Bug 1413343
Summary: | RFE: read and respect the system-default ca-bundle | ||
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Product: | [Fedora] Fedora | Reporter: | Pavel Raiskup <praiskup> |
Component: | openvpn | Assignee: | Gwyn Ciesla <gwync> |
Status: | CLOSED NOTABUG | QA Contact: | Fedora Extras Quality Assurance <extras-qa> |
Severity: | unspecified | Docs Contact: | |
Priority: | unspecified | ||
Version: | 25 | CC: | dazo, gwync, huzaifas, mauricio.teixeira, steve |
Target Milestone: | --- | ||
Target Release: | --- | ||
Hardware: | Unspecified | ||
OS: | Unspecified | ||
Whiteboard: | |||
Fixed In Version: | Doc Type: | If docs needed, set a value | |
Doc Text: | Story Points: | --- | |
Clone Of: | Environment: | ||
Last Closed: | 2017-01-15 09:54:41 UTC | Type: | Bug |
Regression: | --- | Mount Type: | --- |
Documentation: | --- | CRM: | |
Verified Versions: | Category: | --- | |
oVirt Team: | --- | RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host: | |
Cloudforms Team: | --- | Target Upstream Version: | |
Embargoed: |
Description
Pavel Raiskup
2017-01-15 06:27:47 UTC
This is a VERY BAD idea. OpenVPN should NOT use or depend on any public CA instances. This actually reduces the authentication level to a bare minimum. Mounting a MITM attack would then be extremely simple: Configure a new server using a Lets Encrypt issued certificate, redirect all OpenVPN detected traffic on your network to this new server and you've won. This would be a dreamscenario for The Great Firewall of China and other national routing points implementing complete network surveillance. OpenVPN should ALWAYS be configured using non-public/private CA instances, as that makes much harder to trick clients into connecting to the wrong server. I'm closing this one, as this will not be considered for upstream inclusion. I am speaking on behalf as an upstream OpenVPN community developer and OpenVPN Technologies, Inc employee. |