Bug 1610539 (CVE-2018-10921)

Summary: CVE-2018-10921 ttembed: failure to check file bounds may lead to input file corruption
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: Scott Gayou <sgayou>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Red Hat Product Security <security-response-team>
Status: CLOSED WONTFIX QA Contact:
Severity: low Docs Contact:
Priority: low    
Version: unspecifiedCC: frenaud, nick, pvoborni, security-response-team
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
Fixed In Version: Doc Type: If docs needed, set a value
Doc Text:
Certain input files may trigger an integer overflow in ttembed input file processing. This overflow could potentially lead to corruption of the input file due to a lack of checking return codes of fgetc/fputc function calls.
Story Points: ---
Clone Of: Environment:
Last Closed: 2019-06-10 10:34:35 UTC Type: ---
Regression: --- Mount Type: ---
Documentation: --- CRM:
Verified Versions: Category: ---
oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
Bug Depends On: 1611686, 1611684, 1611685    
Bug Blocks: 1608880, 1610916    

Description Scott Gayou 2018-07-31 21:17:17 UTC
ttembed fails to validate file bounds before reading and seeking in the input file. This can lead to an integer overflow and the corruption of the input file.

Comment 1 Scott Gayou 2018-07-31 21:18:41 UTC

Name: Scott Gayou (Red Hat)

Comment 4 Scott Gayou 2018-08-02 15:45:15 UTC
Unembargoed due to very low impact. Upstream notified.

Comment 5 Scott Gayou 2018-08-02 15:48:56 UTC
Created ttembed tracking bugs for this issue:

Affects: fedora-all [bug 1611686]

Comment 7 Scott Gayou 2018-08-02 16:15:06 UTC
Upstream Issue:


Comment 8 Scott Gayou 2018-08-02 16:26:46 UTC
Note the following:

unsigned long readbe32(FILE *f)
    unsigned long v;
    v  = fgetc(f) << 24;
    v |= fgetc(f) << 16;
    v |= fgetc(f) << 8;
    v |= fgetc(f);
    return v;

readbe32 should be checking for EOF. The application fails to verify that reads will succeed via ensuring minimum file-lengths.
Instead, it blindly reads and fails to check that EOF is not returned. As such, large negative values are returned by readbe32.

One obvious case occurs on line 49 where fstype is set to the output of readbe32. If no more bytes can be read from the file handle,
readbe32 will return -1. A fseek on line 51 adds 8 to -1, which wraps around to an fseek of 7, which is valid. This later leads to incorrect writes and "corruption" of the input file.

All usages of fgetc should be checked else file bounds should be verified before fseeks/fgetcs are called.