Bug 2402271 (CVE-2023-53634)

Summary: CVE-2023-53634 kernel: bpf, arm64: Fixed a BTI error on returning to patched function
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
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Priority: low    
Version: unspecifiedKeywords: Security
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Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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A control-flow integrity flaw was found in the Linux kernel on the arm64 architecture within the extended Berkeley Packet Filter trampoline return path. Returning to a patched function with an instruction sequence that fails the branch-target security check can trigger an exception and panic. A local user could use this flaw to crash the system when attaching programs that patch kernel call sites, resulting in a denial of service.
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2025-10-07 16:06:38 UTC
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf, arm64: Fixed a BTI error on returning to patched function

When BPF_TRAMP_F_CALL_ORIG is set, BPF trampoline uses BLR to jump
back to the instruction next to call site to call the patched function.
For BTI-enabled kernel, the instruction next to call site is usually
PACIASP, in this case, it's safe to jump back with BLR. But when
the call site is not followed by a PACIASP or bti, a BTI exception
is triggered.

Here is a fault log:

 Unhandled 64-bit el1h sync exception on CPU0, ESR 0x0000000034000002 -- BTI
 CPU: 0 PID: 263 Comm: test_progs Tainted: GF
 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
 pstate: 40400805 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=-c)
 pc : bpf_fentry_test1+0xc/0x30
 lr : bpf_trampoline_6442573892_0+0x48/0x1000
 sp : ffff80000c0c3a50
 x29: ffff80000c0c3a90 x28: ffff0000c2e6c080 x27: 0000000000000000
 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000050
 x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000ffffcfd2a7f0 x21: 000000000000000a
 x20: 0000ffffcfd2a7f0 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000ffffcfd2a7f0
 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffff80000914f5e4 x9 : ffff8000082a1528
 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0101010101010101
 x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 00000000fffffff2 x3 : 0000000000000001
 x2 : ffff8001f4b82000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000001
 Kernel panic - not syncing: Unhandled exception
 CPU: 0 PID: 263 Comm: test_progs Tainted: GF
 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
 Call trace:
  dump_backtrace+0xec/0x144
  show_stack+0x24/0x7c
  dump_stack_lvl+0x8c/0xb8
  dump_stack+0x18/0x34
  panic+0x1cc/0x3ec
  __el0_error_handler_common+0x0/0x130
  el1h_64_sync_handler+0x60/0xd0
  el1h_64_sync+0x78/0x7c
  bpf_fentry_test1+0xc/0x30
  bpf_fentry_test1+0xc/0x30
  bpf_prog_test_run_tracing+0xdc/0x2a0
  __sys_bpf+0x438/0x22a0
  __arm64_sys_bpf+0x30/0x54
  invoke_syscall+0x78/0x110
  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x6c/0x1d0
  do_el0_svc+0x38/0xe0
  el0_svc+0x30/0xd0
  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x1ac/0x1b0
  el0t_64_sync+0x1a0/0x1a4
 Kernel Offset: disabled
 CPU features: 0x0000,00034c24,f994fdab
 Memory Limit: none

And the instruction next to call site of bpf_fentry_test1 is ADD,
not PACIASP:

<bpf_fentry_test1>:
	bti     c
	nop
	nop
	add     w0, w0, #0x1
	paciasp

For BPF prog, JIT always puts a PACIASP after call site for BTI-enabled
kernel, so there is no problem. To fix it, replace BLR with RET to bypass
the branch target check.