Bug 2464145 (CVE-2026-7507)

Summary: CVE-2026-7507 org.keycloak/keycloak-services: Session fixation in OIDC login flow that can lead to account takeover
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security <prodsec-ir-bot>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: high Docs Contact:
Priority: high    
Version: unspecifiedCC: aschwart, aszczucz, boliveir, drichtar, mposolda, pjindal, rmartinc, security-response-team, ssilvert, sthorger, vmuzikar
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
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Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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A session fixation vulnerability was found in Keycloak's login-actions endpoints. An unauthenticated attacker could exploit this flaw by pre-creating an authentication session and tricking a victim into visiting a maliciously crafted link. By leveraging the /login-actions/restart endpoint—which processes session handles without adequate CSRF protection or cookie ownership validation—an attacker can reset the authentication flow state. This causes Single Sign-On (SSO) to authenticate the victim transparently upon clicking the link, allowing the attacker to hijack the required-action form without needing the victim's credentials. A successful exploit could lead to complete account takeover, including highly privileged administrative accounts.
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-04-30 14:59:54 UTC
A session fixation vulnerability in Keycloak's login-actions endpoints
allows an unauthenticated attacker to pre-create an authentication
session, deliver a crafted link to a victim, and claim the resulting
required-action form without the victim entering any credentials.
A separate endpoint, /login-actions/restart, accepts the session
handle with no CSRF token or cookie ownership check, enabling the
attacker to reset flow state so that SSO fires silently when the
victim clicks the link. The demonstrated impact
on the default Keycloak deployment is full takeover of the
master-realm admin account.