 16 raw bytes of IKEv2 Traffic Selector into ipv6 ts >| ipv6 ts 20 01 0d b8 00 0f 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 >| parsing 16 raw bytes of IKEv2 Traffic Selector into ipv6 ts >| ipv6 ts 20 01 0d b8 00 0f 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 >| ***parse IKEv2 Traffic Selector: >| TS type: IKEv2_TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE >| IP Protocol ID: 0 >| length: 40 >| start port: 0 >| end port: 65535 >| parsing 16 raw bytes of IKEv2 Traffic Selector into ipv6 ts >| ipv6 ts 20 01 0d b8 00 01 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 12 34 >| parsing 16 raw bytes of IKEv2 Traffic Selector into ipv6 ts >| ipv6 ts 20 01 0d b8 00 01 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 12 34 >| ikev2_evaluate_connection_fit evaluating our I=ikev2:2001:db8:f:1::1/128:0/0 R=2001:db8:1:1::1234/128:0/0 to their: >| tsi[0]=2001:db8:f:1::1/2001:db8:f:1::1 proto=0 portrange 0-65535, tsr[0]=2001:db8:1:1::1234/2001:db8:1:1::1234 proto=0 portrange 0-65535 >| ei->port 0 tsi[tsi_ni].startport 0 tsi[tsi_ni].endport 65535 >| has ts_range1=0 maskbits1=128 ts_range2=0 maskbits2=128 fitbits=32896 <> -1 >| bfit_n=ikev2_evaluate_connection_fit found better fit c ikev2 >| ei->port 0 tsi[tsi_ni].startport 0 tsi[tsi_ni].endport 65535 narrowing=no >| tsi[0] 0-65535 == ei 0-65535 exact match all ports fitrange1 65535 >| tsr[0] 0-65535 == ei 0-65535 exact match all ports fitrange2 65535 >| is a match >| and is a better fit tsi[0] fitrange1 65535 tsr[0] fitrange2 65535 fitbits 16842495 >| port_fitness 16842495 >| ikev2_evaluate_connection_port_fit found better fit c ikev2, tsi[0],tsr[0] >| ei->protocol 0 tsi[tsi_ni].ipprotoid 0 narrowing=no >| tsi[0] 0 == ei->protocol 0 exact match fitrange1 255 >| tsr[0] 0 == er->protocol 0 exact match fitrange2 255 >| is a match >| and is a better fit tsi[0] fitrange1 255 tsr[0] fitrange2 255 fitbits 65535 >| protocol_fitnes 65535 >| ikev2_evaluate_connection_protocol_fit found better fit c ikev2, tsi[0],tsr[0] >| find_host_pair: comparing to 2001:db8:1:1::1234:500 2001:db8:f:1::1:500 >| checking hostpair 2001:db8:1:1::1234/128 -> 2001:db8:f:1::1/128 is found >| match_id a=2001:db8:f:1::1 >| b=2001:db8:f:1::1 >| results matched >| trusted_ca called with a=(empty) b=(empty) >| ikev2_evaluate_connection_fit evaluating our I=ikev2:2001:db8:f:1::1/128:0/0 R=2001:db8:1:1::1234/128:0/0 to their: >| tsi[0]=2001:db8:f:1::1/2001:db8:f:1::1 proto=0 portrange 0-65535, tsr[0]=2001:db8:1:1::1234/2001:db8:1:1::1234 proto=0 portrange 0-65535 >| ei->port 0 tsi[tsi_ni].startport 0 tsi[tsi_ni].endport 65535 >| has ts_range1=0 maskbits1=128 ts_range2=0 maskbits2=128 fitbits=32896 <> -1 >| prefix range fit d ikev2 d->name was rejected by port matching >| duplicating state object #2 >| creating state object #3 at 0x7f256afbcfb0 >| ICOOKIE: e4 d9 bd e8 36 f6 51 77 >| RCOOKIE: d4 86 3e 17 b8 49 d6 ca >| state hash entry 22 >| inserting state object #3 >| inserting event EVENT_SO_DISCARD, timeout in 0 seconds for #3 >| event added at head of queue >| printing contents struct traffic_selector >| ts_type: IKEv2_TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE >| ipprotoid: 0 >| startport: 0 >| endport: 65535 >| ip low: 2001:db8:1:1::1234 >| ip high: 2001:db8:1:1::1234 >| printing contents struct traffic_selector >| ts_type: IKEv2_TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE >| ipprotoid: 0 >| startport: 0 >| endport: 65535 >| ip low: 2001:db8:f:1::1 >| ip high: 2001:db8:f:1::1 >| *****emit IKEv2 Security Association Payload: >| next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSi >| critical bit: none >| entered ikev2_parse_child_sa_body() >| kernel_alg_db_new() initial trans_cnt=128 >| kernel_alg_db_new() will return p_new->protoid=3, p_new->trans_cnt=1 >| kernel_alg_db_new() trans[0]: transid=3, attr_cnt=1, attrs[0].type=5, attrs[0].val=2 >| returning new proposal from esp_info >| ***parse IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: >| last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_LAST >| length: 36 >| prop #: 1 >| proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_ESP >| spi size: 4 >| # transforms: 3 >| parsing 4 raw bytes of IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload into CHILD SA SPI >| CHILD SA SPI 91 09 92 2e >| ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: >| last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST >| length: 8 >| IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR >| IKEv2 transform ID: 3DES >| ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: >| last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST >| length: 8 >| IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG >| IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96 >| ****parse IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: >| last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST >| length: 8 >| IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ESN >| IKEv2 transform ID: ESN_DISABLED >| Starting at transform type TRANS_TYPE_ENCR >| failed proposal 1 >| succeeded encr= (policy:3DES(-1) vs offered:3DES(-1)) >| failed integ=(policy:AUTH_NONE(0) vs offered:AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96(-1)) >| failed esn= (policy:ESN_DISABLED vs offered:ESN_DISABLED) >| Starting at transform type TRANS_TYPE_INTEG >| failed proposal 1 >| succeeded encr= (policy:3DES(-1) vs offered:3DES(-1)) >| succeeded integ=(policy:AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96(-1) vs offered:AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96(-1)) >| failed esn= (policy:ESN_DISABLED vs offered:ESN_DISABLED) >| Starting at transform type TRANS_TYPE_ESN >| matched proposal 1 >| succeeded encr= (policy:3DES(-1) vs offered:3DES(-1)) >| succeeded integ=(policy:AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96(-1) vs