Bug 1360634 (CVE-2016-6349)
Summary: | CVE-2016-6349 oci-register-machine: information exposure for docker containers | ||
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Product: | [Other] Security Response | Reporter: | Martin Prpič <mprpic> |
Component: | vulnerability | Assignee: | Red Hat Product Security <security-response-team> |
Status: | CLOSED CURRENTRELEASE | QA Contact: | |
Severity: | low | Docs Contact: | |
Priority: | low | ||
Version: | unspecified | CC: | dkholia, johannbg, lnykryn, msekleta, muadda, qcai, ssahani, s, systemd-maint-list, systemd-maint, tjay |
Target Milestone: | --- | Keywords: | Security |
Target Release: | --- | ||
Hardware: | All | ||
OS: | Linux | ||
Whiteboard: | |||
Fixed In Version: | Doc Type: | If docs needed, set a value | |
Doc Text: | Story Points: | --- | |
Clone Of: | Environment: | ||
Last Closed: | 2016-10-13 10:15:15 UTC | Type: | --- |
Regression: | --- | Mount Type: | --- |
Documentation: | --- | CRM: | |
Verified Versions: | Category: | --- | |
oVirt Team: | --- | RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host: | |
Cloudforms Team: | --- | Target Upstream Version: | |
Embargoed: | |||
Bug Depends On: | 1359809, 1360635, 1366337, 1366402 | ||
Bug Blocks: | 1360636 |
Description
Martin Prpič
2016-07-27 08:21:19 UTC
Acknowledgments: Name: CAI Qian (Red Hat) Created systemd tracking bugs for this issue: Affects: fedora-all [bug 1360635] As discussed elsewhere: This isn't really a security issue, for a couple of reasons: - machine registration is only accessible to privileged clients. - Read-only access to the the list of available machines and their properties is available for unprivileged clients, but this shouldn't be much of a problem. After all on UNIX/Linux unprivileged users generally get access to the process tree, which certainly carries substantially more relevant information than just the list of machines which group these processes. - Access is controlled via the dbus policy, and thus subject to dbus policies. The above is simply the default policy, and if more restrictive policy are required it's a simple matter of putting together the right dus XML. Thus, I believe the issue at hend is without merit and should simply be closed. (In reply to Lennart Poettering from comment #3) > As discussed elsewhere: > > This isn't really a security issue, for a couple of reasons: > > - machine registration is only accessible to privileged clients. > > - Read-only access to the the list of available machines and their > properties is available for unprivileged clients, but this shouldn't be much > of a problem. After all on UNIX/Linux unprivileged users generally get > access to the process tree, which certainly carries substantially more > relevant information than just the list of machines which group these > processes. There are users use things like gresecurity/pax kernel patches to restrict process tree only to its user or group. > > - Access is controlled via the dbus policy, and thus subject to dbus > policies. The above is simply the default policy, and if more restrictive > policy are required it's a simple matter of putting together the right dus > XML. Right, it is up to oci-register-machine developers if they would like to pursue that route. I personally agree this is a clean solution. > > Thus, I believe the issue at hend is without merit and should simply be > closed. I suggest leave as it is. The ball is now in oci-register-machine developers’ court to at least give users a choice between security and usability as highlighted in the children bugs if put a restrict dbus policy is too heavy weight a solution for them to pursue. the grsecurity/pax stuff is not in the upstream kernel. Have you filed a CVE against the upstream kernel because of that, too? Not yet. I guess I could especially in the DevOps context. There are lots of things not consider security in the past and should be considered now. |