Bug 2482826 (CVE-2026-43000)

Summary: CVE-2026-43000 keystone: OpenStack Keystone: Privilege escalation via chained application credential impersonation and trust misuse
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security <prodsec-ir-bot>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: high Docs Contact:
Priority: high    
Version: unspecifiedCC: eglynn, jjoyce, jpretori, jschluet, lhh, mburns, mgarciac
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
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Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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A flaw was found in OpenStack Keystone. An attacker with a member role on a project can escalate their privileges to an administrator role. This is achieved by combining an application credential impersonation vulnerability with the misuse of Keystone trusts. The system incorrectly validates delegated roles against the victim's actual database roles instead of the requesting token, allowing the attacker to create a trust that grants them the victim's administrative privileges. This trust can then be used to maintain persistent access.
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-05-28 19:01:35 UTC 
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.2. When combined with an application credential impersonation vulnerability, an attacker with the member role on a project can escalate to admin by chaining unrestricted application credentials with Keystone trusts. The impersonated token carries the victim's identity, which passes the trustor validation check. Keystone then validates the delegated roles against the victim's actual role assignments in the database, not the roles on the requesting token. This allows the attacker to create a trust delegating the victim's admin role to themselves. The trust persists independently, and additional trusts and application credentials can be created to maintain access. All actions are logged under the victim's identity.