Bug 195539 (CVE-2006-2660)

Summary: CVE-2006-2660 tempnam() unique filename bypass
Product: [Fedora] Fedora Reporter: Josh Bressers <bressers>
Component: phpAssignee: Joe Orton <jorton>
Status: CLOSED NOTABUG QA Contact: David Lawrence <dkl>
Severity: low Docs Contact:
Priority: medium    
Version: 5Keywords: Security
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Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
Whiteboard: impact=low,source=cve,public=20060711,reported=20060613
Fixed In Version: Doc Type: Bug Fix
Doc Text:
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Clone Of: Environment:
Last Closed: 2006-06-23 11:49:40 UTC Type: ---
Regression: --- Mount Type: ---
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
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Embargoed:

Description Josh Bressers 2006-06-15 16:43:38 UTC 
tempnam() unique filename bypass

Buffer consumption vulnerability in the tempnam function in PHP 5.1.4
and 4.x before 4.4.3 allows local users to bypass restrictions and
create PHP files with fixed names in other directories via a pathname
argument longer than MAXPATHLEN, which prevents a unique string from
being appended to the filename.

In order for this issue to be exploited, a user application would have
to use tempnam() in manner which would allow an attacker to control
the filename.


This issue also affects FC4
Comment 1 Josh Bressers 2006-06-23 11:49:40 UTC 
Text stolen from bug 195538

The "attack" described here to pass a long path to the
php_do_open_temporary_file function, which will force the snprintf() call to
truncate the path printed to the fixed length buffer (of size MAXPATHLEN).  The
'XXXXXX' characters would then be omitted from the path passed to mkstemp.

The aim being that the mkstemp call would then create a file with an extension
under the control of the "attacker" and hence possibly an executable PHP script,
rather than with the unique suffix.

But the glibc mkstemp() implementation will fail if the passed-in path does not
include the trailing "six Xs"; in that case php_open_temporary_* will fall back
on using the sytem-wide temp dir rather than the user-supplied one.

In any case, the "open_basedir" feature does not implement a reliable security
barrier between script and environment, so script authors must be trusted with
privileges of the "apache" user anyway.