Bug 2030932 (CVE-2021-44228)
Summary: | CVE-2021-44228 log4j-core: Remote code execution in Log4j 2.x when logs contain an attacker-controlled string value | ||
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Product: | [Other] Security Response | Reporter: | Wade Mealing <wmealing> |
Component: | vulnerability | Assignee: | Red Hat Product Security <security-response-team> |
Status: | CLOSED ERRATA | QA Contact: | |
Severity: | urgent | Docs Contact: | |
Priority: | urgent | ||
Version: | unspecified | CC: | aboyko, adsoni, ahumbe, aileenc, ajose, akhaire, akoufoud, alazarot, alexisph, almorale, amackenz, amasferr, amiftah, anazmy, andcosta, anisal, annelson, anr, anstephe, antgarci, aos-bugs, apaladug, apurty, asoldano, atangrin, ataylor, avibelli, bbaranow, bbuckingham, bcourt, bdettelb, bgeorges, bibryam, bihu, bkearney, bmaxwell, bmontgom, boliveir, brian.stansberry, bshephar, bshirren, btotty, byuan, caswilli, cdewolf, cfrancio, chazlett, chris.couples, christian.affolter, cldavey, clement.escoffier, cperry, cwawak, dandread, darran.lofthouse, dbecker, dbhole, devrim, dkreling, dosoudil, drieden, dsulliva, dtarabor, ehelms, eleandro, eparis, etirelli, ewolinet, fadamo, fjuma, fweimer, gagore, ggaughan, ggrzybek, gmalinko, gscott, gsmet, hamadhan, hbraun, hfukumot, hhorak, hshukla, hvyas, hyunpark, ibek, igreen, iweiss, jalviso, janstey, java-sig-commits, jburrell, jcantril, jiehuang, jizhu, jjoyce, jnethert, joboyer, jochrist, jokerman, jorton, josgutie, jpallich, jperkins, jrokos, jross, jschluet, jsherril, jstastny, jwon, kahara, kaycoth, kkinge, krathod, kverlaen, kwills, kyoshida, kzona, lgao, lhh, lmadsen, lpeer, lthon, lzap, mbagga, mbenatto, mburns, mfuruta, mgarciac, mhulan, micmurph, mirollin, mizdebsk, mjahangi, mkolesni, mkudlej, mmccune, mnovotny, moddi, momran, mrunge, mscherer, msochure, msvehla, mszynkie, myarboro, nivarma, nmoumoul, nobody, nstielau, nwallace, orabin, orivat, pantinor, patrick.andrieux, pcreech, pdelbell, pdrozd, peholase, pgallagh, pjindal, pmackay, probinso, qguo, rajukuma, rbarrott, rchan, remon.lam, rguimara, rkshirsa, rludva, rpalathi, rrajasek, rruss, rstancel, rsvoboda, saydas, sbiarozk, sclewis, scohen, scorneli, sd-operator-metering, sdouglas, security-response-team, sfowler, skaipi, skharat, slinaber, smaestri, snikolov, soutteri, sparpate, sponnaga, stanislav.polasek, sthorger, swoodman, tflannag, tjochec, tmielke, tom.jenkinson, tzimanyi, vkumar, vlours, yanmliu, yaoli, yborgess, ymittal, yozone, ytale, yuokada |
Target Milestone: | --- | Keywords: | Security |
Target Release: | --- | ||
Hardware: | All | ||
OS: | Linux | ||
Whiteboard: | |||
Fixed In Version: | log4j 2.15.0 | Doc Type: | If docs needed, set a value |
Doc Text: |
A flaw was found in the Apache Log4j logging library in versions from 2.0.0 and before 2.15.0. A remote attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters, can execute arbitrary code on the server via JNDI LDAP endpoint.
