Bug 113211

Summary: should login have pam_securetty as requisite?
Product: Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3 Reporter: Steve Bonneville <sbonnevi>
Component: util-linuxAssignee: Elliot Lee <sopwith>
Status: CLOSED NOTABUG QA Contact: Ben Levenson <benl>
Severity: medium Docs Contact:
Priority: medium    
Version: 3.0CC: johnsonm
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
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Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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Fixed In Version: Doc Type: Bug Fix
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Last Closed: 2004-02-20 19:24:07 UTC Type: ---
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
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Description Steve Bonneville 2004-01-09 19:15:06 UTC
In /etc/pam.d/login, the auth management group reads:
  auth  required  pam_securetty.so
  auth  required  pam_stack.so service=system-auth
  auth  required  pam_nologin.so

I was discussing this with johnsonm, and my understanding is that the
original intent here was that if root is attempting to log in from a
insecure terminal, authentication should fail before root exposes the
root password over the wire.  That would imply that pam_securetty.so
should be requisite (to fail immediately), not required (which causes
authentication to fall through to system-auth and a password prompt,
even though PAM knows it will fail).

The obvious counter-argument is that by using requisite, it would leak
information about why root authentication on an insecure terminal is
failing, which is why we don't use requisite anywhere now.

I'm filing this bug to make sure that the current configuration is
intentional.

Version-Release number of selected component (if applicable):
  util-linux-2.11y-31.1 (at least)

Comment 1 Elliot Lee 2004-02-20 19:24:07 UTC
It's a tradeoff between transmitting the root password in the clear,
and transmitting the fact that we're using securetty to anyone who
wants it.

Since the latter is something anyone would reasonably assume anyways,
and the former is a very secret piece of information, I'd have to say
that the present setup makes more sense.