Bug 2488388 (CVE-2026-46340)

Summary: CVE-2026-46340 netty-transport-sctp: Netty-transport-sctp: Denial of Service due to unbounded memory growth from SctpMessage fragments
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security <prodsec-ir-bot>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: high Docs Contact:
Priority: high    
Version: unspecifiedCC: anujha, aschwart, asoldano, aszczucz, bbaranow, bbrownin, bmaxwell, boliveir, bstansbe, dlofthou, drichtar, fmariani, gmalinko, istudens, ivassile, iweiss, janstey, jwon, mcarlett, mosmerov, mposolda, msvehla, nwallace, pberan, pdelbell, pesilva, pjindal, pmackay, rmartinc, rstancel, rstepani, ssilvert, sthorger, tcunning, thjenkin, vdosoudi, vmuzikar, yfang
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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A flaw was found in netty-transport-sctp. A remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending specially crafted, non-complete Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) message fragments. This can lead to unbounded memory growth within the application, causing a Denial of Service (DoS) condition. The affected component fails to limit the size or number of these fragments, allowing an attacker to consume excessive system resources.
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: --- Target Upstream Version:
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-06-12 15:01:57 UTC
Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In versions of netty-transport-sctp prior to 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, for each non-complete SctpMessage fragment the handler does `fragments.put(streamId, Unpooled.wrappedBuffer(frag, byteBuf))`, wrapping the previous accumulator and the new slice into a *new* CompositeByteBuf every time. After N fragments the accumulator is an N-deep chain of composites, each holding references and component arrays; readableBytes()/getBytes() on the final buffer recurse N levels. There is no limit on N, on total bytes, or on the number of streamIdentifiers an attacker can open (each gets its own map entry). A peer that never sets the `complete` flag can grow this structure indefinitely from tiny 1-byte DATA chunks. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.

Comment 3 errata-xmlrpc 2026-07-09 15:30:02 UTC
This issue has been addressed in the following products:

  Red Hat build of Apache Camel 4.18.1.P1 for Spring Boot 3.5.16

Via RHSA-2026:37390 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:37390

Comment 4 errata-xmlrpc 2026-07-20 11:58:02 UTC
This issue has been addressed in the following products:

  Red Hat Data Grid 8.6.2

Via RHSA-2026:41951 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:41951

Comment 5 errata-xmlrpc 2026-08-04 14:00:09 UTC
This issue has been addressed in the following products:

  Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 8.1

Via RHSA-2026:50085 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:50085

Comment 6 errata-xmlrpc 2026-08-11 16:37:55 UTC
This issue has been addressed in the following products:

  Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 7.4 ELS on RHEL 7

Via RHSA-2026:53644 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:53644

Comment 7 errata-xmlrpc 2026-08-11 17:42:43 UTC
This issue has been addressed in the following products:

  Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 7.4.25

Via RHSA-2026:53806 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:53806