offered:AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96(-1)) >| succeeded esn= (policy:ESN_DISABLED vs offered:ESN_DISABLED) >| kernel_alg_esp_enc_ok(3,192): OK >| netlink_get_spi: allocated 0x705e15d5 for esp:0@2001:db8:1:1::1234 >| ******emit IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: >| last proposal: v2_PROPOSAL_LAST >| prop #: 1 >| proto ID: IKEv2_SEC_PROTO_ESP >| spi size: 4 >| # transforms: 3 >| emitting 4 raw bytes of our spi into IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload >| our spi 70 5e 15 d5 >| *******emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: >| last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST >| IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ENCR >| IKEv2 transform ID: 3DES >| emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8 >| *******emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: >| last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_NON_LAST >| IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_INTEG >| IKEv2 transform ID: AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96 >| emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8 >| *******emit IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: >| last transform: v2_TRANSFORM_LAST >| IKEv2 transform type: TRANS_TYPE_ESN >| IKEv2 transform ID: ESN_DISABLED >| emitting length of IKEv2 Transform Substructure Payload: 8 >| emitting length of IKEv2 Proposal Substructure Payload: 36 >| emitting length of IKEv2 Security Association Payload: 40 >| *****emit IKEv2 Traffic Selector Payload: >| next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2TSr >| critical bit: none >| number of TS: 1 >| ******emit IKEv2 Traffic Selector: >| TS type: IKEv2_TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE >| IP Protocol ID: 0 >| start port: 0 >| end port: 65535 >| emitting 16 raw bytes of ipv6 low into IKEv2 Traffic Selector >| ipv6 low 20 01 0d b8 00 0f 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 >| emitting 16 raw bytes of ipv6 high into IKEv2 Traffic Selector >| ipv6 high 20 01 0d b8 00 0f 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 >| emitting length of IKEv2 Traffic Selector: 40 >| emitting length of IKEv2 Traffic Selector Payload: 48 >| Received v2N_USE_TRANSPORT_MODE from the other end, next payload is v2N_USE_TRANSPORT_MODE notification >| *****emit IKEv2 Traffic Selector Payload: >| next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2N >| critical bit: none >| number of TS: 1 >| ******emit IKEv2 Traffic Selector: >| TS type: IKEv2_TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE >| IP Protocol ID: 0 >| start port: 0 >| end port: 65535 >| emitting 16 raw bytes of ipv6 low into IKEv2 Traffic Selector >| ipv6 low 20 01 0d b8 00 01 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 12 34 >| emitting 16 raw bytes of ipv6 high into IKEv2 Traffic Selector >| ipv6 high 20 01 0d b8 00 01 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 12 34 >| emitting length of IKEv2 Traffic Selector: 40 >| emitting length of IKEv2 Traffic Selector Payload: 48 >| Local policy is transport, received USE_TRANSPORT_MODE >| Now responding with USE_TRANSPORT_MODE notify >| Adding a v2N Payload >| *****emit IKEv2 Notify Payload: >| next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE >| critical bit: none >| Protocol ID: PROTO_RESERVED >| SPI size: 0 >| Notify Message Type: v2N_USE_TRANSPORT_MODE >| emitting 0 raw bytes of Notify data into IKEv2 Notify Payload >| Notify data >| emitting length of IKEv2 Notify Payload: 8 >| kernel_alg_esp_info(): transid=3, auth=2, ei=0x7f2569899b80, enckeylen=24, authkeylen=20, encryptalg=3, authalg=3 >| hmac_update data value: >| >| hmac_update data value: >| e7 df 53 36 c2 41 b6 f5 a1 ba 61 36 0a 30 e8 5e >| 31 3b 63 bf 80 90 f3 cf 3e 54 6a 6f c5 d7 17 77 >| 8d 70 22 37 74 d0 bb a8 e0 02 a3 fd 03 c4 c8 b0 >| 8a da d9 53 67 4d 9d 81 e0 70 c6 78 4a 68 dd 8a >| 71 dd 89 7a 6c 8f c6 15 d7 17 a2 88 fb 97 f9 89 >| d0 bb a6 70 1d 97 7d 35 ec 51 bf 62 e2 a8 7a fd >| 3e ed 10 d9 04 4a 9d ed d4 54 e6 ba a0 34 e8 ea >| 82 d8 59 75 ca f4 5b a2 a0 f6 2a a8 ff d7 0d f5 >| a9 95 b1 68 8c 9d de b8 37 ae 40 30 4a ea 20 17 >| 6f 13 49 c4 36 be 00 b6 f5 57 52 8c 27 66 72 09 >| f2 e8 bf 99 6c 0a e8 b7 96 cc 4b ba fd 8c af f3 >| ef 42 a9 19 e7 32 f9 c5 ec 95 b7 19 98 06 72 03 >| f3 41 ce 64 53 11 80 ff 22 01 4f e9 01 ad 0e 61 >| 58 a3 fe >| hmac_update: inside if >| hmac_update: after digest >| hmac_update: after assert >| hmac_update data value: >| 4e 9d 57 74 25 de ad f7 5f 25 05 e2 83 6a fd 95 >| hmac_update: inside if >| hmac_update: after digest >| hmac_update: after assert >| hmac_update data value: >| >| hmac_update data value: >| >| hmac_update data value: >| 01 >| hmac_update: inside if >| hmac_update: after digest >| hmac_update: after assert >| prf+[1]: 51 65 de 6e 75 77 29 d5 cc 6f 36 ac c5 79 98 d6 >| prf+[1]: bc 1e 9f 61 >| hmac_update data value: >| 51 65 de 6e 75 77 29 d5 cc 6f 36 ac c5 79 98 d6 >| bc 1e 9f 61 >| hmac_update: inside if >| hmac_update: after digest >| hmac_update: after assert >| hmac_update data value: >| e7 df 53 36 c2 41 b6 f5 a1 ba 61 36 0a 30 e8 5e >| 31 3b 63 bf 80 90 f3 cf 3e 54 6a 6f c5 d7 17 77 >| 8d 70 22 37 74 d0 bb a8 e0 02 a3 fd 03 c4 c8 b0 >| 8a da d9 53 67 4d 9d 81 e0 70 c6 78 4a 68 dd 8a >| 71 dd 89 7a 6c 8f c6 15 d7 17 a2 88 fb 97 f9 89 >| d0 bb a6 70 1d 97 7d 35 ec 51 bf 62 e2 a8 7a fd >| 3e ed 10 d9 04 4a 9d ed d4 54 e6 ba a0 34 e8 ea >| 82 d8 59 75 ca f4 5b a2 a0 f6 2a a8 ff d7 0d f5 >| a9 95 b1 68 8c 9d de b8 37 ae 40 30 4a ea 20 17 >| 6f 13 49 c4 36 be 00 b6 f5 57 52 8c 27 66 72 09 >| f2 e8 bf 99 6c 0a e8 b7 96 cc 4b ba fd 8c af f3 >| ef 42 a9 19 e7 32 f9 c5 ec 95 b7 19 98 06 72 03 >| f3 41 ce 64 53 11 80 ff 22 01 4f e9 01 ad 0e 61 >| 58 a3 fe >| hmac_update: inside if >| hmac_update: after digest >| hmac_update: after assert >| hmac_update data value: >| 4e 9d 57 74 25 de ad f7 5f 25 05 e2 83 6a fd 