| Summary: | [RFE] rpc.gssd: Support new Kerberos kernel keyring cache | ||
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| Product: | [Fedora] Fedora | Reporter: | Jeff Layton <jlayton> |
| Component: | nfs-utils | Assignee: | Steve Dickson <steved> |
| Status: | CLOSED CURRENTRELEASE | QA Contact: | Fedora Extras Quality Assurance <extras-qa> |
| Severity: | high | Docs Contact: | |
| Priority: | high | ||
| Version: | rawhide | CC: | bfields, eguan, gdeschner, jlayton, nfs-maint, qcai, sgallagh, ssorce, steved |
| Target Milestone: | --- | Keywords: | FutureFeature |
| Target Release: | --- | ||
| Hardware: | All | ||
| OS: | Linux | ||
| Whiteboard: | |||
| Fixed In Version: | nfs-utils-1.2.9-1.0 | Doc Type: | Enhancement |
| Doc Text: | Story Points: | --- | |
| Clone Of: | 991187 | Environment: | |
| Last Closed: | 2013-11-25 15:41:18 UTC | Type: | Bug |
| Regression: | --- | Mount Type: | --- |
| Documentation: | --- | CRM: | |
| Verified Versions: | Category: | --- | |
| oVirt Team: | --- | RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host: | |
| Cloudforms Team: | --- | Target Upstream Version: | |
| Bug Depends On: | 1015135 | ||
| Bug Blocks: | 991169 | ||
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Description
Jeff Layton
2013-10-14 14:37:00 UTC
Cloning this bug for Fedora since we need to fix this there first anyway. The patches I have now fix the problem for the most part, but they will likely break things for people using gssproxy. Simo has a plan to change that, but we'll need to coordinate the release of these patches so that it doesn't break things. We may need to add a package conflict between nfs-utils and gssproxy below the fixed version. Ok, confirmed this by setting up gssd to go through gssproxy and set up a keytab for the unprivileged user. Because it's connecting with euid == 0, this works just fine with the original gssd. With the current patchset I have, that no longer works. So, if we take that set, we'll break people using gssproxy to acquire creds using user keytabs. At this point, I'm not sure how many people that actually means so maybe it's worthwhile not to worry much about breaking that use case? (In reply to Jeff Layton from comment #2) > Ok, confirmed this by setting up gssd to go through gssproxy and set up a > keytab for the unprivileged user. Because it's connecting with euid == 0, > this works just fine with the original gssd. With the current patchset I > have, that no longer works. > > So, if we take that set, we'll break people using gssproxy to acquire creds > using user keytabs. At this point, I'm not sure how many people that > actually means so maybe it's worthwhile not to worry much about breaking > that use case? Well this was one of the main uses cases to pair rpc.gssd to gssproxy for the client case. That said now that you chage uid most of these installations will simply be able to put the client keytab in /var/kerberos/krb5/user/ unless they also want privilege separation (ie not give access to those keytabs to the users). We still need gssproxy to work correctly for the upcoming constrained delegation case which will perform impersonation using the host keytab. I have preliminary patches for gssproxy here: http://fedorapeople.org/cgit/simo/public_git/gss-proxy.git/log/?h=alluids Ok, patches are now merged upstream. Probably best to merge these 3 commits:
23118dcce61979da9d3c007cdde1405273de2d8f
f9cac65972da588d5218236de60a7be11247a8aa
6b53fc9ce38ba6fff2fd5c2f6ed143747067a39d
We probably also want to add a directive like this to the specfile as well:
Conflicts: gssproxy < 0.3.0
...Simo does that look correct?
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