Bug 2442671 (CVE-2026-27727)

Summary: CVE-2026-27727 com.mchange/mchange-commons-java: mchange-commons-java: Arbitrary code execution via JNDI dereferencing of crafted objects
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: high Docs Contact:
Priority: high    
Version: unspecifiedCC: abrianik, anthomas, asoldano, bbaranow, bmaxwell, brian.stansberry, ccranfor, chfoley, darran.lofthouse, dhanak, dosoudil, drosa, ehelms, fjuma, fmariani, ggainey, ggrzybek, gmalinko, ibek, istudens, ivassile, iweiss, janstey, jpechane, jrokos, jscholz, juwatts, kgaikwad, kverlaen, mhulan, mnovotny, mosmerov, msvehla, nmoumoul, nwallace, osousa, parichar, pberan, pcreech, pdelbell, pesilva, pjindal, pmackay, rchan, rstancel, rstepani, sausingh, smaestri, smallamp, swoodman, tasato, tcunning, tmalecek, tom.jenkinson, yfang
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
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Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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A flaw was found in mchange-commons-java, a Java utility library. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by providing a maliciously crafted `javax.naming.Reference` or serialized object to an application using the library. This can provoke the application to download and execute arbitrary malicious code due to mchange-commons-java's independent implementation of Java Naming and Directory Interface (JNDI) dereferencing, which supports remote code loading. This could lead to arbitrary code execution within the affected application.
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-02-25 17:04:54 UTC
mchange-commons-java, a library that provides Java utilities, includes code that mirrors early implementations of JNDI functionality, including support for remote `factoryClassLocation` values, by which code can be downloaded and invoked within a running application. If an attacker can provoke an application to read a maliciously crafted `jaxax.naming.Reference` or serialized object, they can provoke the download and execution of malicious code. Implementations of this functionality within the JDK were disabled by default behind a System property that defaults to `false`, `com.sun.jndi.ldap.object.trustURLCodebase`. However, since mchange-commons-java includes an independent implementation of JNDI derefencing, libraries (such as c3p0) that resolve references via that implementation could be provoked to download and execute malicious code even after the JDK was hardened. Mirroring the JDK patch, mchange-commons-java's JNDI functionality is gated by configuration parameters that default to restrictive values starting in version 0.4.0. No known workarounds are available. Versions prior to 0.4.0 should be avoided on application CLASSPATHs.

Comment 2 errata-xmlrpc 2026-03-05 13:32:46 UTC
This issue has been addressed in the following products:

  Red Hat build of Apache Camel 4.14.4 for Spring Boot 3.5.11

Via RHSA-2026:3890 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:3890