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Story Points: | --- |
Clone Of: | Environment: | ||
Last Closed: | 2021-12-16 16:56:12 UTC | Type: | --- |
Regression: | --- | Mount Type: | --- |
Documentation: | --- | CRM: | |
Verified Versions: | Category: | --- | |
oVirt Team: | --- | RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host: | |
Cloudforms Team: | --- | Target Upstream Version: | |
Embargoed: | |||
Bug Depends On: | 2030945, 2030985, 2030986, 2030987, 2030988, 2030989, 2030990, 2030991, 2031028, 2031102, 2031171, 2032008, 2032598, 2060792 | ||
Bug Blocks: | 2030930 |
Description
Wade Mealing
2021-12-10 02:02:31 UTC
Created log4j tracking bugs for this issue: Affects: fedora-all [bug 2030945] Upstream patch: https://github.com/apache/logging-log4j2/pull/608/commits Pull request: https://github.com/apache/logging-log4j2/pull/608 Another case was opened for this issue. 03100953 I will link it soon @pjindal So products outside of OpenShift are also impacted. Any thoughts on what guidance we can provide to customers in the interim. Are there any workarounds before the fixes arive ? Thanks Anand Team Can we provide answers to these questions in addition to my ask about workaround and fix timeline above. - How can we determine which OpenShift versions or clusters are affected and which components in OpenShift are effected - How is the vulnerability exploited? There are 3 Openshift cases so far today, and we need to provide some answers atleast to customers so we dont keep them in dark until the fixes arrive. Team Can we provide answers to these questions in addition to my ask about workaround and fix timeline above. - How can we determine which OpenShift versions or clusters are affected and which components in OpenShift are effected - How is the vulnerability exploited? There are 3 Openshift cases so far today, and we need to provide some answers atleast to customers so we dont keep them in dark until the fixes arrive. Hello several customers are asking for versions of components that are impacted (with in openshift 4 and 3) and also how work around documented in the CVE page (java system variable) can be implemented. Please advise. Thx We have a couple customers over here with Confirmed Stateside support asking for a fix to this. 1 customer concerned with Satellite and the other concerned about this with EAP 7.3.8 In reply to comment #32: > - How can we determine which OpenShift versions or clusters are affected and > which components in OpenShift are effected The CVE page lists the affected OpenShift components, which includes the following container images: openshift-logging/elasticsearch6-rhel8 openshift4/ose-logging-elasticsearch6 openshift4/ose-metering-presto openshift4/ose-metering-hive openshift3/ose-logging-elasticsearch5 These are part of the optional Logging and Metering add-ons: https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.8/logging/cluster-logging-deploying.html https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.8/metering/metering-installing-metering.html All currently supported versions of OpenShift (3.11, 4.6+) that are using either of these add-ons are affected. Affected Apache log4j2 Versions​ 2.0 <= Apache log4j <= 2.14.1 i.e. the new version of log4j-2.15.0 fix it Hi I have got a customer, who wanted to know, is there any impact of this vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228) on following products: Quay 3.4.6 and Clair3.4.6 ? Regards Selim Is setting the LOG4J_FORMAT_MSG_NO_LOOKUPS env variable in OpenShift (f.e. through oc set env), instead of specifying the log4j2.formatMsgNoLookups system property, a valid mitigation for log4j2 2.10+? (In reply to Al from comment #56) > Is setting the LOG4J_FORMAT_MSG_NO_LOOKUPS env variable in OpenShift (f.e. > through oc set env), instead of specifying the log4j2.formatMsgNoLookups > system property, a valid mitigation for log4j2 2.10+? Yes, this is the advised method for OpenShift linked in this article from the Mitigation section on our CVE page: https://access.redhat.com/solutions/6578421 For RHOSP13, the impacted component is Opendaylight, to verify if you are using Opendaylight in your deployment, you can use the command below to check: $ openstack stack environment show overcloud | egrep "OS::TripleO::Services::OpenDaylightApi:|OS::TripleO::Services::OpenDaylightOvs:" OS::TripleO::Services::OpenDaylightApi: OS::Heat::None OS::TripleO::Services::OpenDaylightOvs: OS::Heat::None If these return as OS::Heat::None like in the example above, you are not using