|Summary:||CVE-2019-14866 cpio: improper input validation when writing tar header fields leads to unexpect tar generation|
|Product:||[Other] Security Response||Reporter:||Riccardo Schirone <rschiron>|
|Component:||vulnerability||Assignee:||Red Hat Product Security <security-response-team>|
|Status:||NEW ---||QA Contact:|
|Version:||unspecified||CC:||databases-maint, kdudka, odubaj, ovasik, panovotn, pkubat, praiskup, tomm.momi|
|Fixed In Version:||Doc Type:||If docs needed, set a value|
It was discovered cpio does not properly validate input files when generating TAR archives. When cpio is used to create TAR archives from paths an attacker can write to, the resulting archive may contain files with permissions the attacker did not have or in paths he did not have access to. Extracting those archives from a high-privilege user without carefully reviewing them may lead to the compromise of the system.
|oVirt Team:||---||RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:|
|Cloudforms Team:||---||Target Upstream Version:|
|Bug Depends On:||1766222, 1766223, 1766234|
Description Riccardo Schirone 2019-10-25 09:51:33 UTC
cpio does not properly validate the values written in the header of a TAR file through the to_oct() function. When creating a TAR file from a list of files and one of those is another TAR file with a big size, cpio will generate the resulting file with the content extracted from the input one. This leads to unexpected results as the newly generated TAR file could have files with permissions the owner of the input TAR file did not have or in paths he did not have access to. References: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-cpio/2019-08/msg00003.html Proposed patch: https://cement.retrofitta.se/tmp/cpio-tar.patch
Comment 1 Riccardo Schirone 2019-10-25 10:11:24 UTC
Mitigation: TAR archives should be inspected before being extracted and the extraction should be performed with the `tar` command or `--no-absolute-filenames` option if done with `cpio`. Moreover, it should be performed by a low-privilege user whenever possible, to prevent extraction of files that could compromise the system.
Comment 4 Riccardo Schirone 2019-10-28 15:27:44 UTC
Acknowledgments: Name: Thomas Habets
Comment 7 Riccardo Schirone 2019-10-28 15:56:47 UTC
Created cpio tracking bugs for this issue: Affects: fedora-all [bug 1766234]
Comment 8 Riccardo Schirone 2019-10-29 09:17:22 UTC
In function tar.c:write_out_tar_header() some fields are written in octal digits in the TAR header. Among them, the "file size" field is written but only 12 bytes are available in the buffer for the resulting octal digits. When the file size of the input file is greater than the maximum number that could be written with 11 octal digits (12 - 1 for the null byte), no checks are performed to detect this case and an unexpected TAR file is generated, containing the files extracted from the input file.