95 >| hmac_update: inside if >| hmac_update: after digest >| hmac_update: after assert >| hmac_update data value: >| >| hmac_update data value: >| >| hmac_update data value: >| 02 >| hmac_update: inside if >| hmac_update: after digest >| hmac_update: after assert >| prf+[2]: e7 9b e6 fe 10 d1 b6 bc 0b 19 ed 52 e6 df 6f a9 >| prf+[2]: 7d e2 ec e4 >| hmac_update data value: >| e7 9b e6 fe 10 d1 b6 bc 0b 19 ed 52 e6 df 6f a9 >| 7d e2 ec e4 >| hmac_update: inside if >| hmac_update: after digest >| hmac_update: after assert >| hmac_update data value: >| e7 df 53 36 c2 41 b6 f5 a1 ba 61 36 0a 30 e8 5e >| 31 3b 63 bf 80 90 f3 cf 3e 54 6a 6f c5 d7 17 77 >| 8d 70 22 37 74 d0 bb a8 e0 02 a3 fd 03 c4 c8 b0 >| 8a da d9 53 67 4d 9d 81 e0 70 c6 78 4a 68 dd 8a >| 71 dd 89 7a 6c 8f c6 15 d7 17 a2 88 fb 97 f9 89 >| d0 bb a6 70 1d 97 7d 35 ec 51 bf 62 e2 a8 7a fd >| 3e ed 10 d9 04 4a 9d ed d4 54 e6 ba a0 34 e8 ea >| 82 d8 59 75 ca f4 5b a2 a0 f6 2a a8 ff d7 0d f5 >| a9 95 b1 68 8c 9d de b8 37 ae 40 30 4a ea 20 17 >| 6f 13 49 c4 36 be 00 b6 f5 57 52 8c 27 66 72 09 >| f2 e8 bf 99 6c 0a e8 b7 96 cc 4b ba fd 8c af f3 >| ef 42 a9 19 e7 32 f9 c5 ec 95 b7 19 98 06 72 03 >| f3 41 ce 64 53 11 80 ff 22 01 4f e9 01 ad 0e 61 >| 58 a3 fe >| hmac_update: inside if >| hmac_update: after digest >| hmac_update: after assert >| hmac_update data value: >| 4e 9d 57 74 25 de ad f7 5f 25 05 e2 83 6a fd 95 >| hmac_update: inside if >| hmac_update: after digest >| hmac_update: after assert >| hmac_update data value: >| >| hmac_update data value: >| >| hmac_update data value: >| 03 >| hmac_update: inside if >| hmac_update: after digest >| hmac_update: after assert >| prf+[3]: 26 aa 23 df 35 e7 bb 35 80 e6 61 f5 06 d1 2e ba >| prf+[3]: 22 22 22 1b >| hmac_update data value: >| 26 aa 23 df 35 e7 bb 35 80 e6 61 f5 06 d1 2e ba >| 22 22 22 1b >| hmac_update: inside if >| hmac_update: after digest >| hmac_update: after assert >| hmac_update data value: >| e7 df 53 36 c2 41 b6 f5 a1 ba 61 36 0a 30 e8 5e >| 31 3b 63 bf 80 90 f3 cf 3e 54 6a 6f c5 d7 17 77 >| 8d 70 22 37 74 d0 bb a8 e0 02 a3 fd 03 c4 c8 b0 >| 8a da d9 53 67 4d 9d 81 e0 70 c6 78 4a 68 dd 8a >| 71 dd 89 7a 6c 8f c6 15 d7 17 a2 88 fb 97 f9 89 >| d0 bb a6 70 1d 97 7d 35 ec 51 bf 62 e2 a8 7a fd >| 3e ed 10 d9 04 4a 9d ed d4 54 e6 ba a0 34 e8 ea >| 82 d8 59 75 ca f4 5b a2 a0 f6 2a a8 ff d7 0d f5 >| a9 95 b1 68 8c 9d de b8 37 ae 40 30 4a ea 20 17 >| 6f 13 49 c4 36 be 00 b6 f5 57 52 8c 27 66 72 09 >| f2 e8 bf 99 6c 0a e8 b7 96 cc 4b ba fd 8c af f3 >| ef 42 a9 19 e7 32 f9 c5 ec 95 b7 19 98 06 72 03 >| f3 41 ce 64 53 11 80 ff 22 01 4f e9 01 ad 0e 61 >| 58 a3 fe >| hmac_update: inside if >| hmac_update: after digest >| hmac_update: after assert >| hmac_update data value: >| 4e 9d 57 74 25 de ad f7 5f 25 05 e2 83 6a fd 95 >| hmac_update: inside if >| hmac_update: after digest >| hmac_update: after assert >| hmac_update data value: >| >| hmac_update data value: >| >| hmac_update data value: >| 04 >| hmac_update: inside if >| hmac_update: after digest >| hmac_update: after assert >| prf+[4]: 5b 21 3a c7 da b9 84 2d 9b 1f 6f 8a 3e 70 3b 10 >| prf+[4]: a3 51 07 6e >| hmac_update data value: >| 5b 21 3a c7 da b9 84 2d 9b 1f 6f 8a 3e 70 3b 10 >| a3 51 07 6e >| hmac_update: inside if >| hmac_update: after digest >| hmac_update: after assert >| hmac_update data value: >| e7 df 53 36 c2 41 b6 f5 a1 ba 61 36 0a 30 e8 5e >| 31 3b 63 bf 80 90 f3 cf 3e 54 6a 6f c5 d7 17 77 >| 8d 70 22 37 74 d0 bb a8 e0 02 a3 fd 03 c4 c8 b0 >| 8a da d9 53 67 4d 9d 81 e0 70 c6 78 4a 68 dd 8a >| 71 dd 89 7a 6c 8f c6 15 d7 17 a2 88 fb 97 f9 89 >| d0 bb a6 70 1d 97 7d 35 ec 51 bf 62 e2 a8 7a fd >| 3e ed 10 d9 04 4a 9d ed d4 54 e6 ba a0 34 e8 ea >| 82 d8 59 75 ca f4 5b a2 a0 f6 2a a8 ff d7 0d f5 >| a9 95 b1 68 8c 9d de b8 37 ae 40 30 4a ea 20 17 >| 6f 13 49 c4 36 be 00 b6 f5 57 52 8c 27 66 72 09 >| f2 e8 bf 99 6c 0a e8 b7 96 cc 4b ba fd 8c af f3 >| ef 42 a9 19 e7 32 f9 c5 ec 95 b7 19 98 06 72 03 >| f3 41 ce 64 53 11 80 ff 22 01 4f e9 01 ad 0e 61 >| 58 a3 fe >| hmac_update: inside if >| hmac_update: after digest >| hmac_update: after assert >| hmac_update data value: >| 4e 9d 57 74 25 de ad f7 5f 25 05 e2 83 6a fd 95 >| hmac_update: inside if >| hmac_update: after digest >| hmac_update: after assert >| hmac_update data value: >| >| hmac_update data value: >| >| hmac_update data value: >| 05 >| hmac_update: inside if >| hmac_update: after digest >| hmac_update: after assert >| prf+[5]: 24 b4 a4 78 f4 6b ad a6 77 68 e6 10 f9 ff f9 d6 >| prf+[5]: 02 66 6f e4 >| our keymat 51 65 de 6e 75 77 29 d5 cc 6f 36 ac c5 79 98 d6 >| our keymat bc 1e 9f 61 e7 9b e6 fe 10 d1 b6 bc 0b 19 ed 52 >| our keymat e6 df 6f a9 7d e2 ec e4 26 aa 23 df >| peer keymat 35 e7 bb 35 80 e6 61 f5 06 d1 2e ba 22 22 22 1b >| peer keymat 5b 21 3a c7 da b9 84 2d 9b 1f 6f 8a 3e 70 3b 10 >| peer keymat a3 51 07 6e 24 b4 a4 78 f4 6b ad a6 >| install_ipsec_sa() for #3: inbound and outbound >| route owner of "ikev2" unrouted: NULL; eroute owner: NULL >| could_route called for ikev2 (kind=CK_PERMANENT) >| looking for alg with transid: 3 keylen: 192 auth: 2 >| checking transid: 11 keylen: 0 auth: 1 >| checking transid: 11 keylen: 0 auth: 2 >| checking transid: 3 keylen: 24 auth: 0 >| checking transid: 3 keylen: 24 auth: 1 >| checking transid: 3 keylen: 24 auth: 2 >| ESP enckey: 35 e7 bb 35 80 e6 61 f5 06 d1 2e ba 22 22 22 1b >| ESP enckey: 5b 21 3a c7 da b9 84 2d >| ESP authkey: 9b 1f 6f 8a 3e 70 3b 10 a3 51 07 6e 24 b4 a4 78 >| ESP authkey: f4 6b ad a6 >| set up outgoing SA, ref=0/4294901761 >| looking for alg with transid: 3 keylen: 192 auth: 2 >| checking transid: 11 keylen: 0 auth: 1 >| checking transid: 11 keylen: 0 auth: 2 >| checking transid: 3 keylen: 24 auth: 0 >| checking transid: 3 keylen: 24 auth: 1 >| checking transid: 3 keylen: 24 auth: 2 >| ESP enckey: 51 65 de 6e 75 77 29 d5 cc 6f 36 ac c5 79 98 d6 >| ESP enckey: bc 1e 9f 61 e7 9b e6 fe >| ESP authkey: 10 d1 b6 bc 0b 19 ed 52 