Bug 2274211 (CVE-2024-3446)
Summary: | CVE-2024-3446 QEMU: virtio: DMA reentrancy issue leads to double free vulnerability | ||
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Product: | [Other] Security Response | Reporter: | Mauro Matteo Cascella <mcascell> |
Component: | vulnerability | Assignee: | Product Security <prodsec-ir-bot> |
Status: | NEW --- | QA Contact: | |
Severity: | medium | Docs Contact: | |
Priority: | medium | ||
Version: | unspecified | CC: | ailan, ddepaula, jen, jferlan, jmaloy, kkiwi, knoel, mrezanin, mst, nilal, pbonzini, ymankad |
Target Milestone: | --- | Keywords: | Security |
Target Release: | --- | ||
Hardware: | All | ||
OS: | Linux | ||
Whiteboard: | |||
Fixed In Version: | Doc Type: | --- | |
Doc Text: |
A double free vulnerability was found in QEMU virtio devices (virtio-gpu, virtio-serial-bus, virtio-crypto), where the mem_reentrancy_guard flag insufficiently protects against DMA reentrancy issues. This issue could allow a malicious privileged guest user to crash the QEMU process on the host, resulting in a denial of service or allow arbitrary code execution within the context of the QEMU process on the host.
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Story Points: | --- |
Clone Of: | Environment: | ||
Last Closed: | Type: | --- | |
Regression: | --- | Mount Type: | --- |
Documentation: | --- | CRM: | |
Verified Versions: | Category: | --- | |
oVirt Team: | --- | RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host: | |
Cloudforms Team: | --- | Target Upstream Version: | |
Embargoed: | |||
Bug Depends On: | 2274212 | ||
Bug Blocks: | 1997699 |
Description
Mauro Matteo Cascella
2024-04-09 18:30:12 UTC
Created qemu tracking bugs for this issue: Affects: fedora-all [bug 2274212] While QEMU is an essential component in virtualization environments, it is not intended to be used directly on RHEL systems due to security concerns. In other words, using qemu-kvm commands is not currently supported by Red Hat (https://access.redhat.com/solutions/408653). It is highly recommended to interact with QEMU by using libvirt, which provides several isolation mechanisms to realize guest isolation and the principle of least privilege. The fundamental isolation mechanism is that QEMU processes on the host are run as unprivileged users. Also, the libvirtd daemon sets up additional sandbox around QEMU by leveraging SELinux and sVirt protection for QEMU guests, which further limits the potential damage in case of guest-to-host escape scenario. The impact of this flaw is therefore limited (Moderate) under such circumstances. |