Bug 1575473 (CVE-2018-1121)
Summary: | CVE-2018-1121 procps-ng, procps: process hiding through race condition enumerating /proc | ||
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Product: | [Other] Security Response | Reporter: | Doran Moppert <dmoppert> |
Component: | vulnerability | Assignee: | Red Hat Product Security <security-response-team> |
Status: | CLOSED WONTFIX | QA Contact: | |
Severity: | low | Docs Contact: | |
Priority: | low | ||
Version: | unspecified | CC: | albert, dmoppert, jaromir.capik, jrybar, kdudka, security-response-team, wmealing |
Target Milestone: | --- | Keywords: | Security |
Target Release: | --- | ||
Hardware: | All | ||
OS: | Linux | ||
Whiteboard: | |||
Fixed In Version: | Doc Type: | If docs needed, set a value | |
Doc Text: |
Since the kernel's proc_pid_readdir() returns PID entries in ascending numeric order, a process occupying a high PID can use inotify events to determine when the process list is being scanned, and fork/exec to obtain a lower PID, thus avoiding enumeration. An unprivileged attacker can hide a process from procps-ng's utilities by exploiting a race condition in reading /proc/PID entries.
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Story Points: | --- |
Clone Of: | Environment: | ||
Last Closed: | 2018-06-04 09:25:32 UTC | Type: | --- |
Regression: | --- | Mount Type: | --- |
Documentation: | --- | CRM: | |
Verified Versions: | Category: | --- | |
oVirt Team: | --- | RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host: | |
Cloudforms Team: | --- | Target Upstream Version: | |
Embargoed: | |||
Bug Depends On: | |||
Bug Blocks: | 1575455 |
Description
Doran Moppert
2018-05-07 04:16:05 UTC
Statement: The /proc filesystem is not a reliable mechanism to account for processes running on a system, as it is unable to offer snapshot semantics. Short-lived processes have always been able to escape detection by tools that monitor /proc. This CVE simply identifies a reliable way to do so using inotify. Process accounting for security purposes, or with a requirement to record very short-running processes and those attempting to evade detection, should be performed with more robust methods such as auditd(8) (the Linux Audit Daemon) or systemtap. Acknowledgments: Name: Qualys Research Labs Public via: http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2018/q2/122 External References: https://www.qualys.com/2018/05/17/procps-ng-audit-report-advisory.txt |