Bug 1153470 (CVE-2014-3702)
| Summary: | CVE-2014-3702 eDeploy: Path traversal in the session parameter | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Product: | [Other] Security Response | Reporter: | David Jorm <djorm> |
| Component: | vulnerability | Assignee: | Red Hat Product Security <security-response-team> |
| Status: | CLOSED UPSTREAM | QA Contact: | |
| Severity: | medium | Docs Contact: | |
| Priority: | medium | ||
| Version: | unspecified | CC: | grocha, jrusnack, mjc, security-response-team, tdecacqu, weli |
| Target Milestone: | --- | Keywords: | Security |
| Target Release: | --- | ||
| Hardware: | All | ||
| OS: | Linux | ||
| Whiteboard: | |||
| Fixed In Version: | Doc Type: | Bug Fix | |
| Doc Text: | Story Points: | --- | |
| Clone Of: | Environment: | ||
| Last Closed: | 2015-03-17 23:27:56 UTC | Type: | --- |
| Regression: | --- | Mount Type: | --- |
| Documentation: | --- | CRM: | |
| Verified Versions: | Category: | --- | |
| oVirt Team: | --- | RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host: | |
| Cloudforms Team: | --- | Target Upstream Version: | |
| Embargoed: | |||
| Bug Depends On: | |||
| Bug Blocks: | 1152549 | ||
|
Description
David Jorm
2014-10-16 04:45:40 UTC
Acknowledgements: This issue was discovered by Andrew Griffiths of Red Hat Product Security. upload.py:
# If the filename ends with a .log, we need to process it as a log file
[1] if ('file' in form) and (form['file'].filename.endswith('.log.gz')):
logitem = form['file']
logfile = logitem.file
try:
# Let's save the file in LOGDIR directory
log_dir = os.path.normpath(config_get('SERVER', 'LOGDIR', cfg_dir)) + '/'
[2] filename = os.path.join(log_dir, logitem.filename)
output_file = open(filename, 'w')
output_file.write(logfile.read(-1))
output_file.close()
except Exception, xcpt:
# If we fails at saving, let's exit
fatal_error("exception while saving log file: %s" % str(xcpt))
sys.exit(1)
# If the succeed at saving log file, let's also exit
# In fact we have nothing more to do once its saved.
log('Log file %s saved' % logitem.filename)
sys.exit(0)
1 - if the file is specified ending with .log.gz, at [2], we can write an arbitrary file
due to an unsanitized filename like ../../../../../../../var/log/whatever.log.gz if the
httpd is overly privileged, etc.
upload.py returns python code to be executed on the client:
sys.stdout.write('''
import commands
import os
import sys
import hpacucli
import ipmi
import time
...
upload-health.py
if form.getvalue('session'):
dest_dir = cfg_dir + form.getvalue('session') + '/' + dirname
else:
dest_dir = cfg_dir + '/' + dirname
try:
if not os.path.isdir(dest_dir):
os.makedirs(dest_dir)
session = a/b/c/d/e/f/g/h/i/j/k/l/m/n/o/p/q/r/s/t/u/v/w/x/y/z for fast fs directory making attack,
can return arbitrary shell commands to be ran:
'''Report a shell script with the error message and log
the message on stderr.'''
print('''#!/bin/sh
cat <<EOF
%s
EOF
exit 1
''' % error)
This is now filed publicly https://github.com/enovance/edeploy/issues/231 Statement: Red Hat does not currently ship eNovance edeploy in a product form and as such this issue has been filed upstream. |