OpenDayLight and therefore not impacted by this CVE. More information about Opendaylight can be found here: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_openstack_platform/13/html/red_hat_opendaylight_product_guide/introducing_opendaylight https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_openstack_platform/13/html/red_hat_opendaylight_installation_and_configuration_guide/index Note that this is NOT the default in RHOSP13, by default this service is not enabled and used, you would need to explicitly enable it using the steps documented in the links above. In reply to comment #55: > Hi > I have got a customer, who wanted to know, is there any impact of this > vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228) on following products: > Quay 3.4.6 and Clair3.4.6 ? > > Regards > Selim Quay and Clair are not affected. Quay uses log4js, which is close name-wise but is not related to the log4j project. Red Hat Virtualization ships rhvm-appliance which includes a vulnerable version of log4j released by Red Hat EAP. Once EAP releases a fixed version of the package Red Hat Virtualization users can consume the fix with a regular update via the package manager inside the rhvm-appliance. Red Hat Satellite bundles log4j-over-slf4j with Candlepin, however, product is not affected as it use logback framework for logging (instead of log4j-core). Marking Red Hat Build of Quarkus as not affected, the product neither ships nor uses log4j 2.x and instead relies on Jboss Logging, furthermore log4j is excluded from the quarkus BOM. Marking Red Hat AMQ Broker 7 as not being not affected by this flaw, the product neither ships nor uses log4j 2.x Marking Red Hat Decision Manager (RHDM) 7 as not being not affected by this flaw, the product neither ships nor uses log4j 2.x. Marking Red Hat EAP-XP 3 as not affected; the product does not directly ship log4j, but consumes artifacts from base EAP. Large customer ticket volume for fixes in rhel-6/7, i created a tracker for both, let engg take a decision and not us. This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 3.11 Via RHSA-2021:5094 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2021:5094 This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.8 Via RHSA-2021:5108 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2021:5108 This issue has been addressed in the following products: Vert.x 4.1.5 SP1 Via RHSA-2021:5093 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2021:5093 This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat Integration Via RHSA-2021:5126 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2021:5126 Are we still waiting on a release for EAP 7.3.8 ? This issue has been addressed in the following products: OpenShift Logging 5.3 Via RHSA-2021:5129 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2021:5129 This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat Integration Via RHSA-2021:5130 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2021:5130 This issue has been addressed in the following products: OpenShift Logging 5.1 Via RHSA-2021:5128 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2021:5128 This issue has been addressed in the following products: OpenShift Logging 5.2 Via RHSA-2021:5127 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2021:5127 This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat Data Grid 8.2.2 Via RHSA-2021:5132 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2021:5132 This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat AMQ Streams 1.6.5 Via RHSA-2021:5133 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2021:5133 This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat Fuse 7.10 Via RHSA-2021:5134 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2021:5134 This issue has been addressed in the following products: OpenShift Logging 5.0 Via RHSA-2021:5137 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2021:5137 This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat AMQ Streams 1.8.4 Via RHSA-2021:5138 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2021:5138 This issue has been addressed in the following products: EAP 7.4 log4j async Via RHSA-2021:5140 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2021:5140 Is Red Hat working on a fix for Red Hat OpenShift Contains Platform 4.9? When can that be released? This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.8 Via RHSA-2021:5148 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2021:5148 This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.6 