Bug 2449833 (CVE-2026-33186)

Summary:	CVE-2026-33186 google.golang.org/grpc/grpc-go: google.golang.org/grpc/authz: gRPC-Go: Authorization bypass due to improper HTTP/2 path validation
Product:	[Other] Security Response	Reporter:	OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component:	vulnerability	Assignee:	Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status:	NEW ---	QA Contact:
Severity:	high	Docs Contact:
Priority:	high
Version:	unspecified	CC:	aazores, abarbaro, abuckta, adudiak, agarcial, akostadi, akoudelk, alcohan, alebedev, alinfoot, alizardo, amasferr, anjoseph, anpicker, ansmith, anthomas, aoconnor, aprice, asegurap, bbrownin, bdettelb, bparees, caswilli, ckandaga, cmah, crizzo, dbosanac, dfreiber, dhanak, dkuc, dmayorov, doconnor, drosa, drow, dschmidt, dsimansk, dtrifiro, dymurray, eaguilar, ebaron, eborisov, eglynn, ehelms, erezende, eshamard, fdeutsch, ggainey, gparvin, gtanzill, hasun, ibolton, jbalunas, jburrell, jbuscemi, jcantril, jchui, jdobes, jfula, jhe, jjoyce, jkoehler, jlanda, jlledo, jmatthew, jmitchel, jmontleo, jolong, jowilson, jprabhak, jpretori, jreimann, jsamir, jschluet, jsherril, juwatts, jvasik, kaycoth, kbempah, kgaikwad, kingland, kshier, ktsao, kverlaen, lball, lbragsta, lchilton, lgamliel, lhh, ljawale, lphiri, luizcosta, manissin, mbocek, mburns, mdessi, mgarciac, mhulan, mkleinhe, mnovotny, mrizzi, mrunge, mstipich, mwringe, nboldt, ngough, nmoumoul, nweather, nyancey, oaljalju, oezr, ometelka, orabin, oramraz, osousa, pahickey, pakotvan, pantinor, pbohmill, pcattana, pcreech, peholase, pgaikwad, pjindal, psrna, ptisnovs, pvasanth, rblanco, rbobbitt, rbryant, rchan, rexwhite, rfreiman, rhaigner, rjohnson, rochandr, rojacob, sakbas, sausingh, sdawley, sfeifer, simaishi, slucidi, smallamp, smcdonal, smullick, solenoci, sseago, stcannon, sthirugn, stirabos, syedriko, teagle, thason, tmalecek, tsedmik, veshanka, vimartin, vkumar, vmugicag, weaton, wenshen, whayutin, wtam, xdharmai, xiyuan, yguenane
Target Milestone:	---	Keywords:	Security
Target Release:	---
Hardware:	All
OS:	Linux
Whiteboard:
Fixed In Version:		Doc Type:	---
Doc Text:	A flaw was found in gRPC-Go, the Go language implementation of gRPC. This vulnerability, an authorization bypass, is caused by improper input validation of the HTTP/2 `:path` pseudo-header. A remote attacker can exploit this by sending raw HTTP/2 frames with a malformed `:path` that omits the mandatory leading slash. This allows the attacker to bypass defined security policies, potentially leading to unauthorized access to services or information disclosure.	Story Points:	---
Clone Of:		Environment:
Last Closed:		Type:	---
Regression:	---	Mount Type:	---
Documentation:	---	CRM:
Verified Versions:		Category:	---
oVirt Team:	---	RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team:	---	Target Upstream Version:
Embargoed:
Bug Depends On:	2450275, 2450276, 2450277
Bug Blocks:

Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-03-20 23:02:50 UTC

gRPC-Go is the Go language implementation of gRPC. Versions prior to 1.79.3 have an authorization bypass resulting from improper input validation of the HTTP/2 `:path` pseudo-header. The gRPC-Go server was too lenient in its routing logic, accepting requests where the `:path` omitted the mandatory leading slash (e.g., `Service/Method` instead of `/Service/Method`). While the server successfully routed these requests to the correct handler, authorization interceptors (including the official `grpc/authz` package) evaluated the raw, non-canonical path string. Consequently, "deny" rules defined using canonical paths (starting with `/`) failed to match the incoming request, allowing it to bypass the policy if a fallback "allow" rule was present. This affects gRPC-Go servers that use path-based authorization interceptors, such as the official RBAC implementation in `google.golang.org/grpc/authz` or custom interceptors relying on `info.FullMethod` or `grpc.Method(ctx)`; AND that have a security policy contains specific "deny" rules for canonical paths but allows other requests by default (a fallback "allow" rule). The vulnerability is exploitable by an attacker who can send raw HTTP/2 frames with malformed `:path` headers directly to the gRPC server. The fix in version 1.79.3 ensures that any request with a `:path` that does not start with a leading slash is immediately rejected with a `codes.Unimplemented` error, preventing it from reaching authorization interceptors or handlers with a non-canonical path string. While upgrading is the most secure and recommended path, users can mitigate the vulnerability using one of the following methods: Use a validating interceptor (recommended mitigation); infrastructure-level normalization; and/or policy hardening.