e6 df 6f a9 7d e2 ec e4 >| ESP authkey: 26 aa 23 df >| add inbound eroute 2001:db8:f:1::1/128:0 --0-> 2001:db8:1:1::1234/128:0 => esp:10000@2001:db8:1:1::1234 (raw_eroute) >| satype(3) is not used in netlink_raw_eroute. >| netlink_raw_eroute: using host address instead of client subnet >| raw_eroute result=1 >| set up incoming SA, ref=0/4294901761 >| sr for #3: unrouted >| route owner of "ikev2" unrouted: NULL; eroute owner: NULL >| route_and_eroute with c: ikev2 (next: none) ero:null esr:{(nil)} ro:null rosr:{(nil)} and state: 3 >| eroute_connection add eroute 2001:db8:1:1::1234/128:0 --0-> 2001:db8:f:1::1/128:0 => esp:9109922e@2001:db8:f:1::1 (raw_eroute) >| satype(3) is not used in netlink_raw_eroute. >| netlink_raw_eroute: using host address instead of client subnet >| raw_eroute result=1 >| command executing up-host-v6 >| executing up-host-v6: PLUTO_VERB='up-host-v6' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='ikev2' PLUTO_INTERFACE='p6p1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='2001:db8:f:1::1' PLUTO_ME='2001:db8:1:1::1234' PLUTO_MY_ID='2001:db8:1:1::1234' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='2001:db8:1:1::1234/128' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='2001:db8:1:1::1234' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16384' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='2001:db8:f:1::1' PLUTO_PEER_ID='2001:db8:f:1::1' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='2001:db8:f:1::1/128' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='2001:db8:f:1::1' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+PFS+UP+IKEV1_DISABLE+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_PROPOSE+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv6' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' ipsec _u >| popen cmd is 1008 chars long >| cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='up-host-v6' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='ikev2' PLUTO_INTER: >| cmd( 80):FACE='p6p1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='2001:db8:f:1::1' PLUTO_ME='2001:db8:1:1::1234' PLUTO: >| cmd( 160):_MY_ID='2001:db8:1:1::1234' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='2001:db8:1:1::1234/128' PLUTO_MY_CL: >| cmd( 240):IENT_NET='2001:db8:1:1::1234' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:fff: >| cmd( 320):f:ffff:ffff' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16384' PLUT: >| cmd( 400):O_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='2001:db8:f:1::1' PLUTO_PEER_ID='2001:db8:f:1::1' PLU: >| cmd( 480):TO_PEER_CLIENT='2001:db8:f:1::1/128' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='2001:db8:f:1::1' PLU: >| cmd( 560):TO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0: >| cmd( 640):' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0: >| cmd( 720):' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+PFS+UP+IKEV1_DISABLE+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_PROPOSE+: >| cmd( 800):SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv6' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS: >| cmd( 880):_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANN: >| cmd( 960):ER='' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' ipsec _updown 2>&1: >| route_and_eroute: firewall_notified: true >| command executing prepare-host-v6 >| executing prepare-host-v6: PLUTO_VERB='prepare-host-v6' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='ikev2' PLUTO_INTERFACE='p6p1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='2001:db8:f:1::1' PLUTO_ME='2001:db8:1:1::1234' PLUTO_MY_ID='2001:db8:1:1::1234' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='2001:db8:1:1::1234/128' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='2001:db8:1:1::1234' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16384' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='2001:db8:f:1::1' PLUTO_PEER_ID='2001:db8:f:1::1' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='2001:db8:f:1::1/128' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='2001:db8:f:1::1' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+PFS+UP+IKEV1_DISABLE+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_PROPOSE+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv6' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0 >| popen cmd is 1013 chars long >| cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='prepare-host-v6' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='ikev2' PLUTO_: >| cmd( 80):INTERFACE='p6p1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='2001:db8:f:1::1' PLUTO_ME='2001:db8:1:1::1234' : >| cmd( 160):PLUTO_MY_ID='2001:db8:1:1::1234' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='2001:db8:1:1::1234/128' PLUTO_: >| cmd( 240):MY_CLIENT_NET='2001:db8:1:1::1234' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:fff: >| cmd( 320):f:ffff:ffff:ffff' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16384': >| cmd( 400): PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='2001:db8:f:1::1' PLUTO_PEER_ID='2001:db8:f:1::1: >| cmd( 480):' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='2001:db8:f:1::1/128' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='2001:db8:f:1::1: >| cmd( 560):' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff' PLUTO_PEER_PO: >| cmd( 640):RT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTI: >| cmd( 720):ME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+PFS+UP+IKEV1_DISABLE+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_PRO: >| cmd( 800):POSE+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv6' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLU: >| cmd( 880):TO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER: >| cmd( 960):_BANNER='' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' ipsec _updown 2>&1: >| command executing route-host-v6 >| executing