Bug 2376056 (CVE-2025-38154)
| Summary: | CVE-2025-38154 kernel: Linux kernel: Use-after-free in BPF sockmap can lead to denial of service and privilege escalation | ||
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| Product: | [Other] Security Response | Reporter: | OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport> |
| Component: | vulnerability | Assignee: | Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev> |
| Status: | NEW --- | QA Contact: | |
| Severity: | medium | Docs Contact: | |
| Priority: | medium | ||
| Version: | unspecified | CC: | rhel-process-autobot, watson-tool-maintainers |
| Target Milestone: | --- | Keywords: | Security |
| Target Release: | --- | ||
| Hardware: | All | ||
| OS: | Linux | ||
| Whiteboard: | |||
| Fixed In Version: | Doc Type: | --- | |
| Doc Text: |
A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's BPF (Berkeley Packet Filter) sockmap subsystem. A race condition exists where the `sk_socket` is not properly locked or referenced during the `skb_send_sock()` function call, allowing for a use-after-free vulnerability. This can be exploited by a local attacker, leading to a system crash (Denial of Service) and potentially enabling information disclosure or privilege escalation.
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Story Points: | --- |
| Clone Of: | Environment: | ||
| Last Closed: | Type: | --- | |
| Regression: | --- | Mount Type: | --- |
| Documentation: | --- | CRM: | |
| Verified Versions: | Category: | --- | |
| oVirt Team: | --- | RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host: | |
| Cloudforms Team: | --- | Target Upstream Version: | |
| Embargoed: | |||
Upstream advisory: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/2025070337-CVE-2025-38154-8353@gregkh/T This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9.6 Extended Update Support Via RHSA-2026:3520 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:3520 This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9.2 Update Services for SAP Solutions Via RHSA-2026:5690 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:5690 This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9.2 Update Services for SAP Solutions Via RHSA-2026:5813 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:5813 This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9.4 Extended Update Support Via RHSA-2026:6310 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:6310 This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9.0 Update Services for SAP Solutions Via RHSA-2026:7013 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:7013 This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9.0 Update Services for SAP Solutions Via RHSA-2026:7100 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:7100 This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10.0 Extended Update Support Via RHSA-2026:27731 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:27731 |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf, sockmap: Avoid using sk_socket after free when sending The sk->sk_socket is not locked or referenced in backlog thread, and during the call to skb_send_sock(), there is a race condition with the release of sk_socket. All types of sockets(tcp/udp/unix/vsock) will be affected. Race conditions: ''' CPU0 CPU1 backlog::skb_send_sock sendmsg_unlocked sock_sendmsg sock_sendmsg_nosec close(fd): ... ops->release() -> sock_map_close() sk_socket->ops = NULL free(socket) sock->ops->sendmsg ^ panic here ''' The ref of psock become 0 after sock_map_close() executed. ''' void sock_map_close() { ... if (likely(psock)) { ... // !! here we remove psock and the ref of psock become 0 sock_map_remove_links(sk, psock) psock = sk_psock_get(sk); if (unlikely(!psock)) goto no_psock; <=== Control jumps here via goto ... cancel_delayed_work_sync(&psock->work); <=== not executed sk_psock_put(sk, psock); ... } ''' Based on the fact that we already wait for the workqueue to finish in sock_map_close() if psock is held, we simply increase the psock reference count to avoid race conditions. With this patch, if the backlog thread is running, sock_map_close() will wait for the backlog thread to complete and cancel all pending work. If no backlog running, any pending work that hasn't started by then will fail when invoked by sk_psock_get(), as the psock reference count have been zeroed, and sk_psock_drop() will cancel all jobs via cancel_delayed_work_sync(). In summary, we require synchronization to coordinate the backlog thread and close() thread. The panic I catched: ''' Workqueue: events sk_psock_backlog RIP: 0010:sock_sendmsg+0x21d/0x440 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc9000521fad8 RCX: 0000000000000001 ... Call Trace: <TASK> ? die_addr+0x40/0xa0 ? exc_general_protection+0x14c/0x230 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30 ? sock_sendmsg+0x21d/0x440 ? sock_sendmsg+0x3e0/0x440 ? __pfx_sock_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 __skb_send_sock+0x543/0xb70 sk_psock_backlog+0x247/0xb80 ... '''