Bug 1232805 (CVE-2015-3228)

Summary:	CVE-2015-3228 ghostscript-core: out-of-bounbds read and write in gs_ttf.ps
Product:	[Other] Security Response	Reporter:	Vasyl Kaigorodov <vkaigoro>
Component:	vulnerability	Assignee:	Red Hat Product Security <security-response-team>
Status:	CLOSED WONTFIX	QA Contact:
Severity:	low	Docs Contact:
Priority:	low
Version:	unspecified	CC:	bleanhar, carnil, ccoleman, dmcphers, jdetiber, jgrulich, jialiu, jkeck, jokerman, jrusnack, kseifried, lmeyer, mmccomas, security-response-team, slawomir
Target Milestone:	---	Keywords:	Security
Target Release:	---
Hardware:	All
OS:	Linux
Whiteboard:
Fixed In Version:	GhostScript 9.10	Doc Type:	Bug Fix
Doc Text:	An integer overflow flaw was discovered in one of Ghostscript's memory allocation routines. A remote attacker could possibly exploit this flaw to cause a crash or, potentially, execute arbitrary code by tricking a user into processing a specially crafted file.	Story Points:	---
Clone Of:		Environment:
Last Closed:	2015-10-16 13:11:45 UTC	Type:	---
Regression:	---	Mount Type:	---
Documentation:	---	CRM:
Verified Versions:		Category:	---
oVirt Team:	---	RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team:	---	Target Upstream Version:
Embargoed:
Bug Depends On:
Bug Blocks:	1232808

Description Vasyl Kaigorodov 2015-06-17 14:06:58 UTC

Out-of-bounbds read and write has been reported in GhostScript package while processing a crafted .ps file.

Upstream bug: http://bugs.ghostscript.com/show_bug.cgi?id=696041
Upstream commit that fixes this (as per reporter): http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=ecc7a199e9307475c37fea0c44d24b85df814ead 

Acknowledgements:

Red Hat would like to thank William Robinet of Conostix S.A. for reporting this issue.

Comment 2 Stefan Cornelius 2015-06-30 15:25:52 UTC

I believe that the root issue is actually an integer overflow in one of
the memory allocation routines.

gs_heap_alloc_bytes() function in base/gsmalloc.c:
>        uint added = size + sizeof(gs_malloc_block_t);
>
>        if (mmem->limit - added < mmem->used)
>            set_msg("exceeded limit");
>        else if ((ptr = (byte *) Memento_label(malloc(added), cname)) == 0)
>            set_msg("failed");


If "size" is very large, then size+sizeof(gs_malloc_block_t) can cause
a wrap-around and "size" will suddenly be a lot smaller than it
actually needs to be.

Comment 3 Stefan Cornelius 2015-07-08 10:51:53 UTC

Upstream patch:
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commitdiff;h=0c0b0859

Comment 4 Martin Prpič 2015-07-24 07:25:39 UTC

Public via:

http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/07/23/14