Bug 684

Summary: dump/restore setuid root
Product: [Retired] Red Hat Linux Reporter: Alan Crosswell <alan>
Component: dumpAssignee: Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin>
Severity: medium Docs Contact:
Priority: medium    
Version: 5.2Keywords: Security
Target Milestone: ---   
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
Fixed In Version: Doc Type: Bug Fix
Doc Text:
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Clone Of: Environment:
Last Closed: 1999-01-20 17:31:50 UTC Type: ---
Regression: --- Mount Type: ---
Documentation: --- CRM:
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: ---
Bug Depends On: 626956    
Bug Blocks:    

Description Alan Crosswell 1999-01-04 20:50:38 UTC
Isn't setuid root dump/restore a security hole?  Setuid dump
allows any user on your system to read the contents of any
file.  Setuid restore allows one to replace any file.
Unless the programs do some sanity checking.  Even if they
do, there's no reason for them to be setuid.

bash$ rpm -qilv dump | egrep
Version     : 0.3                               Vendor: Red
Hat Software
Release     : 14                            Build Date: Tue
Jul 14 17:58:11 1998
-rwsr-sr-x     root     root      36644 Jul 14 17:58
-rwsr-sr-x     root     root      56732 Jul 14 17:58

Comment 1 David Lawrence 1999-01-04 21:00:59 UTC
I have verified that the dump and restore binaries are setuid and
therefor am assigning this to a developer for further review.

Comment 2 Jeff Johnson 1999-01-20 17:31:59 UTC
The dump/restore binaries need to be setuid root in
order to communicate to a remote host. Immediately
after parsing arguments and (possibly) establishing
the connection to the remote host, the uid is reverted
to the invoking user.

There was another minor problem, however. The group on
dump/restore should have been tty, not root. This has been
fixed in dump-0.3-16.