Bug 2250179 (CVE-2023-47641)

Summary: CVE-2023-47641 python-aiohttp: inconsistent interpretation of `Content-Length` vs. `Transfer-Encoding`
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: Robb Gatica <rgatica>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security <prodsec-ir-bot>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: low Docs Contact:
Priority: low    
Version: unspecifiedCC: adudiak, bbuckingham, bcourt, brking, caswilli, dfreiber, drow, ehelms, epacific, ggainey, gsuckevi, gtanzill, haoli, hkataria, jburrell, jcammara, jhardy, jmitchel, jneedle, jobarker, jsherril, jtanner, juwatts, jwong, kaycoth, kshier, luizcosta, lzap, mabashia, mhulan, mminar, nmoumoul, nweather, orabin, pbraun, pcreech, rbiba, rbobbitt, rchan, simaishi, smcdonal, sskracic, stcannon, sthirugn, teagle, tfister, thavo, tsasak, vkrizan, vkumar, vmugicag, yguenane, zsadeh
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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Fixed In Version: aiohttp 3.8.0 Doc Type: If docs needed, set a value
Doc Text:
Aiohttp is susceptible to an HTTP request smuggling vulnerability due to inadequate parsing of the HTTP Content-Length (CL) and Transfer-Encoding (TE) headers. This flaw allows an attacker to bypass proxy rules, poisoning sockets to other users, such as passing Authentication Headers. Additionally, if an open redirect is present, the attacker can leverage it to redirect random users to their website and log the requests.
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
Embargoed:
Bug Depends On: 2250180    
Bug Blocks: 2250178    

Description Robb Gatica 2023-11-16 20:30:47 UTC 
aiohttp is an asynchronous HTTP client/server framework for asyncio and Python. Affected versions of aiohttp have a security vulnerability regarding the inconsistent interpretation of the http protocol. HTTP/1.1 is a persistent protocol, if both Content-Length(CL) and Transfer-Encoding(TE) header values are present it can lead to incorrect interpretation of two entities that parse the HTTP and we can poison other sockets with this incorrect interpretation. A possible Proof-of-Concept (POC) would be a configuration with a reverse proxy(frontend) that accepts both CL and TE headers and aiohttp as backend. As aiohttp parses anything with chunked, we can pass a chunked123 as TE, the frontend entity will ignore this header and will parse Content-Length. The impact of this vulnerability is that it is possible to bypass any proxy rule, poisoning sockets to other users like passing Authentication Headers, also if it is present an Open Redirect an attacker could combine it to redirect random users to another website and log the request. This vulnerability has been addressed in release 3.8.0 of aiohttp. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/commit/f016f0680e4ace6742b03a70cb0382ce86abe371
https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/security/advisories/GHSA-xx9p-xxvh-7g8j
Comment 1 Robb Gatica 2023-11-16 20:31:36 UTC 
griffon --profile triage service products-contain-component aiohttp                                   
ansible_automation_platform-2 python-aiohttp
ansible_automation_platform-2 python3x-aiohttp
rhn_satellite_6 python-aiohttp
rhn_satellite_6 python-aiohttp-socks
rhn_satellite_6 python-aiohttp-xmlrpc
rhn_satellite_6 tfm-pulpcore-python-aiohttp
rhn_satellite_6 tfm-pulpcore-python-aiohttp-xmlrpc
rhui-4 python-aiohttp
rhui-4 python-aiohttp-xmlrpc