Bug 2496197 (CVE-2026-55153)

Summary:	CVE-2026-55153 com.mchange/mchange-commons-java: mchange-commons-java: Remote code execution via JNDI injection
Product:	[Other] Security Response	Reporter:	OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component:	vulnerability	Assignee:	Product Security <prodsec-ir-bot>
Status:	NEW ---	QA Contact:
Severity:	high	Docs Contact:
Priority:	high
Version:	unspecified	CC:	abrianik, anthomas, anujha, asoldano, bbaranow, bmaxwell, bstansbe, ccranfor, chfoley, dlofthou, ehelms, fmariani, ggainey, ggrzybek, gmalinko, istudens, ivassile, iweiss, janstey, jpasqual, jpechane, jraez, juwatts, jwon, kgaikwad, mcarlett, mhulan, mosmerov, msvehla, nmoumoul, nwallace, osousa, parichar, pberan, pcreech, pesilva, pjindal, pmackay, rchan, rgodfrey, rstancel, rstepani, smallamp, swoodman, tasato, tcunning, thjenkin, tmalecek, vdosoudi, yfang
Target Milestone:	---	Keywords:	Security
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Hardware:	All
OS:	Linux
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Doc Text:	A flaw was found in mchange-commons-java, a Java utility library. This vulnerability allows a remote attacker to achieve arbitrary code execution through Java Naming and Directory Interface (JNDI) injection. The library's JNDI ObjectFactory can construct objects of arbitrary classes and initialize properties, which can be exploited by malicious JNDI Reference objects. This could lead to an attacker executing unauthorized code within the application's security domain.	Story Points:	---
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oVirt Team:	---	RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team:	---	Target Upstream Version:
Embargoed:

Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-07-01 21:02:48 UTC

mchange-commons-java is a Java library of shared utility classes used by mchange projects like the c3p0 connection pool. Prior to version 0.6.0, its JNDI ObjectFactory implementation (com.mchange.v2.naming.JavaBeanObjectFactory) will construct objects of arbitrary classes and initialize "JavaBean"-style properties, which for certain classes enables JNDI injection and "deserialization gadgets." Such initialization is unsafe for some classes: for example, setting the contentType property of a Swing JEditorPane to text/html and its text property to HTML containing a stylesheet <link> will provoke an HTTP GET on an arbitrary URL, potentially from within a trusted security domain. The problem is aggravated by the library's ReferenceIndirector, through which malicious JNDI Reference objects can be smuggled in for dereferencing wherever an application reads a Java-serialized object. This has been resolved in version 0.6.0.