Bug 2268268

Summary: libgcrypt: timing based side-channel in RSA implementation
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: Robb Gatica <rgatica>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security <prodsec-ir-bot>
Status: CLOSED DUPLICATE QA Contact:
Severity: medium Docs Contact:
Priority: medium    
Version: unspecifiedCC: hkario, jjelen
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
Whiteboard:
Fixed In Version: Doc Type: If docs needed, set a value
Doc Text:
A timing-based side-channel flaw was found in libgcrypt's RSA implementation. This issue may allow a remote attacker to initiate a Bleichenbacher-style attack, which can lead to the decryption of RSA ciphertexts.
 Story Points: ---
Clone Of: Environment:
Last Closed: 2024-03-08 00:42:53 UTC Type: ---
Regression: --- Mount Type: ---
Documentation: --- CRM:
Verified Versions: Category: ---
oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
Embargoed:
Bug Depends On: 2268272, 2268271, 2274128    
Bug Blocks: 2268270    

Description Robb Gatica 2024-03-06 20:39:22 UTC 
A timing based side-channel exists in the libgcrypt RSA implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in
a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve successful decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a large number of trial messages for
decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OAEP, and RSASVE.
Comment 1 Robb Gatica 2024-03-06 20:46:51 UTC 
Created libgcrypt tracking bugs for this issue:

Affects: fedora-all [bug 2268271]


Created mingw-libgcrypt tracking bugs for this issue:

Affects: fedora-all [bug 2268272]
Comment 5 Robb Gatica 2024-03-08 00:42:53 UTC 

*** This bug has been marked as a duplicate of bug 2245218 ***
Comment 6 Charmaine9x 2024-03-19 03:37:22 UTC Comment hidden (spam)