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| Who | When | What | Removed | Added |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TEJ RATHI | 2023-07-13 18:08:00 UTC | CC | security-response-team | |
| TEJ RATHI | 2023-07-13 18:09:01 UTC | CC | abokovoy, anoopcs, asn, dkarpele, nobody, pfilipen, sbose | |
| TEJ RATHI | 2023-07-13 18:13:19 UTC | Blocks | 2216374 | |
| TEJ RATHI | 2023-07-14 11:42:10 UTC | Depends On | 2222896, 2222894, 2222895 | |
| Guilherme de Almeida Suckevicz | 2023-07-17 14:02:21 UTC | Blocks | 2135524 | |
| TEJ RATHI | 2023-07-17 14:34:57 UTC | Deadline | 2023-07-19 | |
| TEJ RATHI | 2023-07-19 14:52:27 UTC | Fixed In Version | samba 4.16.11, samba 4.17.10, samba 4.18.5 | |
| TEJ RATHI | 2023-07-20 04:35:12 UTC | Doc Text | An out-of-bounds read vulnerability was discovered in Samba's due to insufficient length checks in winbindd_pam_auth_crap.c. When doing NTLM authentication, the client sends replies to cryptographic challenges back to the server. These replies have variable length, which winbind fails to check the lan manager response length. When winbind is used for NTLM authentication, a maliciously crafted request can trigger an out-of-bounds read in winbind and possibly crash it. | |
| TEJ RATHI | 2023-07-20 09:24:17 UTC | Group | security, qe_staff | |
| CC | rhs-smb | |||
| Summary | EMBARGOED CVE-2022-2127 samba: out-of-bounds read in winbind AUTH_CRAP | CVE-2022-2127 samba: out-of-bounds read in winbind AUTH_CRAP | ||
| Deadline | 2023-07-19 | |||
| TEJ RATHI | 2023-07-20 09:33:10 UTC | Depends On | 2224254 | |
| RaTasha Tillery-Smith | 2023-07-20 13:34:27 UTC | Doc Text | An out-of-bounds read vulnerability was discovered in Samba's due to insufficient length checks in winbindd_pam_auth_crap.c. When doing NTLM authentication, the client sends replies to cryptographic challenges back to the server. These replies have variable length, which winbind fails to check the lan manager response length. When winbind is used for NTLM authentication, a maliciously crafted request can trigger an out-of-bounds read in winbind and possibly crash it. | An out-of-bounds read vulnerability was found in Samba due to insufficient length checks in winbindd_pam_auth_crap.c. When performing NTLM authentication, the client replies to cryptographic challenges back to the server. These replies have variable lengths, and Winbind fails to check the lan manager response length. When Winbind is used for NTLM authentication, a maliciously crafted request can trigger an out-of-bounds read in Winbind, possibly resulting in a crash. |
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