| Summary: | 00000000-00000000 adresses in /proc/iomem | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Product: | [Fedora] Fedora | Reporter: | Andrej Manduch <amanduch> |
| Component: | kernel | Assignee: | Kernel Maintainer List <kernel-maint> |
| Status: | CLOSED NOTABUG | QA Contact: | Fedora Extras Quality Assurance <extras-qa> |
| Severity: | unspecified | Docs Contact: | |
| Priority: | unspecified | ||
| Version: | 23 | CC: | gansalmon, ichavero, itamar, jonathan, kernel-maint, madhu.chinakonda, mchehab |
| Target Milestone: | --- | ||
| Target Release: | --- | ||
| Hardware: | Unspecified | ||
| OS: | Unspecified | ||
| Whiteboard: | |||
| Fixed In Version: | Doc Type: | If docs needed, set a value | |
| Doc Text: | Story Points: | --- | |
| Clone Of: | Environment: | ||
| Last Closed: | 2016-08-25 19:42:17 UTC | Type: | Bug |
| Regression: | --- | Mount Type: | --- |
| Documentation: | --- | CRM: | |
| Verified Versions: | Category: | --- | |
| oVirt Team: | --- | RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host: | |
| Cloudforms Team: | --- | Target Upstream Version: | |
|
Description
Andrej Manduch
2016-08-25 19:34:18 UTC
This was intentionally changed with
commit 51d7b120418e99d6b3bf8df9eb3cc31e8171dee4
Author: Linus Torvalds <torvalds>
Date: Thu Apr 14 12:05:37 2016 -0700
/proc/iomem: only expose physical resource addresses to privileged users
In commit c4004b02f8e5b ("x86: remove the kernel code/data/bss resources
from /proc/iomem") I was hoping to remove the phyiscal kernel address
data from /proc/iomem entirely, but that had to be reverted because some
system programs actually use it.
This limits all the detailed resource information to properly
credentialed users instead.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds>
which was in the 4.6 kernel release.
Thanks Josh, I wasn't aware about this. However it still feels as wrong behaviour to me. I guess it would be more sane if it would behave more like let say /proc/$some_id/environ . I mean If privileged user tried to read that it would return real values and if unprivileged user wants to read that it would end up with Permission Denied or ioerror. But I guess correct place to brag about this is kernel mailing list. btw: thanks again Josh for super fast responce. (In reply to Andrej Manduch from comment #2) > Thanks Josh, > > I wasn't aware about this. However it still feels as wrong behaviour to me. > I guess it would be more sane if it would behave more like let say > /proc/$some_id/environ . I mean If privileged user tried to read that it > would return real values and if unprivileged user wants to read that it > would end up with Permission Denied or ioerror. > > But I guess correct place to brag about this is kernel mailing list. Right. > btw: thanks again Josh for super fast responce. No problem. |