Bug 2484326 (CVE-2026-47065)

Summary:	CVE-2026-47065 mina: mina: Arbitrary Code Execution via Deserialization Bypass
Product:	[Other] Security Response	Reporter:	OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component:	vulnerability	Assignee:	Product Security <prodsec-ir-bot>
Status:	NEW ---	QA Contact:
Severity:	low	Docs Contact:
Priority:	low
Version:	unspecified	CC:	anujha, aschwart, asoldano, aszczucz, bbaranow, bmaxwell, boliveir, bstansbe, chfoley, dlofthou, drichtar, istudens, ivassile, iweiss, mosmerov, mposolda, msvehla, nwallace, pberan, pesilva, pjindal, pmackay, rgodfrey, rhel-process-autobot, rmartinc, rstancel, ssilvert, sthorger, swoodman, thjenkin, vdosoudi, vmuzikar, watson-tool-maintainers
Target Milestone:	---	Keywords:	Security
Target Release:	---
Hardware:	All
OS:	Linux
Whiteboard:
Fixed In Version:		Doc Type:	---
Doc Text:	A flaw was found in mina. This vulnerability involves two issues related to how the software handles serialized objects, which are objects converted into a format for storage or transmission. Firstly, a bypass in the `resolveProxyClass` method allows for the deserialization of `java.lang.reflect.Proxy` objects, which are special objects used to control access to other objects. This bypass can circumvent security filters designed to prevent malicious object deserialization. Secondly, deserializing a stream that names an allow-listed class can trigger its static initializer, a block of code that runs automatically when a class is loaded. A remote attacker could exploit these flaws to execute arbitrary code, gaining unauthorized control over the system.	Story Points:	---
Clone Of:		Environment:
Last Closed:		Type:	---
Regression:	---	Mount Type:	---
Documentation:	---	CRM:
Verified Versions:		Category:	---
oVirt Team:	---	RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team:	---	Target Upstream Version:
Embargoed:
Bug Depends On:	2508525, 2508526
Bug Blocks:

Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-06-03 11:01:17 UTC

ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy


Assessment: Fully addressed.


When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker 
for a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc()
 is
dispatched. JDK then calls the default 
ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which 
performs Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH 
interface name and constructs the proxy class â€” bypassing the accepted
 classes list .


ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in 
readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes


Assessment: Fully addressed.


For ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s 
 (static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an 
attacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the 
developer wrote accept(“com.myapp.*") , attacker supplies 
com.myapp.SomeClass ) causes <clinit> of SomeClass â€” and many 
real-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers


Both issues have been fixed.