Bug 2309854 (CVE-2024-44991)

Summary: CVE-2024-44991 kernel: tcp: prevent concurrent execution of tcp_sk_exit_batch
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
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Priority: medium    
Version: unspecifiedCC: dfreiber, drow, jburrell, vkumar
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Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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Bug Depends On: 2309921    
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2024-09-04 20:22:02 UTC
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tcp: prevent concurrent execution of tcp_sk_exit_batch

Its possible that two threads call tcp_sk_exit_batch() concurrently,
once from the cleanup_net workqueue, once from a task that failed to clone
a new netns.  In the latter case, error unwinding calls the exit handlers
in reverse order for the 'failed' netns.

tcp_sk_exit_batch() calls tcp_twsk_purge().
Problem is that since commit b099ce2602d8 ("net: Batch inet_twsk_purge"),
this function picks up twsk in any dying netns, not just the one passed
in via exit_batch list.

This means that the error unwind of setup_net() can "steal" and destroy
timewait sockets belonging to the exiting netns.

This allows the netns exit worker to proceed to call

WARN_ON_ONCE(!refcount_dec_and_test(&net->ipv4.tcp_death_row.tw_refcount));

without the expected 1 -> 0 transition, which then splats.

At same time, error unwind path that is also running inet_twsk_purge()
will splat as well:

WARNING: .. at lib/refcount.c:31 refcount_warn_saturate+0x1ed/0x210
...
 refcount_dec include/linux/refcount.h:351 [inline]
 inet_twsk_kill+0x758/0x9c0 net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c:70
 inet_twsk_deschedule_put net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c:221
 inet_twsk_purge+0x725/0x890 net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c:304
 tcp_sk_exit_batch+0x1c/0x170 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:3522
 ops_exit_list+0x128/0x180 net/core/net_namespace.c:178
 setup_net+0x714/0xb40 net/core/net_namespace.c:375
 copy_net_ns+0x2f0/0x670 net/core/net_namespace.c:508
 create_new_namespaces+0x3ea/0xb10 kernel/nsproxy.c:110

... because refcount_dec() of tw_refcount unexpectedly dropped to 0.

This doesn't seem like an actual bug (no tw sockets got lost and I don't
see a use-after-free) but as erroneous trigger of debug check.

Add a mutex to force strict ordering: the task that calls tcp_twsk_purge()
blocks other task from doing final _dec_and_test before mutex-owner has
removed all tw sockets of dying netns.