Bug 2486933 (CVE-2026-46315)

Summary: CVE-2026-46315 kernel: io_uring/waitid: clear waitid info before copying it to userspace
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: medium Docs Contact:
Priority: medium    
Version: unspecifiedCC: rhel-process-autobot, watson-tool-maintainers
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
Whiteboard:
Fixed In Version: Doc Type: ---
Doc Text:
A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's `io_uring` subsystem, specifically within the `IORING_OP_WAITID` operation. This vulnerability occurs because the `waitid` information structure is not properly initialized before being copied to userspace. A local user could exploit this to expose stale data from previously used kernel memory, leading to information disclosure.
Story Points: ---
Clone Of: Environment:
Last Closed: Type: ---
Regression: --- Mount Type: ---
Documentation: --- CRM:
Verified Versions: Category: ---
oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
Embargoed:

Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-06-09 09:02:24 UTC
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

io_uring/waitid: clear waitid info before copying it to userspace

IORING_OP_WAITID stores its result fields in struct io_waitid::info and
later copies them to userspace siginfo. The prep path initializes the
request arguments, but it does not initialize info itself.

If the wait operation completes without reporting a child event, the common
wait code can return without writing wo_info. In that case io_waitid_finish()
still copies iw->info to userspace, exposing stale bytes from the reused
io_kiocb command storage.

Clear the result storage during prep so the io_uring path matches the
regular waitid syscall, which uses a zero-initialized struct waitid_info.