Bug 2482462 (CVE-2026-9795)
| Summary: | CVE-2026-9795 keycloak: Keycloak: Privilege escalation via improper scope mapping enforcement | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Product: | [Other] Security Response | Reporter: | OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport> |
| Component: | vulnerability | Assignee: | Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev> |
| Status: | NEW --- | QA Contact: | |
| Severity: | high | Docs Contact: | |
| Priority: | high | ||
| Version: | unspecified | CC: | aschwart, aszczucz, boliveir, drichtar, mposolda, pjindal, rmartinc, ssilvert, sthorger, vmuzikar |
| Target Milestone: | --- | Keywords: | Security |
| Target Release: | --- | ||
| Hardware: | All | ||
| OS: | Linux | ||
| Whiteboard: | |||
| Fixed In Version: | Doc Type: | --- | |
| Doc Text: |
A flaw was found in Keycloak's Fine-Grained Admin Permissions (FGAPv2) feature. An administrator with limited client management permissions can exploit this vulnerability to assign any realm role, including highly privileged roles, to a client's scope mapping. This bypasses intended security controls, allowing the injected role to be projected into a user's authentication token when they access the modified client. This could lead to unauthorized privilege escalation within the Keycloak realm.
|
Story Points: | --- |
| Clone Of: | Environment: | ||
| Last Closed: | Type: | --- | |
| Regression: | --- | Mount Type: | --- |
| Documentation: | --- | CRM: | |
| Verified Versions: | Category: | --- | |
| oVirt Team: | --- | RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host: | |
| Cloudforms Team: | --- | Target Upstream Version: | |
| Embargoed: | |||
Summary Under FGAPv2, the ScopeMappedResource and ScopeMappedClientResource write endpoints (add and delete scope mappings) do not call requireMapClientScope per role. An admin holding only fine-grained manage on a single client can attach any realm role — including realm-admin — to that client's scope mapping, bypassing the MAP_ROLE_CLIENT_SCOPE permission boundary. When a privileged user subsequently authenticates through the modified client, the injected role is projected into the issued token. Requirements to exploit FGAPv2 enabled on the realm (adminPermissionsEnabled=true) Attacker holds fine-grained manage permission on at least one client A user holding the targeted role (e.g. realm-admin) must authenticate through the modified client *Component affected:* org.keycloak.services.resources.admin *Version affected:* All versions with FGAPv2 support *Patch available:* no *File issue trackers?* Yes *CVSS:* CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N (7.3 High) *Embargo:* no *Acknowledgement:* Andrej Tomci Github - @andrejtomci Steps to reproduce 1. Enable FGAPv2 on the realm (adminPermissionsEnabled=true) 2. Create a delegated admin with fine-grained manage on a single client — no global manage-clients, no MAP_ROLE_CLIENT_SCOPE on any privileged role 3. As the delegated admin, call POST /admin/realms/{r}/clients/{uuid}/scope-mappings/realm with realm-admin in the roles body — the request succeeds despite no MAP_ROLE_CLIENT_SCOPE permission 4. Optionally flip fullScopeAllowed=true on the client via PUT /admin/realms/{r}/clients/{uuid} 5. Authenticate as a user holding realm-admin through the modified client 6. Inspect the issued token — realm-admin is projected into the token via the injected scope mapping