Bug 2495798 (CVE-2026-55223)

Summary: CVE-2026-55223 c3p0: c3p0: Remote code execution via deserialization vulnerability
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security <prodsec-ir-bot>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: high Docs Contact:
Priority: high    
Version: unspecifiedCC: abrianik, anthomas, anujha, asoldano, bbaranow, bmaxwell, bstansbe, ccranfor, chfoley, dlofthou, ehelms, fmariani, ggainey, ggrzybek, gmalinko, istudens, ivassile, iweiss, janstey, jpasqual, jpechane, jraez, juwatts, jwon, kgaikwad, mcarlett, mhulan, mosmerov, msvehla, nmoumoul, nwallace, osousa, parichar, pberan, pcreech, pesilva, pjindal, pmackay, rchan, rgodfrey, rstancel, rstepani, smallamp, swoodman, tasato, tcunning, thjenkin, tmalecek, vdosoudi, yfang
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
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Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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A flaw was found in c3p0, a JDBC Connection pooling library. This vulnerability allows a remote attacker to potentially execute arbitrary code by crafting a malicious data source object. When an application deserializes this object and automatically resolves its properties, it can trigger vulnerable JDBC drivers. This requires specific conditions, including the presence of a susceptible JDBC driver and a mechanism for automatic property resolution during deserialization.
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-07-01 00:18:10 UTC 
c3p0 is a JDBC Connection pooling library. In versions prior to 0.14.0,  c3p0 in combination with other libraries, can compose to a "sink" for  deserialization gadgets. The JDBC spec's DataSource.getConnection() and  ConnectionPoolDataSource.getPooledConnection() match the getXXX() form, so JavaBean libraries treat them as "properties" assumed safe while they actually call into JDBC drivers. Attackers can thus craft malicious  DataSource objects whose property lookups invoke vulnerable drivers, then  smuggle them in serialized form to where an application deserializes and auto-resolves bean properties — triggering the attack. This requires a  susceptible DataSource/ConnectionPoolDataSource and JDBC driver on the  CLASSPATH, plus a carrier that auto-looks-up JavaBean properties on = deserialization, most commonly a collection paired with an Apache commons-beanutils Comparator that sorts by bean properties. c3p0 supplied that susceptible DataSource/ConnectionPoolDataSource, which was an  essential component of the trigger. This issue has been fixed in version 0.14.0.