Via RHSA-2021:5106 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2021:5106 This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.6 Via RHSA-2021:5141 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2021:5141 This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.7 Via RHSA-2021:5107 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2021:5107 This bug is now closed. Further updates for individual products will be reflected on the CVE page(s): https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2021-44228 Hello Team, There are multiple queries are coming from the CU, Can you please guide me for the same? 1. CU is having a cluster with 4.8.17 and using openshift-logging, so he needs to update the entire cluster with 4.8.24 or only openshift-logging? Can you please guide the channel from where he can get updates for 4.8.24? 2. As we know that our core component has an insight operator which is used by telemetry. In that case, does only the logging operator needs to update, or is entire cluster upgrades required? Question 1: Is this really a mandatory requirement to upgrade the cluster to 4.8.24? Question 2: If yes, where is this documented. (Remark: If Verbund has to upgrade during system lock-down, they need to have formal proof from the vendor that this is a mandatory requirement!) Logging has been upgraded to 5.2.4-17 on the 14th Dec. Question 3: Please confirm that if openshift-logging operator upgrade is a sufficient upgrade to fix the log4j-issue? Question 4: ACS still shows vulnerabilities on logging. Why? - What documentation has these details listed about the fixes? as our RHSA documentation [0]: https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2021:5127 say the SA is for 5.2.4, but does not specify what exact version under 5.2.4 as when I personally install the operator, I see 5.2.4-17 as the version. - What is the difference between a "stable" channel in Elasticsearch Operator which CU sees and has 5.2.2-21 version and "stable-5.2" channel and what he needs to subscribe to have the patches for CVEs. This issue has been addressed in the following products: RHPAM 7.11.1 Via RHSA-2022:0082 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:0082 This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat Fuse 7.8.2 7.9.1 7.10.1 Via RHSA-2022:0203 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:0203 This issue has been addressed in the following products: RHPAM 7.12.0 Via RHSA-2022:0296 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2022:0296 (In reply to Stoyan Nikolov from comment #67) > Red Hat Virtualization ships rhvm-appliance which includes a vulnerable > version of log4j released by Red Hat EAP. Once EAP releases a fixed version > of the package Red Hat Virtualization users can consume the fix with a > regular update via the package manager inside the rhvm-appliance. We are running: rhvm-4.4.9.5-0.1.el8ev.noarch Our question is what is the impact of removing the log4j RPM's on a Hosted Engine? We have these log4j RPMs installed: # rpm -qa | grep log4j log4j12-1.2.17-22.module+el8+2598+06babf2e.noarch ovirt-engine-extension-logger-log4j-1.1.1-1.el8ev.noarch eap7-log4j2-jboss-logmanager-1.0.0-1.Final_redhat_00001.1.el8eap.noarch eap7-log4j-jboss-logmanager-1.2.0-1.Final_redhat_00001.1.el8eap.noarch eap7-log4j-2.14.0-1.redhat_00002.1.el8eap.noarch What is the impact of removing them? Specifically, can we remove the 2.14 version without impact? Is this affected by the CVE? > We are running: rhvm-4.4.9.5-0.1.el8ev.noarch > > Our question is what is the impact of removing the log4j RPM's on a Hosted > Engine? > > We have these log4j RPMs installed: > # rpm -qa | grep log4j > log4j12-1.2.17-22.module+el8+2598+06babf2e.noarch > ovirt-engine-extension-logger-log4j-1.1.1-1.el8ev.noarch > eap7-log4j2-jboss-logmanager-1.0.0-1.Final_redhat_00001.1.el8eap.noarch > eap7-log4j-jboss-logmanager-1.2.0-1.Final_redhat_00001.1.el8eap.noarch > eap7-log4j-2.14.0-1.redhat_00002.1.el8eap.noarch > > What is the impact of removing them? Specifically, can we remove the 2.14 > version without impact? Is this affected by the CVE? RHVM 4.4.z should not install any any log4j v2 at all. See the diagnostic steps in https://access.redhat.com/solutions/6611691 for the log4j components installed with RHVM 4.4. Hi team, We have a customer asking if it is possible to remove the log4j dependencies, as comment #122 suggested. They has updated to the last 4.4.10 version and removed log4j package, but they want to remove all eap7-logj packages. |