Bug 2433134 (CVE-2026-24480)

Summary: CVE-2026-24480 QGIS: QGIS GitHub Actions workflow: Remote Code Execution and repository compromise via insecure `pull_request_target` configuration
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
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Priority: high    
Version: unspecifiedKeywords: Security
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Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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A flaw was found in the QGIS GitHub Actions workflow. This vulnerability allowed a remote attacker to achieve remote code execution and compromise the repository. The flaw occurred because the workflow used the `pull_request_target` trigger, which runs with the base repository's credentials, and then executed untrusted code from external pull requests in a privileged context. This could enable an attacker to execute arbitrary commands with elevated privileges within the QGIS project's continuous integration/continuous delivery (CI/CD) environment.
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
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Bug Depends On: 2433152, 2433154, 2433155, 2433156    
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-01-27 01:01:36 UTC 
QGIS is a free, open source, cross platform geographical information system (GIS) The repository contains a GitHub Actions workflow called "pre-commit checks" that, before commit 76a693cd91650f9b4e83edac525e5e4f90d954e9, was vulnerable to remote code execution and repository compromise because it used the `pull_request_target` trigger and then checked out and executed untrusted pull request code in a privileged context. Workflows triggered by `pull_request_target` ran with the base repository's credentials and access to secrets. If these workflows then checked out and executed code from the head of an external pull request (which could have been attacker controlled), the attacker could have executed arbitrary commands with elevated privileges. This insecure pattern has been documented as a security risk by GitHub and security researchers. Commit 76a693cd91650f9b4e83edac525e5e4f90d954e9 removed the vulnerable code.