Bug 1802479
| Summary: | allow_execstack and allow execmem should be off | ||||||
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| Product: | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 | Reporter: | Julie Pichon <jpichon> | ||||
| Component: | selinux-policy | Assignee: | Zdenek Pytela <zpytela> | ||||
| Status: | CLOSED WONTFIX | QA Contact: | Milos Malik <mmalik> | ||||
| Severity: | medium | Docs Contact: | |||||
| Priority: | medium | ||||||
| Version: | 8.4 | CC: | jpichon, lhh, ltamagno, lvrabec, mmalik, nlevinki, plautrba, ssekidde, zcaplovi | ||||
| Target Milestone: | rc | Keywords: | Security, SELinux, Triaged | ||||
| Target Release: | --- | Flags: | pm-rhel:
mirror+
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| Hardware: | x86_64 | ||||||
| OS: | Linux | ||||||
| Whiteboard: | |||||||
| Fixed In Version: | Doc Type: | No Doc Update | |||||
| Doc Text: | Story Points: | --- | |||||
| Clone Of: | 1801314 | ||||||
| : | 2013629 (view as bug list) | Environment: | |||||
| Last Closed: | 2020-06-25 13:35:43 UTC | Type: | Bug | ||||
| Regression: | --- | Mount Type: | --- | ||||
| Documentation: | --- | CRM: | |||||
| Verified Versions: | Category: | --- | |||||
| oVirt Team: | --- | RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host: | |||||
| Cloudforms Team: | --- | Target Upstream Version: | |||||
| Embargoed: | |||||||
| Bug Depends On: | |||||||
| Bug Blocks: | 2013629 | ||||||
| Attachments: |
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Description
Julie Pichon
2020-02-13 09:40:30 UTC
If the deny_execmem boolean is enabled by default then we need to instruct the cluster team to enable the cluster_use_execmem boolean. Otherwise following SELinux denials will appear:
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type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(04/27/2020 17:15:51.461:189) : proctitle=/usr/bin/ruby /usr/lib/pcsd/pcsd
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(04/27/2020 17:15:51.461:189) : arch=x86_64 syscall=mprotect success=no exit=EACCES(Permission denied) a0=0x7fe8a4990000 a1=0x1000 a2=PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC a3=0x22 items=0 ppid=1 pid=1794 auid=unset uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=(none) ses=unset comm=pcsd exe=/usr/bin/ruby subj=system_u:system_r:cluster_t:s0 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(04/27/2020 17:15:51.461:189) : avc: denied { execmem } for pid=1794 comm=pcsd scontext=system_u:system_r:cluster_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:system_r:cluster_t:s0 tclass=process permissive=0
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# getsebool -a | grep -e selinuxuser_execstack -e deny_execmem
deny_execmem --> on
selinuxuser_execstack --> off
# service pcsd start
If the deny_execmem boolean should be enabled by default then we need to instruct the desktop team to enable the xserver_execmem boolean. Otherwise following SELinux denials will appear:
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type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(04/28/2020 10:24:42.377:313) : proctitle=/usr/bin/gnome-shell
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(04/28/2020 10:24:42.377:313) : arch=x86_64 syscall=mmap success=no exit=EACCES(Permission denied) a0=0x0 a1=0x1000 a2=PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC a3=MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS items=0 ppid=3668 pid=3893 auid=unset uid=gdm gid=gdm euid=gdm suid=gdm fsuid=gdm egid=gdm sgid=gdm fsgid=gdm tty=tty1 ses=unset comm=gnome-shell exe=/usr/bin/gnome-shell subj=system_u:system_r:xdm_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(04/28/2020 10:24:42.377:313) : avc: denied { execmem } for pid=3893 comm=gnome-shell scontext=system_u:system_r:xdm_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=system_u:system_r:xdm_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=process permissive=0
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The gnome-shell is not able to start.
Julie, Thank you for bringing this issue on improving security of our products. RHEL with SELinux is widely used in various customer environments. We cannot predict all of the impact of such important change though, so I am afraid we cannot afford to make such a change during the RHEL 8 development cycle. To declare stability and reliability, we have published the following document: Stability of the SELinux Policy API https://access.redhat.com/articles/4854201 I am closing the bz for now. However, as both suggestions seem to be reasonable, we can participate on a wider discussion if the default value can be changed in Fedora and in future RHEL major versions, and even include more booleans of similar kind to the discussion. |