Bug 241862
| Summary: | CVE-2007-1353 Bluetooth setsockopt() information leaks | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Product: | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 | Reporter: | Marcel Holtmann <holtmann> |
| Component: | kernel | Assignee: | Don Howard <dhoward> |
| Status: | CLOSED ERRATA | QA Contact: | Martin Jenner <mjenner> |
| Severity: | low | Docs Contact: | |
| Priority: | medium | ||
| Version: | 5.0 | CC: | dhoward, dzickus, security-response-team |
| Target Milestone: | --- | Keywords: | Security |
| Target Release: | --- | ||
| Hardware: | All | ||
| OS: | Linux | ||
| Whiteboard: | impact=low,source=redhat,reported=20070328,public=20070418 | ||
| Fixed In Version: | RHSA-2007-0376 | Doc Type: | Bug Fix |
| Doc Text: | Story Points: | --- | |
| Clone Of: | Environment: | ||
| Last Closed: | 2007-06-14 14:55:00 UTC | Type: | --- |
| Regression: | --- | Mount Type: | --- |
| Documentation: | --- | CRM: | |
| Verified Versions: | Category: | --- | |
| oVirt Team: | --- | RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host: | |
| Cloudforms Team: | --- | Target Upstream Version: | |
| Embargoed: | |||
A patch addressing this issue has been included in build 2.6.18-8.1.6.el5 verified the patch is in 2.6.18-8.1.6.el5 An advisory has been issued which should help the problem described in this bug report. This report is therefore being closed with a resolution of ERRATA. For more information on the solution and/or where to find the updated files, please follow the link below. You may reopen this bug report if the solution does not work for you. http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2007-0376.html |
Report from Ilja van Sprundel: The Bluetooth L2CAP setsockopt code has a small information leak. Basically there is a case where 32 bits of kernel stack memory can get leaked to userland in l2cap_sock_setsockopt(): static int l2cap_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, char __user *optval, int optlen) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct l2cap_options opts; ... switch (optname) { case L2CAP_OPTIONS: len = min_t(unsigned int, sizeof(opts), optlen); <-- len can be 0 !!! if (copy_from_user((char *) &opts, optval, len)) { <-- no data copied err = -EFAULT; break; } l2cap_pi(sk)->imtu = opts.imtu; <-- uninit l2cap_pi(sk)->omtu = opts.omtu; <-- uninit break; ... } So optlen can be 0, so no data is copied into opts, and so whatever is on the stack at that point will get put in the sk struct. You could use getsockopt() to retrieve that leaked data. Seems the hci_sock_setsockopt() function has a very simular information leak in the HCI_FILTER case: case HCI_FILTER: len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sizeof(uf)); <-- can be 0 if (copy_from_user(&uf, optval, len)) { <-- no data copied So uf remains uninit. A call to getsockopt can retrieved the leaked info.