Bug 1200927 (CVE-2015-1795)
| Summary: | CVE-2015-1795 glusterfs: glusterfs-server %pretrans rpm script temporary file issue | ||
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| Product: | [Other] Security Response | Reporter: | Martin Prpič <mprpic> |
| Component: | vulnerability | Assignee: | Red Hat Product Security <security-response-team> |
| Status: | CLOSED ERRATA | QA Contact: | |
| Severity: | medium | Docs Contact: | |
| Priority: | medium | ||
| Version: | unspecified | CC: | chrisw, mchangir, mdshaikh, nlevinki, rcyriac, sankarshan, security-response-team, sisharma, smohan, ssaha, vbellur |
| Target Milestone: | --- | Keywords: | Security |
| Target Release: | --- | ||
| Hardware: | All | ||
| OS: | Linux | ||
| Whiteboard: | |||
| Fixed In Version: | Doc Type: | Bug Fix | |
| Doc Text: |
It was found that glusterfs-server RPM package would write file with predictable name into world readable /tmp directory. A local attacker could potentially use this flaw to escalate their privileges to root by modifying the shell script during the installation of the glusterfs-server package.
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Story Points: | --- |
| Clone Of: | Environment: | ||
| Last Closed: | 2017-03-23 07:37:07 UTC | Type: | --- |
| Regression: | --- | Mount Type: | --- |
| Documentation: | --- | CRM: | |
| Verified Versions: | Category: | --- | |
| oVirt Team: | --- | RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host: | |
| Cloudforms Team: | --- | Target Upstream Version: | |
| Embargoed: | |||
| Bug Depends On: | 1362044 | ||
| Bug Blocks: | 1200929 | ||
Acknowledgements: This issue was discovered by Florian Weimer of Red Hat Product Security. We can easily avoid this in RHEL 6/7 by using something like: if (SomeFunc ~= nil) then SomeFunc(Args) end and then for RHEL 5 we can use a made up /tmp thing that is a bit safer like maybe math.random or read from /dev/random and create a string from that. This only affects Gluster packages built with the -server sub package. Analysis -------- Spec file of the glusterfs writes a file with a predictable name in /tmp as /tmp/glusterfs_pretrans_ as this is executed during installation or when updating the glusterfs package. An attacker can execute a targeted attack by replacing contents of glusterfs_pretrans_ file by malicious code to escalate privileges on the system. (In reply to Kurt Seifried from comment #3) > This only affects Gluster packages built with the -server sub package. All %pretrans scripts, which are only available while doing a server-side RPM build, use this mechanism of writing a shell script to a temporary file and then execute it. Would it be safe to assume that fixing all such %pretrans scripts for all glusterfs sub packages would be a sensible thing to do? Also, the glusterfs build on rhel 5 is a client only build and the %pretrans scripts with this security issue are available only for server-side RPM builds on rhel 6 and rhel 7. Since os.tmpname() is available on rhel 6 and rhel 7, would using the file name returned by os.tmpname() fix the security issue? This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat Gluster Storage 3.2 for RHEL 6 Native Client for RHEL 6 for Red Hat Storage Via RHSA-2017:0484 https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017-0484.html This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat Gluster Storage 3.2 for RHEL 7 Native Client for RHEL 7 for Red Hat Storage Via RHSA-2017:0486 https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017-0486.html Statement: This issue did not affect the versions of glusterfs as shipped with Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6, and 7. |
It was discovered that the glusterfs.spec file writes a shell script under a predictable temporary name. A local attacker could potentially use this flaw to escalate their privileges to root by modifying the shell script during the installation of the glusterfs packages. The vulnerable code is: -- rpm in RHEL5 does not have os.tmpname() -- io.tmpfile() can not be resolved to a filename to pass to bash :-/ tmpname = "/tmp/glusterfs_pretrans_" .. os.date("%s") tmpfile = io.open(tmpname, "w") tmpfile:write(script) tmpfile:close() ok, how, val = os.execute("/bin/bash " .. tmpname)