route-host-v6: PLUTO_VERB='route-host-v6' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='ikev2' PLUTO_INTERFACE='p6p1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='2001:db8:f:1::1' PLUTO_ME='2001:db8:1:1::1234' PLUTO_MY_ID='2001:db8:1:1::1234' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='2001:db8:1:1::1234/128' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='2001:db8:1:1::1234' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16384' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='2001:db8:f:1::1' PLUTO_PEER_ID='2001:db8:f:1::1' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='2001:db8:f:1::1/128' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='2001:db8:f:1::1' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+PFS+UP+IKEV1_DISABLE+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_PROPOSE+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv6' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' ip >| popen cmd is 1011 chars long >| cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='route-host-v6' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='ikev2' PLUTO_IN: >| cmd( 80):TERFACE='p6p1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='2001:db8:f:1::1' PLUTO_ME='2001:db8:1:1::1234' PL: >| cmd( 160):UTO_MY_ID='2001:db8:1:1::1234' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='2001:db8:1:1::1234/128' PLUTO_MY: >| cmd( 240):_CLIENT_NET='2001:db8:1:1::1234' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:: >| cmd( 320):ffff:ffff:ffff' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16384' P: >| cmd( 400):LUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='2001:db8:f:1::1' PLUTO_PEER_ID='2001:db8:f:1::1' : >| cmd( 480):PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='2001:db8:f:1::1/128' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='2001:db8:f:1::1' : >| cmd( 560):PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff' PLUTO_PEER_PORT: >| cmd( 640):='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME: >| cmd( 720):='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+PFS+UP+IKEV1_DISABLE+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_PROPO: >| cmd( 800):SE+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv6' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO: >| cmd( 880):_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_B: >| cmd( 960):ANNER='' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' ipsec _updown 2>&1: >| route_and_eroute: instance "ikev2", setting eroute_owner {spd=0x7f256afb8c40,sr=0x7f256afb8c40} to #3 (was #0) (newest_ipsec_sa=#0) >| emitting 4 raw bytes of padding and length into cleartext >| padding and length 00 01 02 03 >| emitting 12 zero bytes of length of truncated HMAC into IKEv2 Encryption Payload >| emitting length of IKEv2 Encryption Payload: 224 >| emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 252 >| data before encryption: >| 27 00 00 18 05 00 00 00 20 01 0d b8 00 01 00 01 >| 00 00 00 00 00 00 12 34 21 00 00 1c 02 00 00 00 >| e7 50 35 1a cd 5a cf 47 e0 11 dd fd d3 09 bf 51 >| 71 83 39 7b 2c 00 00 28 00 00 00 24 01 03 04 03 >| 70 5e 15 d5 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 03 03 00 00 08 >| 03 00 00 02 00 00 00 08 05 00 00 00 2d 00 00 30 >| 01 00 00 00 08 00 00 28 00 00 ff ff 20 01 0d b8 >| 00 0f 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 20 01 0d b8 >| 00 0f 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 29 00 00 30 >| 01 00 00 00 08 00 00 28 00 00 ff ff 20 01 0d b8 >| 00 01 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 12 34 20 01 0d b8 >| 00 01 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 12 34 00 00 00 08 >| 00 00 40 07 00 01 02 03 >| NSS: do_3des init start >| NSS: do_3des init end >| data after encryption: >| e2 28 49 5d 59 bf e5 cd 2f 80 13 ae 08 25 63 a3 >| ea 5d 47 fb f4 e2 47 ac 03 b4 01 54 10 ba 17 20 >| ea 08 8f 00 3d 55 c4 f4 46 ec 87 9c 82 da 0b 7d >| 10 29 67 5a 30 d4 13 f8 83 9a 9a cb 69 02 0d 85 >| a6 cc 83 d7 69 3e 1a 11 d5 3c 85 6e 20 24 94 7e >| fe 70 ee 90 1f ef 86 e6 ed 46 eb bf 9c af ac 4a >| 76 30 6c 52 0b 83 51 a1 2a b6 87 9a 34 9c 15 bc >| 24 d3 70 4a 37 18 f8 5c 81 70 4f 0c 44 0c 04 f3 >| b7 6f 1e 13 75 9e 2c e1 78 6d c1 00 af e7 1d c5 >| 77 77 84 a0 c9 91 1f b1 52 b9 63 71 37 0b b7 81 >| 12 a4 c0 1e 0c 9e d5 2f 14 94 51 d1 49 54 86 a4 >| 16 1b e7 b4 cc 4b b9 5a fa 0a ad 98 dd fa 81 dc >| 1a 97 bc cd ed f1 bf 2a >| Inside authloc >| authkey pointer: 0x7f255c013d10 >| Inside authloc after init >| hmac_update data value: >| e4 d9 bd e8 36 f6 51 77 d4 86 3e 17 b8 49 d6 ca >| 2e 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 fc 24 00 00 e0 >| 88 41 e9 a1 39 aa 11 18 e2 28 49 5d 59 bf e5 cd >| 2f 80 13 ae 08 25 63 a3 ea 5d 47 fb f4 e2 47 ac >| 03 b4 01 54 10 ba 17 20 ea 08 8f 00 3d 55 c4 f4 >| 46 ec 87 9c 82 da 0b 7d 10 29 67 5a 30 d4 13 f8 >| 83 9a 9a cb 69 02 0d 85 a6 cc 83 d7 69 3e 1a 11 >| d5 3c 85 6e 20 24 94 7e fe 70 ee 90 1f ef 86 e6 >| ed 46 eb bf 9c af ac 4a 76 30 6c 52 0b 83 51 a1 >| 2a b6 87 9a 34 9c 15 bc 24 d3 70 4a 37 18 f8 5c >| 81 70 4f 0c 44 0c 04 f3 b7 6f 1e 13 75 9e 2c e1 >| 78 6d c1 00 af e7 1d c5 77 77 84 a0 c9 91 1f b1 >| 52 b9 63 71 37 0b b7 81 12 a4 c0 1e 0c 9e d5 2f >| 14 94 51 d1 49 54 86 a4 16 1b e7 b4 cc 4b b9 5a >| fa 0a ad 98 dd fa 81 dc 1a 97 bc cd ed f1 bf 2a >| hmac_update: inside if >| hmac_update: after digest >| hmac_update: after assert >| Inside authloc after update >| Inside authloc after final >| data being hmac: e4 d9 bd e8 36 f6 51 77 d4 86 3e 17 b8 49 d6 ca >| data being hmac: 2e 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 fc 24 00 00 e0 >| data being hmac: 88 41 e9 a1 39 aa 11 18 e2 28 49 5d 59 bf e5 cd >| data being hmac: 2f 80 13 ae 08 25 63 a3 ea 5d 47 fb f4 e2 47 ac >| data being hmac: 03 b4 01 54 10 ba 17 20 ea 08 8f 00 3d 55 c4 f4 >| data being hmac: 46 ec 87 9c 82 da 0b 7d 10 29 67 5a 30 d4 13 f8 >| data being