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Bug 2063306

Summary: TLS connections with SHA-1 signatures don't work from openssl client
Product: Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 Reporter: Alicja Kario <hkario>
Component: opensslAssignee: Clemens Lang <cllang>
Status: CLOSED ERRATA QA Contact: Alicja Kario <hkario>
Severity: high Docs Contact:
Priority: high    
Version: 9.0CC: cllang, dbelyavs, pvlasin
Target Milestone: rcKeywords: Triaged
Target Release: ---Flags: pm-rhel: mirror+
Hardware: All   
OS: Unspecified   
Whiteboard:
Fixed In Version: openssl-3.0.1-20.el9_0 Doc Type: No Doc Update
Doc Text:
Story Points: ---
Clone Of:
: 2065400 (view as bug list) Environment:
Last Closed: 2022-05-17 15:36:45 UTC Type: Bug
Regression: --- Mount Type: ---
Documentation: --- CRM:
Verified Versions: Category: ---
oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
Embargoed:
Bug Depends On:    
Bug Blocks: 2065400    

Description Alicja Kario 2022-03-11 18:19:31 UTC 
Description of problem:
When openssl client attempts connection to a server that signs ServerKeyExchange with a SHA-1 signature the connection is aborted.

Version-Release number of selected component (if applicable):
openssl-3.0.1-15.el9_0.1.x86_64
crypto-policies-20220223-1.git5203b41.el9.noarch

How reproducible:
always

Steps to Reproduce:
0. update-crypto-policies --set LEGACY
1. openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa -keyout localhost.key -out localhost.crt -subj /CN=localhost -nodes -batch
2. openssl s_server -key localhost.key -cert localhost.crt -www -sigalgs RSA+SHA1 &
3. openssl s_client -CAfile localhost.crt -tls1_2

Actual results:
004C18EF217F0000:error:0A000410:SSL routines:ssl3_read_bytes:sslv3 alert handshake failure:ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c:1584:SSL alert number 40
002C61808C7F0000:error:0A000172:SSL routines:tls12_check_peer_sigalg:wrong signature type:ssl/t1_lib.c:1575:

Expected results:
successful connection

Additional info:
The client does sent RSA+SHA1 in ClientHello, but upon receiving SKE with RSA+SHA1 aborts the connection with hanshake_failure alert.
Comment 1 Alicja Kario 2022-03-11 18:24:18 UTC 
At the same time connections from gnutls:

gnutls-cli --priority '@SYSTEM:-VERS-TLS1.3' --insecure localhost:4433

do work and negotiate SHA-1 in SKE as expected:

- Description: (TLS1.2-X.509)-(ECDHE-X25519)-(RSA-SHA1)-(AES-256-GCM)
Comment 11 Clemens Lang 2022-03-15 12:06:18 UTC 
How relevant are certificates with SHA-1 signatures? According to [1], Chrome hasn't trusted them since January 2017, except for private PKIs with a special option set until 2019. The same applies for Firefox [2,3].

That, combined with the fact that certificates usually expire after a few years means that administrators that still have SHA-1 certificates haven't updated their certificates for at least three years.

I can make the change, but I'm really wondering whether we'll actually need it.


[1]: https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/education/tls/sha-1/
[2]: https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2017/02/23/the-end-of-sha-1-on-the-public-web/
[3]: https://telemetry.mozilla.org/new-pipeline/evo.html#!aggregates=3%2520bucket%2520percentage!4%2520bucket%2520percentage&cumulative=0&end_date=null&include_spill=0&keys=&max_channel_version=nightly%252F100&measure=CERT_CHAIN_SHA1_POLICY_STATUS&min_channel_version=nightly%252F100&processType=*&product=Firefox&sanitize=1&sort_keys=submissions&start_date=null&trim=1&use_submission_date=0
Comment 12 Alicja Kario 2022-03-15 12:30:12 UTC 
Browsers and the HTTP is not the only user of certificates. There may be uses with protocols that browsers don't support.
Private PKIs are also much less likely to be included in telemetry, as such users are more likely to disable telemetry.

So, given that our message is that "We support SHA-1 signatures in LEGACY", I'm afraid that yes, we need sha-1 in certificates working in LEGACY.
Comment 23 errata-xmlrpc 2022-05-17 15:36:45 UTC 
Since the problem described in this bug report should be
resolved in a recent advisory, it has been closed with a
resolution of ERRATA.

For information on the advisory (new packages: openssl), and where to find the updated
files, follow the link below.

If the solution does not work for you, open a new bug report.

https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHBA-2022:3900