Bug 2460736 (CVE-2026-31503)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

udp: Fix wildcard bind conflict check when using hash2

When binding a udp_sock to a local address and port, UDP uses
two hashes (udptable->hash and udptable->hash2) for collision
detection. The current code switches to "hash2" when
hslot->count > 10.

"hash2" is keyed by local address and local port.
"hash" is keyed by local port only.

The issue can be shown in the following bind sequence (pseudo code):

bind(fd1,  "[fd00::1]:8888")
bind(fd2,  "[fd00::2]:8888")
bind(fd3,  "[fd00::3]:8888")
bind(fd4,  "[fd00::4]:8888")
bind(fd5,  "[fd00::5]:8888")
bind(fd6,  "[fd00::6]:8888")
bind(fd7,  "[fd00::7]:8888")
bind(fd8,  "[fd00::8]:8888")
bind(fd9,  "[fd00::9]:8888")
bind(fd10, "[fd00::10]:8888")

/* Correctly return -EADDRINUSE because "hash" is used
 * instead of "hash2". udp_lib_lport_inuse() detects the
 * conflict.
 */
bind(fail_fd, "[::]:8888")

/* After one more socket is bound to "[fd00::11]:8888",
 * hslot->count exceeds 10 and "hash2" is used instead.
 */
bind(fd11, "[fd00::11]:8888")
bind(fail_fd, "[::]:8888")      /* succeeds unexpectedly */

The same issue applies to the IPv4 wildcard address "0.0.0.0"
and the IPv4-mapped wildcard address "::ffff:0.0.0.0". For
example, if there are existing sockets bound to
"192.168.1.[1-11]:8888", then binding "0.0.0.0:8888" or
"[::ffff:0.0.0.0]:8888" can also miss the conflict when
hslot->count > 10.

TCP inet_csk_get_port() already has the correct check in
inet_use_bhash2_on_bind(). Rename it to
inet_use_hash2_on_bind() and move it to inet_hashtables.h
so udp.c can reuse it in this fix.