hmac: 83 9a 9a cb 69 02 0d 85 a6 cc 83 d7 69 3e 1a 11 >| data being hmac: d5 3c 85 6e 20 24 94 7e fe 70 ee 90 1f ef 86 e6 >| data being hmac: ed 46 eb bf 9c af ac 4a 76 30 6c 52 0b 83 51 a1 >| data being hmac: 2a b6 87 9a 34 9c 15 bc 24 d3 70 4a 37 18 f8 5c >| data being hmac: 81 70 4f 0c 44 0c 04 f3 b7 6f 1e 13 75 9e 2c e1 >| data being hmac: 78 6d c1 00 af e7 1d c5 77 77 84 a0 c9 91 1f b1 >| data being hmac: 52 b9 63 71 37 0b b7 81 12 a4 c0 1e 0c 9e d5 2f >| data being hmac: 14 94 51 d1 49 54 86 a4 16 1b e7 b4 cc 4b b9 5a >| data being hmac: fa 0a ad 98 dd fa 81 dc 1a 97 bc cd ed f1 bf 2a >| out calculated auth: >| 6e f2 54 20 c4 ae 05 4c 87 5f 53 4a >| complete v2 state transition with STF_OK >"ikev2" #3: transition from state STATE_PARENT_R1 to state STATE_PARENT_R2 >"ikev2" #3: negotiated tunnel [2001:db8:1:1::1234,2001:db8:1:1::1234:0-65535 0] -> [2001:db8:f:1::1,2001:db8:f:1::1:0-65535 0] >"ikev2" #3: STATE_PARENT_R2: received v2I2, PARENT SA established transport mode {ESP=>0x9109922e <0x705e15d5 xfrm=3DES_192-HMAC_SHA1 NATOA=none NATD=none DPD=passive} >| sending reply packet to 2001:db8:f:1::1:500 (from port 500) >| sending 252 bytes for STATE_PARENT_R1 through p6p1:500 to 2001:db8:f:1::1:500 (using #3) >| e4 d9 bd e8 36 f6 51 77 d4 86 3e 17 b8 49 d6 ca >| 2e 20 23 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 fc 24 00 00 e0 >| 88 41 e9 a1 39 aa 11 18 e2 28 49 5d 59 bf e5 cd >| 2f 80 13 ae 08 25 63 a3 ea 5d 47 fb f4 e2 47 ac >| 03 b4 01 54 10 ba 17 20 ea 08 8f 00 3d 55 c4 f4 >| 46 ec 87 9c 82 da 0b 7d 10 29 67 5a 30 d4 13 f8 >| 83 9a 9a cb 69 02 0d 85 a6 cc 83 d7 69 3e 1a 11 >| d5 3c 85 6e 20 24 94 7e fe 70 ee 90 1f ef 86 e6 >| ed 46 eb bf 9c af ac 4a 76 30 6c 52 0b 83 51 a1 >| 2a b6 87 9a 34 9c 15 bc 24 d3 70 4a 37 18 f8 5c >| 81 70 4f 0c 44 0c 04 f3 b7 6f 1e 13 75 9e 2c e1 >| 78 6d c1 00 af e7 1d c5 77 77 84 a0 c9 91 1f b1 >| 52 b9 63 71 37 0b b7 81 12 a4 c0 1e 0c 9e d5 2f >| 14 94 51 d1 49 54 86 a4 16 1b e7 b4 cc 4b b9 5a >| fa 0a ad 98 dd fa 81 dc 1a 97 bc cd ed f1 bf 2a >| 6e f2 54 20 c4 ae 05 4c 87 5f 53 4a >| releasing whack for #3 (sock=-1) >| releasing whack and unpending for parent #2 >| unpending state #2 >| deleting event for #3 >| inserting event EVENT_SA_REPLACE, timeout in 28530 seconds for #3 >| event added after event EVENT_REINIT_SECRET >| * processed 1 messages from cryptographic helpers >| next event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT in 18 seconds for #1 >| next event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT in 18 seconds for #1 >| >| *received 60 bytes from 2001:db8:f:1::1:500 on p6p1 (port=500) >| e4 d9 bd e8 36 f6 51 77 d4 86 3e 17 b8 49 d6 ca >| 2e 20 25 49 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 3c 00 01 00 20 >| 37 37 07 bb ef c0 4a a3 83 5a 09 d9 88 e6 8d 5d >| 83 12 33 81 22 8d 14 34 be 30 81 01 >packet from 2001:db8:f:1::1:500: bitset flags of ISAKMP Message has unknown member(s): ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION+ISAKMP_FLAG_IKE_INIT+0x40 >packet from 2001:db8:f:1::1:500: Received packet with mangled IKE header - dropped >| * processed 0 messages from cryptographic helpers >| next event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT in 18 seconds for #1 >| next event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT in 18 seconds for #1 >| >| next event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT in 0 seconds for #1 >| *time to handle event >| handling event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT >| event after this is EVENT_PENDING_DDNS in 19 seconds >| processing connection ikev2 >| handling event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT for 2001:db8:f:1::1 "ikev2" #1 attempt 2 of 0 >| sending 284 bytes for EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT through p6p1:500 to 2001:db8:f:1::1:500 (using #1) >| a5 6c 9f 5e 29 9d e7 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >| 21 20 22 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 1c 22 00 00 2c >| 00 00 00 28 01 01 00 04 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 03 >| 03 00 00 08 03 00 00 02 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 02 >| 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 02 28 00 00 88 00 02 00 00 >| c9 80 f5 50 4a 4e f4 72 86 49 03 64 7e ff ae 74 >| b5 00 de 04 72 3b 3f 73 8a fd d2 ec 42 d4 3b da >| 01 1e b6 ef 94 b9 ab 58 93 93 54 32 d6 29 53 86 >| d3 5c 47 49 19 7c 8f 1d b0 a2 14 dd e4 a1 67 a8 >| 8b 89 ad 40 7d fb 98 1e 22 d9 2b 0d 63 33 41 1b >| 85 14 79 1f b4 03 c9 44 d9 3a 36 41 cc 92 e9 72 >| 72 d4 79 ae 78 01 3d 5d 42 3d b4 b0 c3 40 3d 0f >| 1c 36 5f ce 7f db f0 c0 09 d8 72 7f dc 7a cc 40 >| 29 00 00 14 4b d1 d6 74 07 e1 f6 a7 2f 87 d5 1d >| 7a 84 d3 b2 29 00 00 1c 00 00 40 04 53 e5 0e 67 >| ea 06 0d a8 71 b6 98 a9 1f 03 01 dc 30 af ff 9d >| 00 00 00 1c 00 00 40 05 8a d7 8b 69 1d 57 4f bd >| f4 b6 48 df 1b a8 bf f0 c5 da 2b 65 >| inserting event EVENT_v2_RETRANSMIT, timeout in 40 seconds for #1 >| event added after event EVENT_PENDING_DDNS >| next event EVENT_PENDING_DDNS in 19 seconds >| >| *received whack message >shutting down >| certs and keys locked by 'free_preshared_secrets' >forgetting secrets >| certs and keys unlocked by 'free_preshard_secrets' >| processing connection ikev2 >"ikev2": deleting connection >| removing pending policy for "none" {0x7f256afba820} >| processing connection ikev2 >"ikev2" #1: deleting state (STATE_PARENT_I1) >| deleting event for #1 >| deleting state #1 >| deleting event for #1 >| ICOOKIE: a5 6c 9f 5e 29 9d e7 03 >| RCOOKIE: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >| state hash entry 6 >| processing connection ikev2 >"ikev2" #3: deleting state (STATE_PARENT_R2) >| deleting event for #3 >| deleting state #3 >"ikev2" #3: ESP traffic information: in=0B out=0B >| **emit ISAKMP Message: >| initiator cookie: >| e4 d9 bd e8 36 f6 51 77 >| responder cookie: >| d4 86 3e 17 b8 49 d6 ca >| next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2E >| ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) >| exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_INFORMATIONAL >| flags: none >| message ID: 00 00 00 00 >| ***emit IKEv2 Encryption Payload: >| next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2D >| critical bit: none >| emitting 8 zero bytes of iv into IKEv2 Encryption Payload >| *****emit IKEv2 Delete Payload: >| next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE >| critical bit: none >| protocol ID: PROTO_IPSEC_ESP >| SPI size: 4 >| number of SPIs: 1 >| emitting 4 raw bytes of local spis into IKEv2 Delete Payload >| local spis 70 5e 15 d5 >| emitting length of IKEv2 Delete Payload: 12 >| emitting 4 raw bytes of padding and length into cleartext >| padding and length 00 01 02 03 >| emitting 12 zero bytes of length of truncated HMAC into IKEv2 Encryption Payload >| emitting length of IKEv2 Encryption Payload: 40 >| emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 68 >| data before encryption: >| 00 00 00 0c 03 04 00 01 70 5e 15 d5 00 01 02 03 >| NSS: do_3des init start >| NSS: do_3des init end >| data after encryption: >| 4e 00 9a 77 cf 44 da 22 66 0c bc df d8 8c 3c d1 >| Inside authloc >| authkey pointer: 0x7f255c013d10 >| Inside authloc after init >| hmac_update data value: >| e4 d9 bd e8 36 f6 51 77 d4 86 3e 17 b8 49 d6 ca >| 2e 20 25 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 44 2a 00 00 28 >| b2 42 fc 9c 1e 16 64 7f 4e 00 9a 77 cf 44 da 22 >| 66 0c bc df d8 8c 3c d1 >| hmac_update: inside if >| hmac_update: after digest >| hmac_update: after assert >| Inside authloc after update >| Inside authloc after final >| data being hmac: e4 d9 bd e8 36 f6 51 77 d4 86 3e 17 b8 49 d6 ca >| data being hmac: 2e 20 25 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 44 2a 00 00 28 >| data being hmac: b2 42 fc 9c 1e 16 64 7f 4e 00 9a 77 cf 44 da 22 >| data being hmac: 66 0c bc df d8 8c 3c d1 >| out calculated auth: >| 8d 56 9a 38 69 b2 51 3c 73 c3 13 5b >| sending 68 bytes for ikev2_delete_out through p6p1:500 to 2001:db8:f:1::1:500 (using #2) >| e4 d9 bd e8 36 f6 51 77 d4 86 3e 17 b8 49 d6 ca >| 2e 20 25 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 44 2a 00 00 28 >| b2 42 fc 9c 1e 16 64 7f 4e 00 9a 77 cf 44 da 22 >| 66 0c bc df d8 8c 3c d1 8d 56 9a 38 69 b2 51 3c >| 73 c3 13 5b >| deleting event for #3 >| ICOOKIE: e4 d9 bd e8 36 f6 51 77 >| RCOOKIE: d4 86 3e 17 b8 49 d6 ca >| state hash entry 22 >| command executing down-host-v6 >| executing down-host-v6: PLUTO_VERB='down-host-v6' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='ikev2' PLUTO_INTERFACE='p6p1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='2001:db8:f:1::1' PLUTO_ME='2001:db8:1:1::1234' PLUTO_MY_ID='2001:db8:1:1::1234' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='2001:db8:1:1::1234/128' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='2001:db8:1:1::1234' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16384' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='2001:db8:f:1::1' PLUTO_PEER_ID='2001:db8:f:1::1' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='2001:db8:f:1::1/128' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='2001:db8:f:1::1' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+PFS+UP+IKEV1_DISABLE+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_PROPOSE+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv6' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' ipse >| popen cmd is 1010 chars long >| cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='down-host-v6' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='ikev2' PLUTO_INT: >| cmd( 80):ERFACE='p6p1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='2001:db8:f:1::1' PLUTO_ME='2001:db8:1:1::1234' PLU: >| cmd( 160):TO_MY_ID='2001:db8:1:1::1234' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='2001:db8:1:1::1234/128' PLUTO_MY_: >| cmd( 240):CLIENT_NET='2001:db8:1:1::1234' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:f: >| cmd( 320):fff:ffff:ffff' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16384' PL: >| cmd( 400):UTO_SA_TYPE='ESP' PLUTO_PEER='2001:db8:f:1::1' PLUTO_PEER_ID='2001:db8:f:1::1' P: >| cmd( 480):LUTO_PEER_CLIENT='2001:db8:f:1::1/128' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='2001:db8:f:1::1' P: >| cmd( 560):LUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff' PLUTO_PEER_PORT=: >| cmd( 640):'0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME=: >| cmd( 720):'0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+PFS+UP+IKEV1_DISABLE+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_PROPOS: >| cmd( 800):E+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv6' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_: >| cmd( 880):IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BA: >| cmd( 960):NNER='' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' ipsec _updown 2>&1: >| netlink_raw_eroute: using host address instead of client subnet >| delete esp:9109922e@2001:db8:f:1::1 >| delete inbound eroute 2001:db8:f:1::1/128:0 --0-> 2001:db8:1:1::1234/128:0 => esp:10000@2001:db8:1:1::1234 (raw_eroute) >| satype(3) is not used in netlink_raw_eroute. >| netlink_raw_eroute: using host address instead of client subnet >| raw_eroute result=1 >| delete esp:705e15d5@2001:db8:1:1::1234 >| processing connection ikev2 >"ikev2" #2: deleting state (STATE_PARENT_R2) >| deleting event for #2 >| deleting state #2 >| **emit ISAKMP Message: >| initiator cookie: >| e4 d9 bd e8 36 f6 51 77 >| responder cookie: >| d4 86 3e 17 b8 49 d6 ca >| next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2E >| ISAKMP version: IKEv2 version 2.0 (rfc4306/rfc5996) >| exchange type: ISAKMP_v2_INFORMATIONAL >| flags: none >| message ID: 00 00 00 01 >| ***emit IKEv2 Encryption Payload: >| next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2D >| critical bit: none >| emitting 8 zero bytes of iv into IKEv2 Encryption Payload >| *****emit IKEv2 Delete Payload: >| next payload type: ISAKMP_NEXT_v2NONE >| critical bit: none >| protocol ID: PROTO_ISAKMP >| SPI size: 0 >| number of SPIs: 0 >| emitting length of IKEv2 Delete Payload: 8 >| emitting 8 raw bytes of padding and length into cleartext >| padding and length 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 >| emitting 12 zero bytes of length of truncated HMAC into IKEv2 Encryption Payload >| emitting length of IKEv2 Encryption Payload: 40 >| emitting length of ISAKMP Message: 68 >| data before encryption: >| 00 00 00 08 01 00 00 00 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 >| NSS: do_3des init start >| NSS: do_3des init end >| data after encryption: >| d8 26 67 f9 2d 97 a3 e7 fb 61 be 26 1c 31 52 14 >| Inside authloc >| authkey pointer: 0x7f255c013d10 >| Inside authloc after init >| hmac_update data value: >| e4 d9 bd e8 36 f6 51 77 d4 86 3e 17 b8 49 d6 ca >| 2e 20 25 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 44 2a 00 00 28 >| 39 cf 4e 77 30 e3 d4 69 d8 26 67 f9 2d 97 a3 e7 >| fb 61 be 26 1c 31 52 14 >| hmac_update: inside if >| hmac_update: after digest >| hmac_update: after assert >| Inside authloc after update >| Inside authloc after final >| data being hmac: e4 d9 bd e8 36 f6 51 77 d4 86 3e 17 b8 49 d6 ca >| data being hmac: 2e 20 25 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 44 2a 00 00 28 >| data being hmac: 39 cf 4e 77 30 e3 d4 69 d8 26 67 f9 2d 97 a3 e7 >| data being hmac: fb 61 be 26 1c 31 52 14 >| out calculated auth: >| c2 0a 6c 6c 97 d5 48 38 94 98 e1 bd >| sending 68 bytes for ikev2_delete_out through p6p1:500 to 2001:db8:f:1::1:500 (using #2) >| e4 d9 bd e8 36 f6 51 77 d4 86 3e 17 b8 49 d6 ca >| 2e 20 25 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 44 2a 00 00 28 >| 39 cf 4e 77 30 e3 d4 69 d8 26 67 f9 2d 97 a3 e7 >| fb 61 be 26 1c 31 52 14 c2 0a 6c 6c 97 d5 48 38 >| 94 98 e1 bd >| deleting event for #2 >| ICOOKIE: e4 d9 bd e8 36 f6 51 77 >| RCOOKIE: d4 86 3e 17 b8 49 d6 ca >| state hash entry 22 >| delete inbound eroute 2001:db8:f:1::1/128:0 --0-> 2001:db8:1:1::1234/128:0 => esp:10000@2001:db8:1:1::1234 (raw_eroute) >| satype(3) is not used in netlink_raw_eroute. >| netlink_raw_eroute: using host address instead of client subnet >| raw_eroute result=1 >| netlink_raw_eroute: using host address instead of client subnet >| netlink_raw_eroute: using host address instead of client subnet >| route owner of "ikev2" unrouted: NULL >| command executing unroute-host-v6 >| executing unroute-host-v6: PLUTO_VERB='unroute-host-v6' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='ikev2' PLUTO_INTERFACE='p6p1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='2001:db8:f:1::1' PLUTO_ME='2001:db8:1:1::1234' PLUTO_MY_ID='2001:db8:1:1::1234' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='2001:db8:1:1::1234/128' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='2001:db8:1:1::1234' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16384' PLUTO_SA_TYPE='none' PLUTO_PEER='2001:db8:f:1::1' PLUTO_PEER_ID='2001:db8:f:1::1' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='2001:db8:f:1::1/128' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='2001:db8:f:1::1' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff' PLUTO_PEER_PORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDTIME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+PFS+UP+IKEV1_DISABLE+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_PROPOSE+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv6' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PLUTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_BANNER='' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED=' >| popen cmd is 1014 chars long >| cmd( 0):PLUTO_VERB='unroute-host-v6' PLUTO_VERSION='2.0' PLUTO_CONNECTION='ikev2' PLUTO_: >| cmd( 80):INTERFACE='p6p1' PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='2001:db8:f:1::1' PLUTO_ME='2001:db8:1:1::1234' : >| cmd( 160):PLUTO_MY_ID='2001:db8:1:1::1234' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='2001:db8:1:1::1234/128' PLUTO_: >| cmd( 240):MY_CLIENT_NET='2001:db8:1:1::1234' PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:fff: >| cmd( 320):f:ffff:ffff:ffff' PLUTO_MY_PORT='0' PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_SA_REQID='16384': >| cmd( 400): PLUTO_SA_TYPE='none' PLUTO_PEER='2001:db8:f:1::1' PLUTO_PEER_ID='2001:db8:f:1::: >| cmd( 480):1' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='2001:db8:f:1::1/128' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='2001:db8:f:1::: >| cmd( 560):1' PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff' PLUTO_PEER_P: >| cmd( 640):ORT='0' PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='0' PLUTO_PEER_CA='' PLUTO_STACK='netkey' PLUTO_ADDT: >| cmd( 720):IME='0' PLUTO_CONN_POLICY='PSK+ENCRYPT+PFS+UP+IKEV1_DISABLE+IKEV2_ALLOW+IKEV2_PR: >| cmd( 800):OPOSE+SAREF_TRACK+IKE_FRAG_ALLOW' PLUTO_CONN_ADDRFAMILY='ipv6' XAUTH_FAILED=0 PL: >| cmd( 880):UTO_IS_PEER_CISCO='0' PLUTO_PEER_DNS_INFO='' PLUTO_PEER_DOMAIN_INFO='' PLUTO_PEE: >| cmd( 960):R_BANNER='' PLUTO_NM_CONFIGURED='0' ipsec _updown 2>&1: >| crl fetch request list locked by 'free_crl_fetch' >| crl fetch request list unlocked by 'free_crl_fetch' >| authcert list locked by 'free_authcerts' >| authcert list unlocked by 'free_authcerts' >| crl list locked by 'free_crls' >| crl list unlocked by 'free_crls' >shutting down interface lo/lo ::1:500 >shutting down interface p6p1/p6p1 2001:db8:1:1::1234:500 >shutting down interface lo/lo 127.0.0.1:4500 >shutting down interface lo/lo 127.0.0.1:500 >shutting down interface p7p1/p7p1 10.66.13.22:4500 >shutting down interface p7p1/p7p1 10.66.13.22:500
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bug 1157379
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