Bug 2494142 (CVE-2026-13622)
| Summary: | CVE-2026-13622 kubevirt: virt-handler-rhel9: kubevirt: virt-handler migration proxy follows symlinks allowing container escape to host | ||
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| Product: | [Other] Security Response | Reporter: | OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport> |
| Component: | vulnerability | Assignee: | Product Security <prodsec-ir-bot> |
| Status: | NEW --- | QA Contact: | |
| Severity: | high | Docs Contact: | |
| Priority: | high | ||
| Version: | unspecified | CC: | dkeler, fdeutsch, oramraz, security-response-team, smullick, stirabos, suppawar, thason |
| Target Milestone: | --- | Keywords: | Security |
| Target Release: | --- | ||
| Hardware: | All | ||
| OS: | Linux | ||
| Whiteboard: | |||
| Fixed In Version: | Doc Type: | --- | |
| Doc Text: |
A symlink following vulnerability was found in KubeVirt's virt-handler migration proxy. During live migration, virt-handler dials Unix sockets inside the target virt-launcher pod via /proc/<pid>/root/ paths using net.Dial() without symlink protection. These socket paths reside in qemu-owned directories writable by the virt-launcher user. An attacker with namespace edit and pods/exec permissions can replace a migration proxy socket with a symlink to the host CRI-O socket. Because virt-handler runs as root in the host mount namespace, absolute symlink targets resolve against the host filesystem, and the bidirectional io.Copy proxy relays attacker-controlled bytes to the container runtime, enabling full node compromise.
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Story Points: | --- |
| Clone Of: | Environment: | ||
| Last Closed: | Type: | --- | |
| Regression: | --- | Mount Type: | --- |
| Documentation: | --- | CRM: | |
| Verified Versions: | Category: | --- | |
| oVirt Team: | --- | RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host: | |
| Cloudforms Team: | --- | Target Upstream Version: | |
| Embargoed: | |||
| Deadline: | 2026-08-12 | ||
A symlink following vulnerability was found in KubeVirt's virt-handler migration proxy. During live migration, the target-side virt-handler uses net.Dial("unix", "/proc/<pid>/root/...") to connect to Unix sockets inside the target virt-launcher pod. This call follows symlinks without restriction. The socket directories (/var/run/kubevirt/migrationproxy/, /var/run/libvirt/) are owned by the qemu user and writable from within the container. An authenticated user with namespace edit and pods/exec can trigger a migration, exec into the target virt-launcher, replace a socket with a symlink to the host CRI-O socket, and proxy arbitrary CRI gRPC from the source launcher — achieving full node compromise.