The main concern in this bug is that confined user guest_t have setuid and setgid SELinux capabilities, which can be "misused" by sudo (or other tools?).
Generally, for running sudo, there are needed underlying Linux capabilities, access to other files and finally being in the sudoers file. The consequence of fixing this bug is mostly hardening SELinux policy, based on the original report. I also asked Miroslav to confirm this explanation and add if I missed something.
Based on our meeting with Lukas yesterday, we decided to fix this bug only in selinux-policy and therefore this is not bug in OpenSSH.
The openssh in RHEL6 is using special selinux user chroot_user_t which has the permissions to chroot, setuid and setgit permissions.
On the other hand the guest_t users do not need the setuid and setgit permissions, therefore they will be removed based on the selinux-policy bug.