Bug 2364965 (CVE-2025-32441)

Summary: CVE-2025-32441 rack: Rack Session Reuse Vulnerability
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: medium Docs Contact:
Priority: medium    
Version: unspecifiedCC: akostadi, amasferr, anthomas, cbartlet, dmayorov, ehelms, ggainey, jcantril, jlledo, juwatts, mhulan, mkudlej, mmakovy, nmoumoul, osousa, pcreech, periklis, rchan, rojacob, smallamp, tjochec
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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Fixed In Version: Doc Type: ---
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A flaw was found in Rack::Session::Pool middleware. This vulnerability allows an unauthenticated user to retain unauthorized access to a session after a user has attempted to log out. This issue occurs due to a race condition triggered by a long-running request adjacent to the time the user is logging out.
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
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Bug Depends On: 2365049, 2365050, 2365052, 2365053, 2365051    
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2025-05-08 00:01:06 UTC 
Rack is a modular Ruby web server interface. Prior to version 2.2.14, when using the `Rack::Session::Pool` middleware, simultaneous rack requests can restore a deleted rack session, which allows the unauthenticated user to occupy that session. Rack session middleware prepares the session at the beginning of request, then saves is back to the store with possible changes applied by host rack application. This way the session becomes to be a subject of race conditions in general sense over concurrent rack requests. When using the `Rack::Session::Pool` middleware, and provided the attacker can acquire a session cookie (already a major issue), the session may be restored if the attacker can trigger a long running request (within that same session) adjacent to the user logging out, in order to retain illicit access even after a user has attempted to logout. Version 2.2.14 contains a patch for the issue. Some other mitigations are available. Either ensure the application invalidates sessions atomically by marking them as logged out e.g., using a `logged_out` flag, instead of deleting them, and check this flag on every request to prevent reuse; or implement a custom session store that tracks session invalidation timestamps and refuses to accept session data if the session was invalidated after the request began.